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uth~East Asian SPECTRUM

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Anthony Short

Separatism in Indonesia
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

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South-East Asian
SPECTRUM

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Message from the Secretary-General of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization

THIS is the final issue of South-East Asian *SPECTRUM* which was launched in October 1972. It has been produced under SEATO auspices but, as stated in each edition, articles have not necessarily represented the views of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization or of individual Member Governments.

It has been in fact an endeavour to provide a forum for informed and responsible views on events affecting the South-east Asian region. The Secretariat-General has made no attempt to impart any SEATO imprint to the nature or scope of the contents of the journal, but has hoped that successive issues would contain assessments and analyses which would be read with careful attention in various quarters including official circles, academic institutions and the news media.

I should like to convey my sincere appreciation to all who have expressed their interest in or support for *SPECTRUM* in various ways. Particular recognition naturally goes to the Member Governments of SEATO, to those who have contributed articles to the journal, and to the wide community of its readers in numerous countries, not only in South-east Asia but also in other regions of the world. I sincerely hope that the journal has helped in some degree to augment the understanding of the complex security problems of the region which are the concerns of us all.

Sunthorn Hongladarom

20 July 1976

ISURGENCY: *Does recent guerrilla activity in peninsular Malaysia amount to a return to the situation which led to the Emergency of the 1950s? The author provides a comparative analysis of the scenarios then and now, and gives the basis for answering this crucial question.*

Malaysia: Son of Communist Insurrection?

Anthony Short

AT A TIME when urgent if not shrill warnings are being given that the second Communist insurrection has already begun, it y seem rather perverse to start by looking at the nt rather than the sharp end of Malaysian itics. Apart from what is actually happening — l in spite of undoubtedly serious incidents, all that ch doesn't seem to have happened this year — it worth looking not only at what the Communist ty of Malaya, in its various forms, and their porters may be trying to achieve, but also at what Government of Malaysia thinks is happening and v it perceives its position and that of its ponents.

One of the most interesting insights into the vernment's attitude was afforded during the de- e on the King's speech in January of last year. tuk Abdullah Ahmad, Deputy Minister in the me Minister's department, claimed that, objective- the main reason for the Communist failure to n power in Burma or Malaysia was because rma, like us, is free from foreign troops, and the vernment follows a strictly neutral foreign policy". e Communists, he said, could only gain control r a nation if they assumed the mantle of patriots, ging a patriotic war against foreign aggression and alien domination in defence of the nation's ependence and sovereignty. There were, however, foreign bases in Malaysia. Tun Razak was no key to any foreign Power. Malaysia was strictly tral in its foreign policy. It was a member of the -committed world. We represent, he said, the irations, the hopes and ideals of the broad masses he people.

For most of 1975, at least, the assumption that mmunism needed a patriotic war in order to ceed and, by implication, that a country such as Malaysia provided little or nothing on which indigenous Communism might feed, least of all flourish, was the more or less official attitude towards the sporadic violence of ambushes and assassinations that had been going on for the past seven years. On these premises, the chances of a successful Communist insurrection came to an end in 1957 when Malaya became independent; and with the progressive obliteration of foreign bases and the departure of foreign troops it could be argued that there was nothing left to fight for.

Needless to say, this is not how the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) sees it; nor the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which, in a very prominent message in April 1975, extended its warmest congratulations to the CPM on its 45th. birthday. As the Chinese Central Committee saw it, the CPM had "led the Malayan people in taking up arms and waging a protracted and dauntless fight, winning brilliant successes and thus making tremendous contributions to the cause of national independence and liberation of Malaya." Now, it said, it was pushing the liberation struggle of the Malayan people constantly forward by holding aloft the revolutionary banner of opposing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and adhering to the road of armed struggle. At present, it went on, the international situation was characterized by great disorder under heaven. The two crisis-gripped super-Powers were stepping up their contention for world hegemony. The tossing tide of revolution of the world's people was vigorously pounding at the old world. Such an excellent situation was obviously favourable for the Malayan people's revolutionary struggle; and the CPM would, it was convinced, enhance unity on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

* * * * * * *

THE first questions that require an answer would therefore seem to be whether Communism is a "natural" phenomenon in Malaysia and whether the source of its inspiration is essentially internal or external. Communism in Malaya has always provided the radical alternative;and it used to be true, as well as convenient, to assume that the insurgents and their supporters in the 12-year old insurrection known as the "Emergency" were almost all Malayan Chinese whose allegiance to the emerging nation state of Malaya was, at best, doubtful. Communism, and in particular Chinese Communism, was their alternative allegiance and one for which they were prepared, unsuccessfully as it turned out, to fight. Communism could thus be regarded as an alien creed. Unassimilated Malayan Chinese might support it, but if Malays could be involved as well, they were either misguided or had forsaken their religion; but, in any case, they had betrayed their community. When independence came, the State was to be governed by an alliance of Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties, but the unwritten compact was that in exchange for continuing Chinese economic power, the Malays would have political supremacy. At this time the Malayan Communist Party was all but routed and utterly discredited as a support-worthy political movement. The remnants fled to the sanctuary of the Thai border where, for years, their number was officially given as 500 and the Emergency, ended in 1960, was regarded as a dead letter.

As far as the Malayan Chinese were concerned the interests of many of them were looked after by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), the junior party in the ruling Alliance, and, in the spasmodic course of confrontation with Indonesia, with the exception of a few irreconcilables, the nation seemed to close ranks in the face of this powerful threat. Perhaps the origins and course, as well as the mistakes, of the Emergency had been forgotten. If they had, it is as well to be reminded by a Dutch historian, who taught in Kuala Lumpur, of the connection between Communism and the Malayan Chinese:

> "That the Communists switched to a new strategy clearly demonstrated the failure of the British attempts to avert the danger which Communism posed to colonial domination by either haughtily neglecting Communist, and in a wider sense Chinese, aspirations or taking repressive action and restricting the possibilities of operating legally. In fact, the authorities completely underestimated the potentially large influence which the M.C.P. was capable of exercising among the Chinese, and this not primarily because it was a Communist party, but because it was an overwhelmingly Chinese party with a proper insight into Chinese grievances and Chinese demands. The Communist revolt was the answer to a British policy which ignored the non-Malay dissatisfaction with the preferential treatment accorded to the Malays; it was also the outcome of the British failure to evaluate correctly the changed mentality of the younger generation."(1)

For the moment, at any rate, Malaysi politics seemed to follow a comparatively smooth a constitutional course and apart from the trauma Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia there were great crises of accommodation between one comm nity and another. Perhaps the warning signs w already there: most particularly in the Labour Pa which, in spite of its annual subscription of detain to Special Branch, was essentially taken over Chinese-educated Chinese radicals to the point wh it became virtually an extension of the Commun Party of Malaya and one which was following fairly aggressive Peking line at the time. Such a might not have commended itself to the elector and, in the event, the Labour Party, by boycotti the 1969 election, did not care to put it to the te But the Democratic Action Party (DAP) — in ori the Singapore PAP (People's Action Party) sail under Malaysian colours — did, and increasin contended with the MCA for the allegiance and i sense the protectorate of the Chinese-educated Ma yan Chinese. To this end it became more explici communal in its appeal, particularly in the Chin medium, and more of a challenge, perhaps calcul ed, to the special position of the Malays. Commu parties, in the DAP programme, were to abolished and their place taken by truly multi-rac parties. There was to be no more distinction betwe indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants; a perhaps most sinister of all from the Malay point view, the Malay Regiment — by definition racist would also have to give way to multi-racial units. a party interested in the exercise rather than in theory of power, the DAP had looked for immediate base in the area of existing Chin discontent; and while, in terms of total votes, it beaten into third place by the Pan-Malayan Islan Party, it is worth remembering that the Allian parties themselves polled less than half the total vo cast.

What happened then, the tragedy of 13 M and its communal killings, has been a matter sadness, recrimination and sober reflection e since. In terms of more or less legitimate opposit to a government which first suspended and t reconvened parliament the major consequence that the most explosive — and the most fundamen — issues were excluded as subjects of politi debate; and when, in the 1974 elections, the Allia won control of all thirteen state assemblies and

ıt of 154 seats in the federal parliament, the results ight seem not only to justify the argument for but so to establish in practice the principle of the ıe-party state, — that is, if one assumes that the ›vernment adequately and properly represents the terests of all the citizens, of all races and of all asses and that, if it does not, there is the ospect of a change of government. In Malaysia, ›wever, it must seem that there is no such prospect ıd, although the example of Sweden suggests that it ›uld be foolish to judge democracy and freedom by is criterion, there is, nevertheless, a possible nnection between the decline of effective parliaentary opposition and the acts of political violence the last seven or eight years. It may be argued at the opposition parties have no one but themves to blame for this state of affairs but they have ıdoubtedly found themselves in a cruel dilemma. ery often when they have been successful they have en swallowed up by government in coalition rangements, which means they have ceased to play eir role as opposition. Where they have been successful they have dissolved. Those which remain e more or less socialist, have tended to be ddle-class, and are somewhat self-conscious upders of representative government in the Western litical tradition. Their function as critics of vernment is circumscribed by the necessity of bscribing to *Ruku Negara,* the national principles, d the definition of sedition that now includes ›ughts as well as words and deeds. Criticism is still ered of government policies but there is little idence of their influence upon the course of events. arly everyone — or at least every outsider — used agree that what Malaysia needed was an effective position party and that, to be effective, it must be th moderate and non-communal. Unfortunately, wever, parties which have these admirable qualities ıd to be ineffective in commanding electoral ›port and, given the presuppositions of the domint Alliance, the outstanding political issues tend to come identified either with communal politics or e, at the limits of far-left socialism, move off the nstitutional scale altogether.

Which is not to suggest that the Communist rty of Malaya is a frustrated constitutional party, hough it must often have occurred to them, as to ›st genuine revolutionary Communist parties, how ıch more they could achieve if, when the opporıity arose, they were allowed to exchange the ned for the parliamentary struggle and *vice versa.* enty years ago in fact this was obviously their ention and in the peace talks that were held, nificantly, at Baling in 1954 — still one of the ıtres of Communist activity and currently under rfew — the real argument between Chin Peng and ınku Abdul Rahman was whether the Communist errillas would lay down their arms, and be owed, in exchange, to organize as a *bona fide* litical party. Today it sounds rather like sour grapes when the *Voice of Malayan Revolution* laments the serious setback that was suffered when the Party followed the "Right" opportunist line under pressure from Khrushchev and Liu Shao Chi, even though in compensation they claim that British imperialism was forced to change the form of rule by announcing nominal independence with a puppet clique in power with British support.

* * * * * * *

BUT IN 1961, in the Party's own account, they returned to the way of righteousness and to the armed struggle. Their announced plan is to surround the cities, form a united front of workers and peasants, overthrow the reactionary role of British imperialism and the landlord and bureaucratic bourgeois class, and establish the Malayan People's Republic. The question to be asked now is what success they have had in this over the past fifteen years. Even if one only looks at the record since their first major success in June 1968 it is not very impressive as far as overt activity is concerned and reported Government casualties. Admittedly, overt activity is no infallible criterion; and while the occasional spectacular success may help to bolster morale and sustain the otherwise rather threadbare assertions from the *Voice of Malayan Revolution* that the revolution has already begun, the real success — or failure — will have been in creating an infra-structure of guerrilla and Communist supporters. However in June 1968, on the twentieth anniversary of the start of the Emergency, an ambush near Kroh, on the Thai border, succeeded in killing eighteen Malay policemen, — an incident that would have put it amongst the worst of the Emergency. Since then there have been bursts of activity, one of them occurring in August/September of last year. Most of the incidents then — a river ambush on the Sungei Perak in which four men were killed, six wounded in an ambush of a police Landrover on the Kroh-Baling road, a bomb explosion at Grik, and another successful ambush on the Betong-Kroh road — took place in Northern Malaya in what could be called, somewhat loosely, the border area. The two most spectacular, however, took place in Kuala Lumpur itself. One, essentially symbolic in its outcome, involved damage to the National Monument, which commemorates the dead of the first Emergency, but was apparently launched by the Marxist-Leninist faction of the CPM who now call themselves the Malayan National Liberation Front. It is this group which dismisses the old CPM as "a handful of counter-revolutionary revisionists" and one might assume therefore that the attack on the National Monument was undertaken for internal as well as external reasons.

On 3 September last year, however, a very cool and more serious attack was made on the brigade headquarters of the Police Field Force by a couple of

terrorists who lobbed grenades over the fence killing two police and wounding another fifty. In November an even more spectacular success was the lunchtime killing of Perak's Chief Police Officer, Datuk Khoo Chong Kong by two youths in school uniform. Khoo had been one of the most successful counter-insurgency officers in Sarawak. The Inspector General of Police said it would be difficult to replace him — a senior Chinese police officer in a largely Chinese state — and one of the names that may have been suggested was that of Deputy Superintendent Kulasingam, who was shot and seriously wounded in Kuala Lumpur ten days later. These particular killings were the latest in a series which had eliminated half a dozen or more Special Branch officers and were obviously intended to blunt the point of the Government's most effective counter-guerrilla weapon. Overall, it has been suggested that these and similar attacks — against the Royal Malayan Airforce in Kuala Lumpur, against the 5th. Rangers at Port Dickson, and on a base of the Police Field Force in Johore — are intended to undermine public confidence in the Security Forces and, perhaps more important, to damage the morale of the police and services. It has also been suggested by a London Sunday newspaper that more than a hundred troops were killed in 1975 — which presumably includes Police as well — and if this figure were true then the situation is more serious than the Government has so far admitted. Nevertheless, the main pattern of incidents is fairly close to the border and it is tempting to introduce the concept of geo-politics and the axiom that whoever holds the middle ground — a hundred miles either side of the Thai-Malaysian border — will hold the key to the stability of both Thailand and Malaysia. Like Pahang, and the belt of "white areas" — which were free of Communist guerrillas — that was established across Malaya during the Emergency, this border belt would seem to be critical for the future of the Malay peninsula. On the Malaysian side two features stand out. First, that most attacks now seem to be **launched** from Thailand. Second, that, at least in upper Perak, the Security Forces have lost the initiative and advantages they had ten years ago. When the Emergency ended the number of border terrorists was, for years, given as a round 500. Now the number is given, very precisely, as 2,054 of whom 732 are said to be Malaysian Chinese, 661 are Thai Chinese, 107 are Malay, 509 Thai Malay, and the remaining 13 are said to include 2 Japanese. The latter might one day be interested to meet some of the Japanese presently working at the site of the Temenggor dam. So far, however, the only contact was a shooting incident in December 1974 which gave some theatrical point to a warning delivered to the Japanese Ambassador by the Malayan National Liberation Front that his country should dissociate itself from the project.

The Temenggor river was, incidentally, the site of one of the bloodiest ambushes and most he battles of the Emergency from which the M Regiment emerged with great credit. The jungle Upper Perak and Kelantan are some of the wi and most inaccessible in the country; but altho they could hardly be called a liberated area — t is practically nothing and no one to liberate — were the refuge of a handful of Malaysian guer who had integrated themselves with the shi tribes of aborigines. From the guerrilla point of the inaccessibility of the Malaysian side of the bo is now threatened by the East-West highway and increased mobility for Security Forces, and settlement in the area of police and army ex-ser men and their families. On a large scale, para-military homesteading might be the big threat of all to the guerrilla's freedom of movem But it is essentially long-term and in the meanti there are the more immediate prizes to be ha effective border co-operation between Thai Malaysian forces. This may be a critical issue an certainly a very sensitive one(2). On the one h Malaysian authorities almost invariably profess satisfaction with arrangements and with mee that have been held. On the other hand, there is reported concern with "the inconsistent co-ord tion, motivation and morale of the Thai Army":

> "Despite official claims of successful joint border operations between Thais and Malaysians the fact remains that border co-operation so far as effective anti-insurgency measures are concerned is lamentable. And while this state of affairs exists, Thai and Malaysian units will continue to be beaten by the terrorists at every encounter."(3)

It has also been said that whereas low level small scale co-operation between Malaysian P Field Force and Thai units has often been exce in the past, now that operations are on an en different scale it is the co-ordination that br down and the overall direction which is mis Analogies with the Emergency period are not fruitful. In those days, there was much more lat for Police jungle squads to operate on an *ad* basis up to 15 miles on the Thai side of the bo while joint Malayan/Thai Special Branch teams established at Songkhla, Sadao and Betong. It understood, however, that the absorption of the police and services in politics in Bangkok detr greatly from the possibilities of effective action i South although the point was eventually rea when Malayan guerrillas could not enjoy unharr R and R once they were over the border. Pol directives from Bangkok and the determination which they are carried out, as well as the pol balance between various Thai forces, are obvi important factors, but as far as operations concerned perhaps the main lesson of the Emerg

ıow important it was that operational boundaries uld coincide with the operational boundaries of target organization. Too often they covered too ıll an area and the consequence was that the rrilla fighting formation moved away from the nt of attack and yet still remained within reach of ir own supply and intelligence organization.

The problems of conducting trans-border opeions must be enormous, even on the military level, l one would assume that, on the Malaysian side at rate, it has the highest priority. If, in effect, the thern provinces lie outside the range of Thai ninistration then the prospects for Malaysian ırity are diminished to that extent. During the ergency most of the few weapons that came into laya from outside the country were acquired in ailand. Today, the enormous surpluses of war terial left over from the Vietnamese war would, if oduced into Malaya, create at least the potential an effective insurrection. In 1948, and indeed for ıt of the insurgency, the Malayan guerrillas were short of weapons, in marked contrast to the ations in Indonesia and Vietnam in 1945. Now, it aid, it is possible to buy almost any weapon one ıts in Thailand although, in spite of evidence of mines, explosives and booby traps, there has n little evidence of the M.16s and AK.47s which guerrillas are now said to possess. Nevertheless, prospect of a flood of weapons from Thailand — ırate, short-range rocket launchers that would ify the Security Forces' advantage in armoured — would be particularly unnerving even though, ke the DMZ in Vietnam, there is no prospect of eady supply along an alternative land route that provided by the Ho Chi Minh trails.

* * * * * * *

WHAT, from the Malaysian point of view, must be almost as worrying as the trans-border at is the existence of Moslem guerrillas. For the der area the Malaysians themselves give a ratio of o 1 by which Thai Moslems outnumber Malay slem guerrillas; and the immediate contrast with Emergency is that there was then virtually no ay guerrilla problem in Kelantan. That it is a blem today must be reckoned to be one of the M's successes. It is a success based first upon the loitation of a local situation and, second, on the ty's gamble in the wake of the May '69 ımunal conflict *not* to exploit the racial issue but ırgue instead that the national struggle was to be natter of class rather than race. The Central nmittee of the CPM had in fact condemned ay chauvinism. But the issue of special Malay ıts was interpreted as rights for a handful of eaucrats and landlords of Malay nationality, — a which may not have seemed very promising at time but which, in spite of government policies had been designed to improve the identifiably Malay sector of the community, has not always been fast enough to ensure the allegiance of all the Malays. Reports of a new 400-man strong Malay regiment of guerrillas may well be exaggerated although individual instances of unemployed Malay Regiment ex-servicemen joining the guerrillas gives some cause for alarm; and, again, the experience of the Emergency suggests that, while there was indeed a Malay guerrilla component to the insurrection, the 10th. Regiment based on Pahang, it was one which was comparatively easy to contain, was virtually unintegrated into the general offensive, and, in the end, was badly let down by the hard core of Chinese guerrillas. In revolutionary situations there is, arguably, no obvious connection between the direst poverty and the violence of political protest. Nevertheless, the Malay 10th. Regiment had its origins in the squalor of the riverine *kampongs* of Pahang, in spite of all the built-in restraints of religion and a benevolent Sultan. If, as the Malaysian Prime Minister has said, Malays should become involved with the guerrillas in large numbers it would be very serious if not disastrous but, at the moment, this problem has hardly reached critical proportions(4).

* * * * * * *

ONE returns therefore to the threat of a renewed insurrection as essentially a Malaysian Chinese problem. In a recent book on problems of independence in postwar South-east Asia(5), Professor John F. Cady has suggested that, at the constitutional level, in 1969 the Government ignored the longterm causes of political unrest. The leadership of the United Malaysian National Organization (UMNO) was unwilling or unable to heed the criticism registered at the polls and to adjust its personnel and policies in order to reduce the growing dissatisfaction. In summarizing the evidence presented in an earlier study on surrendered guerrillas during the Emergency(6), he also suggests a fact that may be more relevant to present day experience:

> "Most of the surrendered youths who were interviewed ranged from ages 20 to 23. They were drawn as a rule not from peasant or worker families, but from teenage rebel groups who had broken with traditional ties and with such political organizations as secret societies or trade unions. Their primary objective was to find opportunity for social mobility commensurate with their educational achievement and personal sophistication. Only a peasant mentality, they reasoned, would give precedence to such traditional virtues as patience, diligence and industry. Rebel recruits were interested in career prospects, in finding release from the frustration of inactivity, and in the possible achievement of personal dignity through

peer-group participation in the worldwide capital Communist revolution. Disciplined exposure to the regimen of self-accusation and cleansing from bourgeois errors might conceivably contribute significance to an otherwise discouraging personal and social environment. Such persons were little interested in religion, ethics or philosophical problems, and equally contemptuous of poetry and literature. The majority of them prized shrewdness over intellectual acumen, and skilful employment of violence over idealistic concerns."(7)

It is easy to poke fun at some of these assumptions. And one may wonder, with the Editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review,* where "a contemporary revolutionary leader could find young people so resentful of injustice and so hardened in ideological dedication to a cause that an army could be formed willing to fight years for a distant promise of distant victory"(8). Nevertheless, and again allowing for exaggeration, there are reports that over the past year thousands of young men have vanished from the Chinese "New Villages" that were created as resettlement areas for rural and suburban Chinese during the Emergency. Some, it is said, belong to the invisible community of 250,000 stateless Chinese whose parents failed to apply for citizenship at the time of independence; and, even though it may reasonably be assumed that many of them have in fact simply moved to the towns, it is from this sort of catchment area that potential guerrillas are to be found.

The resettlement of Chinese "squatters" was the most imaginative act of the whole Emergency and, at that time, the greatest social engineering project in the whole of South-east Asia. Their success was a result of localizing and particularizing the guerrillas' main sources of supply and support. Control was by no means perfect but many, in the end, became so reliable that they defended themselves against guerrilla attacks. Until they could be relied on, or until an intelligence framework could be painstakingly assembled that would cover the whole village and pinpoint the guerrilla suppliers and supporters, the Emergency continued; but as long as the guerrillas had any hope of winning some kind of victory and until they had to abandon the settled areas altogether, the New Villages provided the main points of contact and the approaches to them became the killing ground of the Emergency.

Contrary to some expectations, the New Villages did not break up when the Emergency ended; but keeping them together was something that could not go by default. Over the last 15 years however they have, on the whole, suffered from neglect, although from time to time political parties — first the Malayan Chinese Association, now the DAP — have made them an object of attention or a source of potential support. Present discontents focus u[pon] unemployment, land titles and self-government. [Ori]ginally the normal term given for land was 30 t[o] years but it seems that much more land has [been] been brought into cultivation: some of it ill[egally] some of it on a share-cropping basis and so [on] renewed annually, on the basis of a certificat[e of] Temporary Occupation of Land. It is per[haps] significant that the *Voice of Malayan Revolu[tion]* recently set out a 17-point land reform scheme w[hich] promised to put an end to feudal and semi-fe[udal] exploitation. In the meantime, and until governm[ents] might feel strong enough to tackle the commu[nal] sensitive issue of the alienation of what is nearly [all] technically Malay land, it will almost certainly [be] to do something to improve the practice of [local] commitment to local government. It may only [have] been a process of rationalization but it may also [have] been an unfortunate decision to abolish all form[s of] local authority in Malaysia. Studies by a R[oyal] Commission said the Government had appare[ntly] shown that it was unnecessary and could safely [be] taken over by the State governments. For a cont[rary] opinion expressed during the Emergency it is w[orth] quoting from a memorandum by Sir Robert Tho[mp]son, one of the foremost authorities on cou[nter] insurgency, who was then the Secretary for Chi[nese] Affairs in Johore:

> "The workings of municipalities, State and Settlement Council, the Federal Legislative Council and the Member system are far above the heads of dwellers in villages and settlements, and even although some may acquire the right to vote in due course they are not likely to display the least interest in the franchise or for democracy in action, because they have had so little, if any, personal contact with it. If, however, the ordinary person can see exactly the same system working in his Village (or Settlement) Board as works in the Council, then he will have a better chance of understanding democracy and his own responsibilities to democracy. Furthermore if the normal method of appointment to Village Boards is by popular election in which every resident adult has a vote and is himself eligible for election, no matter if he be alien or not, then the effect will be to teach those aliens who are not Federal citizens or subjects of the Ruler the advantages of democracy and the civic responsibilities under it."

Now that there are signs of growing disaf[fec]tion in many of the New Villages, the Governm[ent] may be seen as a victim of its own policies

elerated development for the Malays and in the ıe dilemma that it experienced during the Emer- cy when there was understandable resentment t the condition of the Chinese, whose allegiance the country was in considerable doubt, should be proved while that of the Malays, whose allegiance taken for granted, would be that much worse Perhaps these are just problems of modernization l development in a plural society, but when they ur at the edge of the distinction between peace l war there is that much less room for mistakes.

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DISAFFECTION, however, is hardly the same thing as insurrection; but even if the causes of ontent are reduced, and even if, as has been med, the Government finds no "objective" unds for a revolutionary struggle, this is not to that "objectively" the CPM and the CCP think e are none. In November 1969 the *Voice of layan Revolution* began its broadcasting from ınan and, like the *Voice of the People of ıiland,* with whom it sometimes shares its adcasts and with whom it may be sharing its ısmitters, it supports the revolutionary struggle. In it seems to reflect the opinion of the CCP rather ı the Government of the Peoples' Republic; and, le this makes for fascinating academic analysis, it matter of immediate and urgent concern to the aysian Government. In May 1974, in a major omatic breakthrough for the whole region, aysia entered into an accord with the People's ublic of China which stated that "the two ernments consider all foreign aggression, interfer- e, control and subversion to be impermissible". v the PRC square this with the existence of the *ce of Malayan Revolution* they have yet to ain. Meanwhile, Malaysia has protested that such adcasts were contrary to the assurance of Chair- ı Mao on the problems of Malayan Communism that Tun Razak had been assured that it was an rnal matter for Malaysia to deal with as it ight best.

However, an article last year in the *Frankfurter emeine Zeitung* carried a speech, already de- nced as a forgery, by Deputy Premier Chiao n-hua, in which he is purported to have ained to worried Party cadres, presumably an- is for a little more action, that while China nised not to interfere with the internal affairs of countries of South-east Asia, this did not n "that we have promised to stop the local ulation from starting revolutionary struggles, or revolutionary movements which are led by ımunist parties". So perhaps China is hedging its , or maintaining fruitful inconsistencies, in what ld otherwise seem to be a multiple dilemma. s Peking consider revolutionary situations to exist outh-east Asia, particularly in Malaysia, and if so, should local Communist parties be supported? Or is it preferable to establish relations with the governments of those states and withdraw support from revolutionary parties? Would the latter course leave China open to the charge of betraying the revolution? And would it, in any case, leave the field open to the Russians, who are already showing exceptional interest in Malaysia and may either be thinking along orthodox lines of supporting the revolutionary potential of trades unions or else, by identifying the Malaysian guerrillas as **Chinese,** offer support to a government prepared to resist that challenge?

Before each side had nudged the other into action in 1948, the revolutionary potential of trades unions, particularly in Singapore, was considerable; and even in Malaya the structure of the Communist Federations of Trade Unions dominated such organized labour as there was. The Russians, if they were interested, could presumably support such revolutionary potential as they think they can find in the unions, particularly in Indian unions where the closeness of relations between India and the USSR are obviously not to the latter's disadvantage, and may also encourage people to think along the lines of Malaysian socialism, with or without the revolutionary *dénouement.* Sooner or later though they are likely to have to face up to the problem of identifying revolutionary potential, if they want to, in terms of communal division or the class struggle. Both have their advantages and disadvantages but, apart from the difficulties of "correct" analysis, they are now part of that hegemony-seeking process which Peking has discerned on the part of the super-Powers and in which it is itself involved.

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IN SOME ways the situation is reminiscent of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Throughout South-east Asia no one can be sure how serious the Russians and the Chinese are about exportable revolution. Their assistance, competitive, was overwhelming in Indo-China where the revolutions, or at least the wars of national liberation, have now been consummated. In 1949 when Britain's recognition of the Chinese Peoples' Republic brought with it the implied threat of Communist consuls in Malaya, it became a resignation matter for top Malayan officials and the consuls were not allowed in. The assumption of Chinese support for Malayan Chinese guerrillas was frequently made, particularly outside Malaya, but, apart from their vocal encouragement, occasional propaganda or financial infusions, what is astonishing is how **little** assistance was given that might have affected the outcome of the insurgency. Now China has again been recognized, this time by Malaysia in its own right and, although for the moment China's intentions appear to be friendly, what would happen if revolutionary factions in the

CCP became more prominent in Peking, is something that Malaysia must also take into account. Ironically, great Powers have more influence today when Malaysia is an independent state and a subject of international relations than when she was, in effect, a British colony and, as it were, on the receiving end of colonial and foreign policy. The worst case, and hopefully one that will never be applied, would be a contest between China and the USSR in which their respective models of revolutionary development were tested in Malaysia. Even if this were ruled out, the ambitions and objectives of Vietnam, perhaps the new Sparta in South-east Asia, are by no means clear beyond North-east Thailand. And in the process of accommodation to dominant local power, the Thai Government might conceivably decide that the struggle against dissidence in the South was no longer worth the trouble. In which case even the makings of a liberated area would enhance the prestige and conviction of the CPM enormously. Again, as it was 25 years ago, the way of the future remains to be discerned. So far, in Malaysia, a second insurrection has not broken out and it would therefore be, untimely, if not counter-productive, to apply the various techniques of the Emergency throughout the country at this stage. It is perhaps the most difficult stage to endure, but, although Malaysia is unable to apply the crude methods which swept up thousands of probable guerrilla supporters among the rural Malayan Chinese and returned them to China, it certainly has compensating advantages compared to the colonial government in 1948. With the Federation Army and Police Field Force deploying, on paper, almost as many battalions as at the height of the military effort during the Emergency, with a well-established Special Branch which is probably recovering now from the effects of May '69 and the loss of som its Chinese officers, and with independence accomplished fact, perhaps the most impo consideration is that government should not lo nerve; and that it should neither under- or over-r Devices such as *Rukkun Tetangga,* a vigi scheme with compulsory membership for between the ages of 18 and 55, may serv mobilize the community; but they may, like Anti-Bandit month of the Emergency, be little in practice than a propaganda success. The Essential Regulations which seem to render accused guilty until proved innocent, which secret evidence and which carry a mandatory penalty for those in illegal possession of arm explosives may also, in practice, be essential, — their intemperate use may ensure an intemp response.

Government is once again face to face wit problems of a plural and a disparate post-co society, this time to be dealt with as a matt urgency if not emergency. Perhaps the most i tant military lesson of the period which was the Emergency is that the Army in particular the Security Forces in general were acting in su of the civil power. And that when it was effecti was acting as part of that power. Politically it seem that there were then and are now grie and sources of disorder. Where they are deal imaginatively they result in no more tha irruptions that one might expect on a tropical politic, particularly one which, without an ef constitutional opposition, may have lost some anti-bodies and immunity to disorder. Where are not, they may result in insurrection.

Notes and References

1. J.M. Pluvier, *South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence* (Oxford University Press, 1974).

2. *Editorial Note:* This article was written before the Betong incident in April/May this year, which highlighted the problems involved in cross-border patrolling. Malaysian "hot pursuit" of Communist insurgents, according to reports, involved aerial bombing of Thai territory and the destruction of rubber trees. This led to anti-Malaysian demonstrations in Betong, and Thai demands for the removal of the Malaysian Police Field Force presence there (see *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 14 May 1976).

3. Ian Ward, *Daily Telegraph,* 16 September 1975.

4. *Editorial Note:* A recent article in *The Voice of the Nation* (Bangkok, 20 May 1976) reported on Communist efforts to win Moslem hearts and minds in Malaysia. The vehicle used is the Islamic Solidarity Party (*Parti Persuadaraan Islam,* as Paperi), which was formed by the 10th. Regiment CPM in 1965. Paperi is apparently organized along the lines as the United Malaysian National Organization (U — with youth, women and information wings — and is Kelantan as a springboard from which to influence M men and women in neighbouring Trengganu and P states.

5. *The History of Postwar South-East Asia* (Ohio Uni Press, 1974).

6. Lucien Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: its socia political meaning* (Princeton, 1956).

7. Cady, *op. cit.*

8. Derek Davies, "The Region", *Asia 1976 Yearbook.*

EPARATISM : *The author examines separatist forces at work in Indonesia today and assesses the threat these present to the cohesion of the country as a whole.*

Separatist Movements in Indonesia

Justus M. van der Kroef

TOWARD the close of February 1976, the Indonesian Ambassador to Papua-New Guinea declared in a *Radio Australia* interview at rebels in Irian Jaya (West New Guinea), which part of Indonesia, were creating "trouble" and mpering the development effort in the territory. ne rebels were even said to be slipping into ajapura, the capital of Irian Jaya, and assassinatg civilians and military there. Only little more than week before, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, dam Malik, had denied foreign Press reports of w and extensive uprisings in Irian Jaya. Malik aimed that the situation was "perfectly calm" and at the anti-Indonesian insurgent "Free Papua" ovement in the territory had been "annihilated". eanwhile, in Port Moresby, Papua-New Guinea's efence and Foreign Affairs Minister, Sir Maori ki, warned of the possibility of his Government ving to take military action against "Free Papua" errillas, who periodically cross from Irian Jaya into pua-New Guinea, and at about the same time iversity students in Port Moresby demonstrated ainst what they called "Indonesian aggression" in st Timor and Irian Jaya and denounced alleged ficial Australian and Papua-New Guinean support r Indonesian policies(1).

In Dakar, capital of the West African state of negal, the "Information and Co-ordination Office" the "Provisional Government of West Papua", nich was opened there on 1 July 1975, claimed that ring the early weeks of January 1976, more than 600 villagers had been killed by several thousand donesian military during fighting with "Free Pa-ua" guerrillas along the Irian-Jaya — Papua-New uinea border. The "Provisional Government" also aimed that, during these border clashes, Papua-New uinea troops had fired at the "Free Papua" rebels. In Papua-New Guinea, itself plagued by secessionist movements, the anti-Indonesian "Free Papua" rebels have become an increasing source of embarrassment. There have been warnings by Kiki and other officials to the guerrillas to stay out of Papua-New Guinea territory, while Papua-New Guinea's President, Michael Somare, has warned the three hundred or so refugees from Irian Jaya, currently residing in Papua-New Guinea, not to help the insurgents on pains of deportation(2). Vigorous criticism in Australian political, intellectual, and labour circles of Indonesia's invasion and alleged policy of subjugation of nearby East Timor is also having its effect in Papua-New Guinea, however. And the interaction of the conflicts in Irian Jaya and Timor, evident in charges made by the critics of the Suharto Government in various parts of the world, casts the pattern of various secessionist movements in Indonesia, past and present, into a new and bolder relief.

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OPPOSITION to Indonesian rule has intermittently flared up in Irian Jaya since 15 August 1962, when Holland and Indonesia reached agreement on the transfer of the territory, which up to that point had been under the Dutch flag, to Indonesian control, after a brief interim United Nations administration. West New Guinea was the only part of their former East Indies empire that was not transferred by the Dutch to the independent Indonesian Republic at the close of 1949, and ever since it had become a source of mounting conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The 15 August 1962 agreement, however, had come at a time when an indigenous Papuan nationalism, seeking political independence for West New Guinea, had already begun to take root among the emanci-

pated segment of Papuan society, especially in the towns. During the 1960s after Jakarta had established formal control, there were therefore repeated clashes between guerrillas of the "Free Papua Organization" (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* — OPM) and other Papuan dissidents, on the one hand, and Indonesian military on the other. For example, on 27 April 1967, the Indonesian military commander of Irian Jaya, Brigadier General Bintoro, stated that during recent disturbances in the town of Manokwari, strafing Indonesian airforce planes had killed some forty persons.

In 1969 an "Act of Free Choice" for the Papuans was held in Irian Jaya, under United Nations auspices and in accordance with the 1962 Dutch-Indonesian agreement. The "Act" presumably was designed to permit Papuans to express their wishes on their political future. But even before the "Act" was held, Indonesian officials had indicated that Jakarta would not accept a Papuan vote for their independence from Jakarta. Specially convened councils during the "Act" registered reportedly "unanimous" Papuan wishes for a continuation of Indonesian control of the territory. But tight Indonesian control over, and arrest and intimidation of Papuans had turned the whole "free choice" procedure, in the words of one foreign journalist present, into a "shoddy script for the 'act of no choice'"(3).

On 1 July 1971, a leader of the Papuan resistance movement, Seth Rumkoren, issued a proclamation of independence at Markas Victoria/Port Numbay, establishing a free and democratic "Republic of Papua Barat (West Papua)". Subsequent Press releases by the "Provisional Government" of this Republic have claimed that the area now governed by it "is already as large as approximately 2½ times the area of the Netherlands", that it has "a National Army", that schools and hospitals are functioning in the Republic's territory, and so on. After efforts by Rumkoren and his associates, in the latter half of 1975, to persuade leaders of the new independent Government of Papua — New Guinea to aid the West Papua cause had failed, the "National Liberation Council of West Papua", which, according to article 124 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of West Papua, exercises legislative authority with the Government in the absence of a fully functioning Senate, passed a resolution authorizing Rumkoren "to continue the fight for freedom" until West Papua "will have acquired international recognition". The same resolution accuses the "Government of Papua-New Guinea" of being the "partner" of the Indonesian Republic in an "endeavour entirely to destroy the perspective of the fight for freedom of the people of West Papua"(4).

To the Indonesian Republic the "Republic of Papua Barat" and Rumkoren officially represent no more than a handful of trouble makers, usually with Dutch colonial antecedents, who are wholly unrepresentative of the very great majority of the Papuan population which, today, thanks to assistance and aid from the rest of Indonesia, is rapidly developing the once backward province. Indonesian spokesmen have stressed that the "Free Papua" movement "only consists of some tens of people" once hailing from the territory, but who now mostly hold Dutch passports or Dutch nationality(5). It is not difficult to substantiate such disparagement of West Papuan nationalism. In the hothouse climate of the exile community of 200 or so Papuans living in the Netherlands, sharp leadership disputes and jealousies have arisen which rob the Papuan cause of credibility and strength. Next to the Rumkoren group, which is best financed and has the widest foreign support including some in Japan and the United Kingdom, there are at least two other factions headquartered in the Netherlands and claiming to speak for the Papuan nationalist cause(6).

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WHATEVER the leadership quarrels among Papuan exiles, in Irian Jaya itself, foreign observers of widely different background who have visited the territory have asserted that, in the words of one of them (an Australian doctoral student) "Among Irian's new élite there is a passionate Papuan nationalism". After some contact, members of the élite tend "recklessly" to drop their pretence. "'We are Indonesians,' they (i.e. the Papuans) echo at first meeting, 'but we think differently from the rest' some add on a second, while on a third they state that they want their freedom and ask, 'don't you men?'"(7) One German ethnologist, recently resident in Irian Jaya, noted how a seemingly compliant initial attitude on the part of Papuans, in the course of a discussion about real or imagined wrongs perpetrated by the Indonesian administration in the territory, quickly turned to "anger and open hatred against the "foreign oppressors in their country"(8).

The source of Papuan grievances against Indonesian entrepreneurs, administrators and military in their midst are manifold. Shortly after the formal Indonesian take-over in 1963, there began a heavy influx of Makassarese, Moluccans and other migrants from East Indonesia (historically the region from where slave hunters came to West New Guinea), who entered the retail trade, technical services and other middle level occupations, thus frequently displacing Papuans, especially in the urban economy. Javanese have tended to predominate in the middle and higher echelons of the territorial bureaucracy. While, unquestionably, the proportion of Papuan officials is steadily increasing with the growth in numbers of schooled Papuans, there is little doubt that the rate of Papuan absorption is occurring much too slowly to satisfy Papuan ambitions. Allegations of preferential treatment of non-Papuan over Papuans in various

atters ranging from acquiring use of a telephone to le searches for landholding reportedly have been ard even in the Jakarta Press(9). Notwithstanding e fact that the central Indonesian Government ssisted by Dutch and other foreign assistance funds) is made available to Irian Jaya's 850,000 or so habitants various development subsidies larger than en the most populous other Indonesian provinces e getting (indeed the subsidy of 9.15 billion upiah in 1971 has been said to be of the same proximate size as that during the Dutch colonial riod), the neglect suffered by the Papuan popula-on in the economically chaotic last years of Sukarno 963-66), has left psychological scars in a population customed to the relative prosperity and welfare evailing during the post-war Dutch colonial pe-od(10).

The very acceleration of recent development forts in the territory by Australian, Japanese, and mineral, timber and fishing interests, has ompted new charges that the Indonesian Govern-ent is "exploiting" Irian Jaya and "draining" it of wealth. One Dutch journalist who recently visited e territory has noted how easily educated Papuans ndy about the supposed data of their exploitation: nly 13% of what Indonesia permits to be tracted from the soil of Irian Jaya — and allows to paid for — benefits Irian herself", or (in the rds of a Papuan economist): "According to my gures the administration of Irian Jaya costs US$15 illion per year, but our province only receives US$5 illion for development"(11). The "damned if you , and damned if you don't" attitude of criticism nong the schooled Papuans and élite toward the rrent Indonesian development and integration fort seems (as is so often the case with the stance nationalists toward their antagonists) wholly im-rvious to reasoned rebuttal. This is so not least cause the mystique and reality of Papuan resist-ce to Jakarta's rule threaten now to become stitutionalized in whatever political culture is likely develop in the territory in the future. It is part of at Papuan nationalist mystique and/or reality that to 1969 alone some 30,000 Papuans lost their es at the hands of Indonesians, that "numerous lages" were levelled in Indonesian punitive actions, at large numbers of the Papuan élite have been rtured and killed, and so on(12).

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REPORTS of on-going Papuan guerrilla resis-tance against Indonesian rule being dissemi-ted in the world Press, lend a measure of validity the Papuan nationalist claims and ideology(13). en at the time of the 1969 "Act of Free Choice", ternational media coverage generally had been itical of the Indonesians(14). This has helped the iled Papuan nationalists to keep the cause of apua Barat" alive, particularly in winning interna-tional recognition. Then, as now, moreover, West Papuan independence aspirations project a vision of unity with Eastern New Guinea, that is with the new state of Papua-New Guinea. As early as 1957, before the Indonesian take-over, and when West New Guinea was still under Dutch control, one of the developing West New Guinea Papuan political parties committed itself to the formation of a "sovereign and prosperous Melanesian Federation", i.e. involving also the unification of Eastern and Western New Guinea. Since then prominent spokesmen, in exile for the cause of an independent Papua Barat, have reiterated the desirability of such a unification. In Irian Jaya itself, the idea has remained alive also, the correspondent in Irian Jaya of the *Pacific Islands Monthly* (a Sydney based publication) noting recently that among Irian Jaya Papuans "it is popularly believed that at a not-too-distant time Papua-New Guinea will demand union with Irian Jaya to make up one independent nation"(15). The same reporter notes that this feeling exists "despite the protestations of friendship and goodwill that politicians in Papua-New Guinea profess to feel toward Indonesia", and notwithstanding the critical remarks these politicians sometimes make of the West Papuan political refugees.

In Papua-New Guinea, beset by separatist problems of its own, there is officially no interest at all in a unification of the two halves of New Guinea; on the contrary, in the course of 1975, but well before Papua-New Guinea became independent, Australian, Indonesian, and Papua-New Guinea officials sought to hammer out a new *modus vivendi* between the Jakarta and Port Moresby Governments, designed to prevent future frontier conflicts (a new border agreement was signed between Indonesia and Papua — New Guinea on 12 February 1973), and thus turning Papua-New Guinea into a base for the "Papua Barat" independence movement. At the time the 1973 border agreement was signed, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik declared that the agreement reflected the wish of both Papua-New Guinea and Indonesia "to build friendship on the foundation of sturdy trust", and he added that many elements in the Papuan independence movement in exile now wished to go back to Irian Jaya(16).

This last assertion may well be doubted however. The community of legitimate West New Guinea Papuan exiles in Port Moresby and elsewhere in Papua-New Guinea, i.e. those who have received a residence permit from the Australian and now the Papua-New Guinea Government, numbers at least 300. According to the "Provisional Government of the Republic of West Papua", in a 1973 appeal addressed to the United Nations, more than 4,000 additional West New Guinea refugees now live in Papua-New Guinea, presumably without a permit(17). On 16 September 1975, the official day of Papua-New Guinea's independence proclamation, a

joint Indonesian-Papua-New Guinea statement was issued, expressing the two Governments' joint opposition "to any political separatist movement", and Papua-New Guinea "restressed her guarantee that Papua-New Guinea will absolutely honour Indonesia's sovereignty over all her territories within Indonesian boundaries", according to a report by the semi-official Indonesian news agency on the joint statement(18).

Yet, despite their unwillingness to become embroiled in the independence struggle of Papua Barat, Port Moresby officials are well aware of the potential importance of that struggle as an emotional issue in the developing pattern of domestic Papua-New Guinea politics. The long term interaction of an already independent Papua-New Guinea, harbouring several hundred Papua Barat refugees and nationalists, and an Irian Jaya where dreams of independence and anti-Indonesian sentiments, especially among the Papuan élite, remain alive, seems likely to present the Jakarta Government with a persistent separatist problem.

Moreover, weak and wholly utopian as the unification idea is in Papua-New Guinea, yet it is by no means unheard of. Dutch-Australian agreement in the 1950s to co-operate in the development of New Guinea, explicitly posited a future unification of the eastern and western halves of the island as among the choices to be made by the indigenous inhabitants. Certainly in then Australian administered Papua-New Guinea such unification caught the imagination of some native politicians, one of whom, Dr. John Guise, for example, told this author in 1969 that in his own platform for legislative office he had favoured the idea. In 1968 the programme of the then newly created United Islands Party in Papua-New Guinea not only called for complete independence for the territory but also asked the peoples of the region to "think seriously" about joining with West New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in making "a bigger and safer nation". Prominent Papua-New Guinea intellectuals have on occasion also commented on the allegedly close identification of the populations of the two halves of the island of New Guinea, saying that a small segment of the Papua-New Guinea population was now entertaining the idea of a future merger(19).

The guerrilla struggle of Papua Barat insurgents will almost certainly become a domestic political issue in Papua-New Guinea, also and particularly if an anti-Indonesian guerrilla struggle in nearby Eastern Timor retains both staying power and the sympathies of Australian intellectuals and other supporters, notably in the opposition Australian Labor Party.

Papua Barat's appeals, however, extend not only to Papua-New Guinea, but to a broader racial image as well. Since the early 1960s, Papu nationalists have sought to accentuate the "Negro character of the Papuans, and hence to win suppo from African states and politically influential Bla interest groups in the USA, such as the Natio Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo (NAACP). The latter organization, since its six second congress in July 1971, has consistently su ported the Papua Barat cause and petitioned United Nations to give the Papuans of Irian Jaya opportunity to express themselves freely and dem cratically as to their political future. In vario appeals to the states of OCAM [*L'Organisat Commune Africaine, Malgache et Mauricienne*] puan nationalist spokesmen have also stressed racial differences between Indonesians (described Mongoloid) and Papuans (described as Negroi while at other times they have called their land " New Africa". In requesting aid from the Organi tion of African Unity, headquartered in Ad Ababa, such spokesmen have described their count men as "Papuan Negroes" and as "the Negro Peo of Western New Guinea" who are calling on th "Brothers and Sisters in Africa" not to permit extirpation of a "Negro nation" by the Indo sians(20).

Some African states have, from time to ti taken up the cudgels of the Papua Barat cause the United Nations, particularly during the 1 transfer of the territory to Indonesian control, a again, in the context of the 1969 "Act of F Choice". As noted, in 1975 Senegal accorded semi-diplomatic recognition. But all this has n thus far, obliged the Jakarta Government to consi changing its policy of "integrating" Irian Jaya rapidly as possible into the rest of the Indones Republic. Then, too, the periodic leadership squ bles among Papuan nationalists abroad have prom ed potential foreign sympathisers to further caution

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IRIAN Jaya is, however, but one focal po of Indonesia's separatist problem. Only so 130 miles west of the Irian Jaya town of Fakf across the sea of Seran (Ceram), the South Molucc islands of Amboyna, Seran, Haruku and Sapa have been the point of origin of another secession resistance movement against the Jakarta Gove ment's central authority. Today, the problem of so-called South Moluccan Republic [*Republik Ma ku Selatan* — RMS] is primarily a domes sociological and political one for the Netherlan Secondarily, it is, like Irian Jaya, a minor probl in Indonesia's foreign relations. However, unl Irian Jaya, there is little or no evidence of existence of a viable, secessionist, nationalist curr in the Moluccan islands. Despite claims of R leaders in the Netherlands, recent independ foreign observers (who have documented the ex

ce of Papuan nationalism and guerrilla resistance Irian Jaya) do not find a comparable level of nificant open support for the RMS in the South oluccas at present(21). To be sure, in the South oluccas, as in other outlying provinces of Indone-, there is a desire for more home rule. It has also en asserted that the population in "many" coastal lages in the South Moluccas periodically reports at guerrillas have come by to request food(22). ll, there is little evidence of a persistent guerrilla uggle. Indeed, one of the South Moluccan islands, uru, is the site of a large prison camp, housing me 10,000 prisoners suspected of Communist tivity and/or involvement in the abortive 1965 up, and security measures taken in connection with e camp also led to stepped-up surveillance on ighbouring islands.

However, recent terrorist activity by younger uth Moluccans residing in the Netherlands has awn increased international interest to the by now ore than 25-year old RMS cause. This, in turn, has ected further attention and concern, led by vocal tics of the Suharto regime abroad, to Jakarta's licies in East Timor and Irian Jaya.

The origins of the RMS lie in the period of the donesian Revolution against the Netherlands (1945-49), during which, originally, a federal Indonesian public had come into existence, largely as a result Dutch policy. In the South Moluccas, a regional ministrative council had provisionally voted to join e federal Indonesian state of East Indonesia. hen, however, in the course of 1950, through a carta-led campaign, the federal structure of the donesian state was dissolved by constitutionally ntroversial means, regional rebellions broke out in st Indonesia, and, on 24 April 1950, dissidents the island of Amboyna formally proclaimed the dependent South Moluccan Republic(23).

Dutch and United Nations' mediating efforts led, and, by the beginning of October 1950, after ned forces of the Indonesian Republic had acked, only limited RMS guerrilla resistance nained, which gradually ended by 1965. Mean-ile, some 3,600 South Moluccan military, non-rticipants in the RMS struggle thus far, who had ved in the Dutch colonial army in Indonesia, ceeded, with the backing of Dutch courts, in eventing the Dutch Government from demobilizing em in Indonesia. Fear of possible Indonesian risals because of their service in the colonial ny, or because some other South Moluccan erans had managed to join the RMS' armed istance against Jakarta, had prompted their refusal be discharged in Indonesia. They suggested that ey be demobilized in "the free territory of the MS" in the South Moluccas, or else in West New inea. Declining these requests, the Dutch Govern-nt eventually ordered the 3,600 to be shipped to and demobilized in the Netherlands, where they and their families arrived during March and April of 1951.

It might be noted, however, that several scores of other South Moluccan veterans of the former colonial army who were demobilized in Indonesia in 1950, suffered no reprisals, and, in some instances, even made new careers for themselves in the Indonesian armed forces. Moreover, a few South Moluccans subsequently attained high political office and prominence in the new Indonesian Republic. While it is difficult to substantiate significant anti-Moluccan discrimination by the Indonesian Government (even though non-South Moluccans tend to hold the key posts on Amboyna and adjacent islands), on the other hand, the South Moluccan region has historically and ethnically occupied a quite distinctive place in the mosaic of Indonesian life. During the Dutch colonial period successive generations of inhabitants of this area forged strong bonds of loyalty to the Dutch Crown. Moreover, the South Moluccas have long been an important centre of Protestant Christianity in Indonesia, though most of the inhabitants of the region, as indeed of Indonesia generally, are Moslems or consider themselves so. South Moluccan males won renown for their service in the Dutch colonial army, and, during the Indonesian revolutionary struggle against the Dutch, many in the South Moluccan islands remained loyal to the Netherlands, viewing the claims of the Java-based Revolutionary Indonesian Republic with suspicion. RMS spokesmen have always stressed South Moluccan differences, claiming, to the author on occasion, for example, that "there is a greater difference between a Javanese and an Ambonese than between an Italian and a Norwegian".

After their arrival in the Netherlands, the nearly 3,600 demobilized South Moluccan military, plus 8,500 or so of their dependents, began a difficult, ghetto-ized existence in special camps and housing facilities, as refugees. RMS leaders, meanwhile, sought to maintain their influence over them by keeping the RMS cause alive with the aid of sympathetic Dutchmen from different, but predominantly politically conservative, political strata. The frustrations, festering grievances, leadership quarrels, and adverse effects of isolation experienced by the Moluccan exile community during the next 25 years, as well as the various policies of social adjustment for the South Moluccans pursued by successive Dutch cabinets, fall outside the scope of this essay. By the early 1970s, let it be noted, the South Moluccan community in the Netherlands had grown to more than 30,000 and, although about 3,000 over the years trickled back to Indonesia, and a few others achieved a high level of integration within the Netherlands, problems of employment, citizenship and housing continued to provide an embittered atmosphere in which younger elements became

increasingly radicalized(24). The execution by the Indonesian Government of the RMS resistance leader, Dr. Christian Soumokil in April 1966, who had been captured nearly two and a half years previously, was a turning point, and contributed significantly to a new spirit of militancy.

A sequence of violent South Moluccan activities has since cascaded over the Netherlands, even as RMS leaders deplored all resort to force. In July 1966, youthful South Moluccans sought to put the Indonesian Embassy in the Hague to the torch, and in December of the same year they launched another ineffectual attack on the Embassy. In August 1970, on the eve of President Suharto's visit to the Netherlands, 33 South Moluccan youths forcibly entered and occupied the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar, north of the Hague. The ambassador escaped, but a Dutch police officer was killed by one of the South Moluccans. Intense mediation efforts by Dutch cabinet officials and leaders of South Moluccan interest groups ultimately led the South Moluccans to vacate the Embassy after occupying it for some eleven hours. In December 1974, hundreds of South Moluccans threw stones and firebombs at the Indonesian Embassy at the Hague, while others assaulted the Hague Peace Palace, hurling rocks and breaking windows and doors, before being driven off. This demonstration came in the wake of reports of alleged maltreatment of recently arrested, RMS-sympathizing South Moluccan prisoners by the Indonesian authorities. Then, in March 1975, a group of South Moluccans sought to seize Queen Juliana and hold her hostage at the Soestdijk Palace. The bloodiest eruption to date occurred on 2 December 1975, when five young South Moluccans captured a local train near the small community of Beilen, in the Northern Netherlands, holding several scores of the train's passengers hostage and killing three of them before surrendering, after having held out for twelve days. On 4 December 1975 the Indonesian Consulate-General in Amsterdam was occupied for several days by South Moluccans.

These latter incidents in particular embarrassed the Dutch Government of Premier Joop den Uyl, and strained Dutch-Indonesian relations. Though briefly focusing world attention on the plight of RMS adherents in the Netherlands (RMS leaders again publicly condemned such acts of violence), these incidents brought little or no discernible change in the position of the South Moluccan community, let alone any upsurge in RMS activity in Indonesia itself. It appears, moreover, that the actions at Beilen and at the Indonesian Consulate-General in Amsterdam had already been planned by some South Moluccans during the summer of 1975(25). Yet the adoption, by a segment of South Moluccan youth, of the tactics of international terrorism, does not, at this juncture, suggest that, officially at least, a more accommodating attitude toward the RMS on the p of the Indonesian Government is likely to forthcoming.

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AFTER formal discussions between the Du cabinet and RMS leaders on 17 January 19 the Indonesian Embassy in the Hague issue lengthy statement which said:

- that the South Moluccan problem "is purely an internal affair of the Netherlands", and not of Indonesia's concern, because the RMS "issue" does not in any way exist in Indonesia itself;

- that whatever the nature of "Indonesia's contribution and participation" in the "efforts to manage the Moluccan problem in the Netherlands", such contribution and participation should be viewed in the context of enhancing the good relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands;

- that it was Indonesia's understanding that in the Netherlands' Government's policy vis-à-vis the South Moluccans, emphasis was "clearly put" on the "integration and assimilation of South Moluccans" into Dutch society with "preservation of their own cultural identity"; and

- that as far as the aspirations of the South Moluccan people, i.e. presumably those in Indonesia itself, were concerned, these aspirations had already been "accommodated and realized" long ago, at the time when the South Moluccan people "manifested their will" in the formation of a province of their own "within the unitary Republic of Indonesia"(26).

According to the Indonesian Government, inhabitants of the province of the Moluccas Indonesia today are only concerned with the devel ment of their region and the raising of their liv standards. In February 1976, the Indonesian Gove ment announced that it was closing down Consulate-General in Amsterdam, because of cond for the safety of Indonesian lives and property in Netherlands.

Behind their formally negative attitude tow RMS aspirations, Indonesian officials have attemp to be more flexible, however. It is well understood Jakarta that the Netherlands is an important me ber of the Inter-governmental Group in Indon (IGGI) which has played a major role in stabiliz Indonesia's post-Sukarno finances and which been mobilizing hundreds of millions of dollars

velopment investments in Indonesia. Indonesia's ding of political prisoners, in conjunction with arta's policies toward East Timor, had already ained relations with the left-leaning den Uyl inet. And, while RMS supporters in the Netherlands d often to come from the more conservative itical strata, the Suharto Government has shown appropriate degree of understanding of the Dutch vernment's plight in dealing with the RMS cause. August 1975, the Dutch and Indonesian Governnts reached an agreement which stressed the need increased Dutch-RMS dialogue in order, essenlly, to convince the South Moluccans of the ality" of their situation and of the fact that their ure either lay in integration in the Netherlands or urn to Indonesia. The Dutch-RMS discussions, owing the December 1975 incidents at Beilen and sterdam, were officially welcomed by the Indone-'n Government, as was the formation of a nmission of South Moluccans, nominated by major ith Moluccan interest groups, to advise the Dutch ial Welfare Ministry and act as liaison with other tch bodies.

But persuading the South Moluccans in the therlands to be "realistic" is not easy. For one ng, there is the complex nationality question. cording to Dutch sources, some 15,000 South luccans, over the years, have officially acquired tch citizenship (according to RMS leaders many of se did so for reasons of convenience only), while onesian officials maintain that additionally some ,000 still hold Indonesian nationality, thus leaving least 10,000, and probably more, in a stateless hough granted Dutch residence) condition(27). these statistics are not very certain, and there is much clarity as to how many South Moluccans fully espouse the ultimate goal of the RMS, i.e. creation of an independent Moluccan state in onesia. Internecine fights and alleged intimida-n among South Moluccans of different political suasion have occurred, and thus raise questions out the relative popularity of the RMS even among ith Moluccan exiles in Holland, let alone in the luccan islands themselves. On the other hand, ing the 1950s and '60s, only 3,000 or so South luccans are estimated to have returned to Indone- not a large number in view of official Indonesian ms that the RMS group is not representative of South Moluccan community in the Netherlands.

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AS IN the case of the Papuan exiled commu-nity, there is a serious leadership split in the tch South Moluccan Community, although the tion led by RMS President J.A. Manusama, a duate engineer and long-time mathematics teach- clearly predominates. These internal quarrels do bode well for future "integration" however, and, ess South Moluccans show greater "realism", Jakarta, understandably, will have little interest in encouraging the immigration of troublemakers and dissidents. Actually Jakarta need not worry. For the great majority of South Moluccans now in the Netherlands, an increasingly large number of whom were neither born in, nor have ever seen, Indonesia, and who have, since their earliest years, become accustomed to the amenities of an open, highly industrialized, public service-oriented society, seem little inclined to go to Indonesia. There is even less interest in going to the rural, technologically undeveloped Moluccan island society, where economic conditions are "gloomy", and where, outside the provincial capital of Ambon, the "economy is largely non-monetary and basically subsistence"(28).

The latter point has been made again, recently, by the former Indonesian diplomat and cabinet minister, Muhammad Rum, in an evaluation of the RMS problem. The Indonesian Government, according to Rum, is prepared to accept the return of the South Moluccans in the Netherlands, but "only if they consider themselves as Indonesians". But, as mentioned above, the conditions of life in Indonesia are less favourable than those to which they are accustomed in the Netherlands(29). Rum sees as the only solution, therefore, an "indoctrination" process of the South Moluccans in Holland itself, whereby they will abandon the idea of self-determination which led to the creation of the RMS. Netherlanders who, in earlier years, assisted in fostering among the South Moluccans in Holland this idea of self-determination, could now do a lot to rectify the situation.

Rum's advice is but an echo of a significant part of Dutch public opinion. Scholarly Dutch analyses, examining the origins of the RMS problem, have warned against the cultivation of a "myth", current among RMS adherents and their Dutch sympathizers, that the Netherlands somehow "betrayed" the South Moluccans during 1950-51 and that it has a special debt to repay(30). The present Dutch Government has reiterated that it cannot support the political objectives of the RMS, and that the Dutch-Indonesian Transfer of Sovereignty Agreement of 1949, whereby Indonesia formally attained its independence, provided no legal basis for a South Moluccan claim to self-determination. RMS Presidents, J.A. Manusama, however, however, still maintains that the Dutch Government must recognize that the South Moluccan issue is a political, not just a social problem, and that its international legal aspects remain vital(31).

In the absence of a significant RMS resistance movement in the South Moluccan islands themselves, it is precisely the international aspect of the RMS cause that appears to be acquiring new significance, in part because of the precedent-setting recognition won by the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations and among sympathizing states

throughout the world. In mid-January 1976, Manusama journeyed to Dakar where he was reportedly received as a visiting head of state and obtained assurances of support from Senegal's President Leopold Senghor and Premier Abdu Diaf. During this meeting between Manusama and the Senegalese leaders, which had been arranged by the foreign representative (and vice president) of the "Provisional Government of the Republic of Papua Barat", Herman Womsiwor, the question of a Senegalese diplomatic recognition of the RMS, and the opening, in Dakar, of an RMS "Information Bureau", similar to that of Papua Barat, was said to have been also discussed. According to the RMS Vice President, P.W. Lokollo, the South Moluccan Republic today also has "contact" with Ghana(32).

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ANOTHER, more controversial dimension of the new "internationalization" strategy of the RMS is its reported contact with the Fretilin (*Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente,* — the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor), the leftist political and guerrilla movement in East Timor, which has been battling Indonesian forces and the new Indonesian backed "provisional government" there(33). In Hamburg, on 31 October 1975, a meeting reportedly took place between representatives of the South Moluccan movement and of "Papua Barat", their Dutch and West German supporters, and an official of Fretilin. Whatever agreement, if any, was reached at this meeting has not been disclosed, and would, in any case, have been vitiated by the opposition of RMS President Manusama to Fretilin on grounds of the latter's leftwing persuasion(34). Meanwhile, meetings of such groups as the World Federation of United Nations Associations are being attended (in the role of "observers") by representatives of the South Moluccans in the Netherlands, who appear as members of an organization called the "United Nations Association of Spice Islands". This kind of participation seems designed to amplify the South Moluccans' claim to a presence in the international arena, at a time when traditional criteria of nationhood have been depreciated by the growth of quasi-national or only partially recognized organizations and entities on the world scene.

The formation of a common RMS-Papua Barat-Fretilin front, both in international affairs and in the deployment of a guerrilla struggle, would have potentially serious consequences for the Jakarta Government, and would permeate much of Eastern Indonesia with a multi-front military problem. At the moment, such a development seems unlikely, however. Among some of the younger, Left-oriented, South Moluccans in the Netherlands there is sympathy for Fretilin. But the already noted opposition of RMS President Manusama and his associates makes a Fretilin-RMS tactical rapprochement unlikely at moment.

Then, too, relations between the RMS and exiled Papuan nationalist community are at ambiguous. One segment of the Papuan nationali i.e. the dominant group led by Papua Ba President Seth Rumkoren in Irian Jaya, had ear co-operated with RMS leaders in joint appeals to Dutch Government and the international commun and it was primarily through the efforts of Rum ren's principal foreign representative, the Papu businessman Herman Womsiwor, that Manusa established contacts with the Senegal Governme Recently, however, there have been indications t Rumkoren's faction has changed its co-opera attitude toward the RMS and its principal Du backers. Moreover, another, smaller segment of Papuan nationalist movement, the one led Nicolaas Jouwe, a Papuan civil servant in the Du colonial period and an early nationalist figure, v now also resides in the Netherlands, has asserted t there can be no co-operation between the RMS a the Papuan nationalist movement. The reas according to Jouwe, is historical: the South Mol cans, in earlier ages, not only attempted to introd "Christian civilization" among the Papuans, but w also engaged in slaughtering the latter(35). Jou also points to the important racial differe between Papuans and Moluccans.

There have been unverified reports of dis sions between Fretilin's representatives in Europe those of Papua Barat, aiming at the formation c common anti-Jakarta military and diplomatic off sive. Nothing concrete, however, has thus far d loped out of these discussions.And as the caref planned, if slow, process of the Indonesian take-c of East Timor continues (capped by an event legislative sanction by the pro-Jakarta "provisio government" in Dili of a merger of the territory w Indonesia), the Fretilin resistance will face m serious problems, despite assurances of support fr Hanoi, Peking, Havana, and unofficial leftist cir in Australia. By siding, as far as possible, with Arabs in anti-Israeli action, and with the Afri states in anti-colonial policies, the Jakarta Gove ment blocks Fretilin's Communist bloc suppor from mounting much of a diplomatic offensive o its policies either in East Timor or in Irian Jaya. this connection, it is ironic, if hardly surprising, t in the aftermath of the South Moluccan terrorist a in the Netherlands in December 1975, Indones Foreign Minister Adam Malik readily declared t terrorism could not be justified, "regardless of w its purpose may be"(36). Malik, and other Indo sian spokesmen, however, have not been so quick criticize terrorist acts carried out by, or on behalf the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This is not to say that there is no natu dynamic that could eventually lead to a Freti

apua Barat tactical alliance, and to a widening of errilla separatist action in Eastern Indonesia. It is say, however, that for the moment such an liance is still no more than a talking point among rious anti-Jakarta exiles and their friends.

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SEPARATISM in East Indonesia today is the more recent manifestation of a historic pro-em, dating from Indonesia's colonial period. It has agued the independent Indonesian Republic since early days. While large empires flourished in the st Indian islands, and before the gradual solidifi-tion of Dutch colonial power, a unified Indonesian te within the present territorial boundaries did not ist. Not until the nineteenth century does the ncept of a single, defined, territorial and sovereign tity called "Netherlands East India" begin to erge. And even then, in their internal public ministrative and judicial policies, the colonial tch stressed the separate and distinctive character the various Indonesian population groups, their ltures, and their traditional leaders. While in the esent century a unifying, pan-Indonesian national-n won support among some (by no means all) of e new Indonesian élite, the emphasis of recent donesian writers on the strength of "cohesive -Indonesian forces" before World War II, and on e alleged acceptance by non-Javanese of Javanese minance "in the all-Indonesian way of life"(37), quires serious qualification. The organizational uralism of the Indonesian national awakening ded to confirm Dutch colonial policymakers in eir belief in the desirability of a federal rather an unitary constitutional structure for "Netherlands dia", and of preserving in the various parts of the chipelago the different bodies of local custom law, d the traditional aristocracies and other élites.

To some Indonesian nationalists, however, all s was but a dimension of the old imperialists' ivide and rule" policy. Moreover, the collapse of e Dutch colonial regime, and the ideological effects the Japanese occupation during World War II, ve significant impetus to a popular, "all Indone-n" national consciousness. It is apparent that after orld War II, the returning Dutch, in attempting circumscribe the aspirations of the revolutionary donesian Republic which had been proclaimed on August 1945, seriously underestimated the not considerable, though by no means total, sympathy that Republic even in population groups and in eas beyond Java. Nevertheless, after the close of 49, Dutch policy had succeeded in creating a leral, rather than a unitary Indonesian Republic, d it was to the government of such a federal public that the Dutch ultimately transferred their vereignty.

Those nationalists and advocates of the unitary Indonesian state like Sukarno, who had become President of the federal Indonesian Republic, acquiesced in the federal structure of the state as the means by which Indonesia would at last achieve its independence. Hardly had the ink on the Sovereignty Transfer Agreement dried, however, when the Jakarta-based unitarians began driving for the dissolution of the federal structure. This led to open rebellion in East Indonesia, and to the proclamation of the RMS. But, while the Jakarta central Government soon broke the main RMS resistance, its policies rapidly provided the seed-bed for increasing regional resistance. In the provinces there was criticism that the central Government was too heavily dominated by the Javanese, and that non-Javanese Indonesians were being shunted aside in policy-making positions. In Sumatra and other areas, there were also popular allegations: that the provinces beyond Java, e.g. Sumatra, were being "exploited", in that through their exports such as rubber and petroleum they contributed the most to the national Indonesian treasury but received only a minimum in return for local public services and social care; that corruption and overcentralization in Jakarta were stifling regional economic development; and that (a charge coming particularly from provincial military commanders) the Indonesian Communist Party, once discredited because of its 1948 coup attempt, was permitted again to have too much influence(38).

After months of friction it came, in December 1956, to open defiance by regional military commanders in North, Central, and South Sumatra provinces against the Jakarta authorities. Jakarta appointed provincial governors and officials were ousted from power, and soon, *de facto,* Sumatra had become largely autonomous. By the middle of 1957, the anti-Jakarta sentiment had taken root in Southern and Northern Sulawesi (Celebes) as well. Amidst increasing party polarization in the capital, a radicalization of political tempers in the wake of new measures against Dutch enterprises, and a steady solidification of Communist Party influence in Java, a number of moderate Moslem leaders in Jakarta and dissident military commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi began to make common cause against the central government. On 15 February 1958, formation of a federal counter-regime, the "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia" [*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* — PRRI] was announced in Padang, Central Sumatra, and the country seemed to hover on the brink of civil war.

Most of the Indonesian Army stayed loyal to Sukarno's government, however, and before the end of the year military campaigns had neutralized the rebel government. But rebel resistance dragged on for more than two years, and, in February 1960, PRRI forces joined elements in North Sumatra and Sulawesi of the *Darul Islam* (Islamic Community), an extremist Muslim movement in Indonesia committed

to creating an Islamic state in the country. PRRI radio messages now proclaimed the establishment of a new "Federated Indonesian Republic", [*Persatuan Republik Indonesia* — PRI], consisting of ten autonomous "states", including the "State of the South Moluccas"(39). But the new Republic was little more than a paper creation, and within a year all significant "federalist" resistance had ended, though prominent adherents of the PRRI-PRI cause carried on a propaganda campaign against the Sukarno regime from abroad until the latter's fall in the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup.

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THE separatist impulses that gave birth to the anti-Javanese, federalist movement of the 'fifties and 'sixties have by now been greatly attenuated, although they are by no means wholly gone, and the supporters of Papua Barat independence or of the RMS do meet with some latent sympathy among those Indonesians in other regions beyond Java where resentment and criticism of an allegedly over-centralized, Java dominated national bureaucratic system continue to rise readily to the surface of local life(40). Open rebellion is another matter, however, and probably most Indonesians would prefer an arrangement providing increased local autonomy, but within a unitary Indonesian Republic.

There are areas of Indonesia where the Jakarta authorities have wisely permitted a public administrative *modus vivendi* to come into existence which nominally acknowledges the sovereignty of the central Indonesian Government, while making *de facto* allowance for extensive self-management by traditional élites and institutions. This is typically the c in fiercely independent Achin, in North Sumat and to a lesser but still notable degree in s regions as Central and Northern Sulawesi. At moment, therefore, it seems unlikely that the Pap Barat resistance, coupled possibly in future to continuing anti-Jakarta guerrilla "liberation" mo ment in East Timor, and, independent of the further RMS agitation, will catch fire in other ar of Indonesia also. Although this is not to say t Papua Barat and East Timorese insurgencies will intensify, particularly if animosities in Hanoi a Havana toward the US-tilting, Suharto Governm grow, and channels of assistance to the insurge can be created.

One should note, in conclusion, that, on t basis of the historical record, thus far, regional a separatist insurgencies, at least in South-east Asia, not appear to have a bright future. Indonesi separatist problem is hardly unique. What strikes t observer of post-World War II, independent Sou east Asia is the profusion of ethnic, religious, other communal fissiparous movements, rangi from up-country Burma to the southern Philippi islands, and many of them having engaged in arm opposition to central authority, sometimes for cades. Nor have these movements been wanting e.g. in the case of the Muslim rebellion in Philippines) in foreign assistance. And yet, whate the significance of the not altogether compara case of Bangladesh, nowhere in the region h separatist movements since World War II succeed in establishing independent national governmen There is at the moment no reason to believe t Indonesia will prove to be the exception.

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RELIGION: *"Every religious idea is unutterable vileness of the most dangerous kind, contagion of th most abominable kind."*

Vladimir I. Lenin

Communism and Buddhism

Dennis Duncanson

IS THE existence of an established Buddhist church in any particular country an obstacle to the spread of Communism in that country? That that might prove to be the case is a view that has been held quite widely in Europe and America as well as Asia during the years of Communist expansion in the East since the Second World War(1). Is it wishful thinking on the part of those opposed to Communist expansion? One recalls the longstanding faith of South-east Asian peasants, incited to rebellion, in the efficacy of talismans sanctified by Buddhist bonzes to render the wearer physically invulnerable to gunfire(2); our experience after rational, but analogous, predictions by European residents on the China coast that Confucian society would be "impervious to Communism" suggests that the expectation of Buddhist immunity to Communism may be no better founded. In these pages, it is proposed to bring together the evidence that has accumulated and on which the balance of probability can be estimated.

The expectation rests in fact on an assumption which, for the very reason that it is often made unconsciously and is rarely challenged, needs to be brought to the surface first. The assumption is that social structures, originating in acquired cultural characteristics and systems of belief, remain constant over long periods and that they condition — even determine — political action more profoundly than the will of political activists conditions them. It arose in Europe early in the nineteenth century, in reaction to the previously prevalent doctrine of Free Will, from the scientific discovery of the enormous variety of human environments and from the realization that social values and political organization often appeared to have a connection, not only with the general historical development and "progress" of Mankind as a whole, but also with longitude a latitude of habitat: parliamentary democracy and liberal system of social values were supposed to attributable to climatic conditions in the temper zone. Whether greater weight is attached to His or to Geography, the idea of the decisiveness social conditioning has informed sociological think ever since, including that of Karl Marx and Marxists, who in turn have influenced a multitude social scientists, whether these share their poli ideals or only their methods of social analysis: b that tension between a rich class of "exploiters" a poor class of "exploited" provides the dynami British society, for example, prevails in British pu debate in the 1970s in spite of the fact that nea two thirds of the national product is assigned by State and nearly two thirds of all wage a salary-earners are employed by the State.

But, in the history of political ideas, there been one very important dissenter from this cons sus: the man who gave Communists the will embark on world conquest and a strategy for do it, namely Lenin. Those who today call themse Marxist-Leninists must be understood as writing acting on a premise opposed to the one shar paradoxically, by Marxians and non-Marxians. ninism (or Marxism-Leninism) is in reality, as so of Lenin's contemporaries and rivals for po complained in his lifetime, a "betrayal" of Ma social and political ideas — a "revision" of prediction that the Revolution would come about the blind operation of the "scientific law of Histo (i.e. that the gap between rich and poor classes i "capitalist system" was destined to widen, and th within a lifetime, it would lead to social upheav and the spontaneous revolt of the oppressed exploited). When Marx's prediction had not co

rue by the end of the century, Lenin "revised" the heory, in *Two Tactics for Revolution* and later ssays, by postulating the dependence of the coming evolution on deliberate, planned, action by a subjective factor" which must have the will to turn he "objective conditions" described in the Marxian ritique of capitalism to advantage, without waiting or those "objective conditions" to shape the destiny f mankind undirected. We shall come later to onsider the methods by which Lenin and the Marxist-Leninists have envisaged the "subjective factor" (in practice, the international Communist movement) making use of "objective conditions"; but it is elpful, when considering the answer to our question, to keep in mind Lenin's positive distinction etween deliberate political action, which he regarded as the only realistic social force, and the prevalent belief of our times in social determinism, whether Marxian or non-Marxian: "The so-called cultured strata of Western Europe and America," he wrote, are incapable of understanding the real state of relative power;...they will shut their eyes to our activities and work hard to prepare their own nicide."(3)

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THE features of Buddhism which might be inimical to the spread of Communism have been uggested from time to time, with special cogency, by Richard Harris of *The Times*. In a broadcast a number of years ago(4), Mr. Harris pointed to the frontier running through South-east Asia between lands of Chinese civilization and lands of Indian civilization: whereas the former are marked by dedication, tirelessness, and intellectual endeavour", the latter set store by passivity, gentleness, and acceptance of fate. One might add, in specifically Buddhist countries — that is to say, outside the Malay world, which, though originally part of the ome Indian culture complex, has since become predominantly Muslim — compassion towards all ther creatures, human or (because of belief in ransmigration) potentially human. Since Mr. Harris irst developed his ideas, identifying Marxism-Leninism with social qualities traditional to China, one might suppose that the rise of "dedicated, tireless, nd intellectually-striving" Marxist-Leninist states in aos and Cambodia, for instance, both of which lie n the Indian side of the cultural frontier, proves m in short order to be wrong; but perhaps these nstitute an exceptional case, to be explained *ad oc* by their debt to the Communist armies from ietnam which placed them in power, by force, as tellites of Hanoi: although power is vested for the oment in Communist hands, it may yet prove mpossible to instal a recognizably Communist form government in these countries on a permanent oting. If that is so, it will be a reminder of earlier tempts by emperors in Vietnam to absorb Laos and Cambodia into their state system, if not their social system: as early as the fifteenth century, the Emperor Le Thanh-tong tried to intimidate the Lao ruler, by a show of force, into "entering the map of Vietnam"(5), and again in the nineteenth Emperor Minh Mang tried to incorporate Cambodia into Vietnam. It could be argued that these attempts were unsuccessful: the internal north-south cultural frontier within Indo-china was re-established, and, even though the state of Champa, as deeply permeated by Indian culture then as Laos and Cambodia are now, did succumb to Vietnamese aggrandizement, the Cham population never changed sides, as it were, but suffered either slaughter on the spot or eviction from their land, still retaining their Indian culture today in their new homes in Cambodia.

However, the coercive capacity of those earlier aggressors was much smaller than that of their modern, Communist, imitators. Moreover, there are other objections to these theories of immunity to Marxism-Leninism which cannot be explained away so easily. In the first place, the Chinese themselves have a Buddhist tradition going back to even remoter times than in the countries of South-east Asia; though Mahayanist, not Theravadin, Chinese Buddhism too prized passivity, gentleness, and compassion, and its devotees were, at least from the thirteenth century onwards, often paragons nevertheless of the selfsame Confucian qualities of dedication and tirelessness which are postulated as marking Chinese civilization off from Indian; the church and the Sangha were identified at times with institutions of the Confucian state under a regime which appears to have provided the model for their formal establishment in Theravadin Thailand at the end of the eighteenth century(6). Thus, if there really is a fundamental sociological difference between Chinese civilization and Indian civilization, potentially presenting some obstacles to the spread of Communism, that difference must be independent of Buddhism. Angkor was undoubtedly a warlike state notwithstanding its Indian civilization, which comprised both Buddhist and Hindu elements, not merely alternating in the great architectural monuments erected from reign to reign by a Suryavarman II or a Jayavarman VII, but met with in the market place side by side(7). Chu Yüan-chang, the Beggar King who founded the Ming Dynasty, started life as a bonze and built merit-seeking pagodas (with conscript labour) on the ruins of the slaughter and rapine which had given him the throne of China. Buddhism has not managed to tame men of war in Burma, and struggles for power there have been no whit less violent during the last two centuries for being conducted exclusively by Theravadin princes among Theravadin peoples.

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ON THE other hand, it is by no means certain that the Buddhist faith (or a more general Indian culture) has dominated the lands to the west of Mr. Harris's frontier as totally as is assumed. The same early observers who bear witness to Buddhism as an established religion also mention religious practices which do not originate in any branch of Indian civilization(8); in our day, a Kachin remarks: "The transition to Buddhism is easy because our Buddhism includes *nat* workship."(9) The French scholar, Georges Coedes, maintains that "the penetration of Singhalese Buddhism to the masses in Cambodia, Siam, Laos, and Burma cannot be doubted" but does not say why(10). Another French scholar recognizes that the few monuments bearing Buddhist symbols left here and there by marauding armies from Angkor do not detract from other evidence that it was the thirteenth century before the Siamese adopted the faith, the fourteenth before the Lao did(11); even then, how far "mass society" was affected by it is hard to find out, and it is a fair assumption that, since the popular festivals and ceremonies of the Thai and Khmer peoples, as of the Kachins — if not the Burmans —, still include numerous non-Buddhist elements, their social attitudes are similarly mixed. Arthur Wright remarks of China: "Ultimately Buddhist, Taoist, and folk-religious elements fused into an almost undifferentiated popular religion."(12) Indeed, a third French scholar pointed out long ago that social structure and folk religion were at one time very similar among the Chinese and at least the Thai, if not other South-east Asian peoples, and the degree to which they have really diverged in modern times may be more superficial than substantial(13).

Buddhism has certainly been the religion of the court in South-east Asian countries, as Hinduism (Brahmanism, Shivaism, Vishnuism) was in the middle ages, providing a sanction for the monarch's rule in the way that Christianity and Islam do in other regions(14) — if also, thanks to the doctrine of transmigration, to rebellion by usurpers(15). And since independence from colonial rule, assertion of one's Theravadin faith for instance in the refurbishing of *wats* has become a mark alike of patriotism and of sophistication(16). But the first of these ideological uses of the faith is not evidence in itself of a deep penetration into social attitudes(17); our evidence for patriotism and sophistication is found among the modernizing middle classes; but here foreigners like the American Colonel Olcott (designer of the flag of the World Fellowship of Buddhists) had too conspicuous a hand(18). All the states of South-east Asia which profess Buddhism as an official religion contain within their frontiers hill populations, amounting to fifteen or twenty per cent of the total (sixty per cent in Laos)(19), and among them there is, save for the Shans and Kachins of Burma, little or no Buddhist influence; the high ratio of non-Buddhists in Laos might conceivably be an explanation for the triumph of Communi there, but one would be hard put to it to delinea the connection, and it would not be applicable Cambodia. Finally, one must draw attention to t now notorious controversy, started by the la Professor Embree, over the suggestion that Thaila — and presumably some or all of its neighbours has, whether because of its Buddhism or for oth reasons, by comparison with Confucian society exemplified by Japan and Vietnam as much as China), a "loosely-structured" social system(2 Whatever judgement one may pass on the substan of this controversy among sociologists, if it does le weight to the "cultural frontier" proposition of M Harris, it is by emphasizing the individualism behaviour associated with Indian civilization, a that, as we shall now see, might be expected favour the spread of Communist power, not impede it. Taken together, the cultural diversity a individualism of the Buddhist states in South-e Asia have dictated a system of public administrati which most definitely is loosely structured: on t one hand the metropolitan provinces of the pla are lightly policed, whilst on the other those of t hills and the periphery are virtually self-governing governed by native dignitaries, that is. The conn tion between loose government and the success of t Communists' domino strategy of "people's war" been both direct and demonstrable.

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IT IS now time to consider the significant f tures of Marxism-Leninism. Fortunately, t can be done with more certainty, for the politi process is by nature more self-conscious than t religious and the sociological; in both the revolutio ary stage before power is seized and the governm stage after power is seized, the Leninist, it will remembered, envisages his activity as the deliber work of a "subjective factor" in the passive envir ment of the "objective conditions", namely, in context, a state and society dominated by a Buddh church.

There is a common misapprehension abo Lenin's plans for revolution: it is that the master la down cut-and-dried procedures for exploiting ideal "revolutionary situation" — in the colon context, the rise of nationalist sentiment exploita by a Communist Party through "national liberatio or, in an Asian context more specifically, soc injustice over peasant indebtedness exploita through promises of land reform. As a matter fact, Lenin treated all such narrow definitions "objective conditions" with sarcasm, as "infant disorders". Similarly, because he won power in t end by exploiting, in a virtual coup d'état, nationwide crisis, affecting both the exploited a the exploiters ... — a governmental crisis drawi even the backward masses into politics"(21), where

Mao Tse-tung planned and carried out what he called "a protracted war", it has been held that Mao somehow "revised" Lenin and deliberately looked for a specially Chinese "road to socialism" — one, that is, more suited to Chinese conditions than Lenin had known about. This is to misunderstand both of them: Mao does not set himself up even as the equal, let alone a rival, of Lenin(22), the key to whose teaching is the passage:

> "In order to accomplish its task, the revolutionary class (i.e. the Communist Party) must be able to master all forms and aspects of social activity without exception ... and be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another. An army which does not use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare, that the enemy possesses or might possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner. This applies to politics even more than it does to the art of war."(23).

This clearly enjoins the use of any and every "objective condition" to win power for the Party (the "subjective factor") — it does not regard some types of society as more suitable for takeover than others, some as standing in greater moral need of revolution than others: all societies ought to be brought under Communist Party rule, and whatever conditions prevail in them — bad or good — can and ought to be turned to account for that purpose. It was neither necessary nor desirable to try to convert followers to faith in the Party's ultimate object of absolute rule by itself alone: conversion would follow, not precede, subversion. Since all societies exhibit internal tensions, it was preferable to play on those as temporary expedients, by pretending to espouse the interests of one section against another: "The most thorough, alert, and skilful use must be made of any, even the smallest, rift between enemies, and of any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie within the various countries; advantage must be taken of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional." The ally is, of course, to be liquidated once he has served the Party's purpose(24). One would expect a "loosely-structured" society to be more exposed to Leninist opportunism than a tightly-knit one, individualism to lead to more exploitable conflicts of interest than rigid conformism; a free people may not welcome the regime the Communist Party will set up, but that is not the issue on which the individual's collaboration is sought — it is his greed, ambition, or spite which tempts him into deceiving or intimidating his neighbour, not in the avowed name, but at the instigation, of the Party, and, if he still proves recalcitrant, then his fear for his own skin.

The First World War rendered most of Lenin's plans for the Revolution superfluous. As soon as it broke out, he revised his theory to take advantage of it: imperialist war, he wrote, must be turned into civil war to seat the Party in power, "if necessary by undermining the defence of one's own country"(25). The war produced a "governmental crisis" in Russia in which the bourgeoisie overthrew the Czar and, in so doing, set the pattern for the two-stage revolution — the "bourgeois-democratic" stage which destroyed the old regime, and the "national-liberation" stage in which the Communists were able to seize power for themselves alone. A similar pattern was planned for China: in the 1920s, the Russian mission armed and trained Chiang Kai-shek's "bourgeois-democratic" army to conquer central and northern China from the base in Canton, after which Mao and the Chinese Communists planned to mount a coup from within the ranks of Chiang's army and seize power in a second stage(26). It was only when Chiang moved first and Mao had to take to the countryside in pure self-defence that the idea of "people's war" suggested itself to the latter as an alternative road to power. By force of circumstances more than by design, Mao found himself drawn into the way of life of Chinese banditry which had become re-established during the decadence of the Manchu dynasty and which he sublimated into a Marxist-Leninist doctrine in his *Military Writings* of the 1930s. But his methods for enlisting recruits and living off the land can now be seen as an application to the rural scene in China of Lenin's tricks of agitation, propaganda, and subversion. The Japanese invasion of China from 1931 onwards was a godsend, providing an "imperialist war" which Mao could turn into a civil war: in the first place (before 1941), the Japanese destroyed Chiang's administrative apparatus and enabled the cadres of Liu Shao-Ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to move into the vacuum in rural areas; from those bases they were able, in the second place (after 1945), with Stalin's assistance in Manchuria, to fight a conventional campaign and conquer all of China, much as Trotsky's Red Army fought its way across Russia in 1918-20. The technique was repeated under Ho Chi Minh's leadership in Indo-China. The distinction of this last "Revolution" was the skilful use made by the Vietnamese themselves, by the Russian and Chinese Governments, and by crypto-Communists in non-Communist countries, of the "capitalist" press and the anti-colonial sentiment of Third World governments in order to secure the Indo-Chinese Party sympathy and support among its overseas enemies, France and the USA; the Party's diplomatic success compensated for the lack of resources it could muster.

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IN THE writings of Marx, the Revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat were ends, the Communist Party the means or agent for leading the workers in their

struggle; in Lenin's "revision" the roles gradually became reversed, so that the workers' struggle became the means of seating the Party in power: to the disgust of a majority of European Marxians then and ever since, "dictatorship of the proletariat" became dictatorship by the Party, and both the political institutions of the Communist state and the arrangements for management of the means of production were designed to keep the Party in power — in accordance, that is, with the "political realism" of our second quotation from Lenin above: "Dictatorship is rule based directly on force and not restricted by laws; the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is rule won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, rule that is not restricted by laws."(27) It was Stalin who fleshed up the skeleton of Lenin's ideas for the practical governance of the Russian empire; a glance at the state constitutions of other Communist countries suffices to show how closely all are drafted on the one model. The chief features of Stalin's state were: first, the parallel hierarchy of Party and administration, subordinating the latter at all levels (even in nominally autonomous "republics" like the Ukraine or Uzbekistan), to the former(28); second, the working principle of "democratic centralism" whereby all decisions are taken at the centre and adopted by mass resolution all the way down, and from which nobody is allowed to dissociate himself; third, collectivization, which ties peasants to their land and workers to their factories, serflike, and prevents the retention of economic resources outside Party control; and fourth, exclusion of any element of choice from personal decisions in people's lives, coupled with a Party monopoly of paper, printing presses, and all other means of communication. The Party envisages itself as no mere administrator of the state but as a custodian of the interests of the masses (whether "the proletariat" or "the whole people"), possessing both a right and a duty to mould Society and create the New Man through a "socialist transformation" which amounts to curbing individual will by environmental conditioning: ethnic differences, like cultural ones, are gradually obliterated in favour of a countrywide — eventually a worldwide — norm(29). Immediate differences between the Stalinist state in Russia and that in China or in Indo-China are temporary adjustments to the society that has been taken over; although there may be different roads to Socialism, they do not diverge further but converge.

Two consequences of special relevance to our inquiry flow from these characteristics and purposes of the Stalinist state. The first is that no church, any more than a political party, can continue to function under it except to a limited extent, and then only with the day-to-day and place-to-place sanction of the Communist Party, which is concerned solely with diverting the church's resources into the single orthodox channel, dictated by preservation of the Party's monopoly of power. The second consequen is that a totalitarian regime is enabled to mobilize resources nationwide yet in complete secrecy, witho risk of parliamentary (Congressional) criticism, st less Pentagon Paper-type betrayal, and to use the in order to conduct subversion or "people's wa among its neighbours. It remains to consider t historical record of how "subjective factors" worki on these principles have succeeded or failed in t attempt to dominate Buddhist societies, especially South-east Asia, in the closely-linked twin contexts winning power in more territories and of exercising after it has been won.

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THE COMINTERN interested itself rather la in the Buddhist countries of South-east Asia: approach to dependent territories was through t Communist Parties of the metropolis, so that Tha land was left out altogether, Burma not distinguish from British India, Laos and Cambodia not disti guished from Vietnam. The Burmese Communi Party was an offshoot (1939) of the Indian(30), a in Laos and Cambodia the only Communists we Chinese or Vietnamese immigrants(31). From 194 when the *Cominform* took the place of the *Comi tern,* it became Moscow policy, adopted by Peki after 1949, to advance Communist power along t lines simultaneously — corresponding, one might s to "the obligatory combination of illegal with le forms of struggle" laid down by Lenin(32): on o hand, "people's war" was fostered in the hi jungles, and minority areas of South-east Asi countries, whether still under colonial rule or alrea "bourgeois-democratically" independent and (in L ninist theory) ripe for "national liberation"; on t other hand, the same "bourgeois-democratic" gover ments were wooed by aid and diplomatic support, the hope of detaching them from actual or projecte alignment with the USA and Western Europe a thereby realigning them with the Communist wor in the counsels of the expanding General Assemb of the United Nations. It should be emphasized th there is no contradiction between these two lines, n do they represent differences of policy between o decade and another, still less between Russia a China: the dominant interest of all Communists is weaken "capitalism" — Communist-Party takeover sequential. Periodical changes of emphasis on o line or the other have simply been the "domin tactics enjoined by Lenin "at each particular m ment to find the particular link in the chain whi one must grasp with all one's might in order to ke hold of the whole chain in preparation for tackli the next link"(33). Apparent differences of poli between Russia and China towards the countries South-east Asia can all be explained by the diffe ence of geographical relationship to them of the t Powers; the Sino-Soviet dispute, in so far as it affe "national liberation", has been over tactics, n

ltimate aims, and in the case of Indo-China the two ollaborated in logistics and diplomacy to make ertain the Indo-Chinese Party's final victory.

In defending themselves against either of these wo lines, it is hard to detect any strength that has ccrued to target governments from the Buddhism of heir peoples. In Laos, hill folk neither Lao nor uddhist were mobilized to fill the ranks of the atriotic Forces engaged in "people's war" to over- ome the Buddhist Lao king and "smash the idyllic olonial garden of Buddhism on the Mekong"(34); hose who opposed them most gallantly were others f their own race and culture, not the king's uddhist subjects, whose lack of martial valour arned them the contempt of Western journalists. In urma, the first Communist insurrection arose mong a Buddhist population, and probed into the ery suburbs of Rangoon, under Burman leaders who ad learnt Marxism-Leninism from books rather an the Moscow schools and had overhastily set up n undisciplinable plethora of front organizations ncluding the All-Burma Fire Brigade!)(35); they ruck prematurely, while still isolated from succour y either Russia or China, fell out among themselves he Red and the White Flags), and eventually were eaten. Better luck has attended the separatist ovements among the hill peoples of Burma, upported from China(36); the Shans are Buddhists, e Karens are Christian, the Kachins are mostly either, and yet all have been drawn in, giving rong arguments for the view of Sir Edmund Leach at the socio-political dynamics of the region (before here were any Communists in it) were the product personal, sectarian, and factional feuds which lied on religion and mythology for explanations d justifications(37) — as, we might add, Leninists ly on Marxism. In Laos, the Royal Government rtured the idea that Buddhist missionaries sent into e hills might somehow tame the rebelliousness of e minorities under Vietnamese Communist leader- ip; but, in the coalition governments of 1957 and 973, the Communists demanded the Ministry of eligion for their Party with the clear intention of bverting the Buddhist communities of the lowlands rough manipulation of the Sangha. In Thailand, ommunist insurgents in the North are non-Bud- ist, in the North-east Buddhist; in Cambodia, the nk and file of the Khmers Rouges were almost tirely Vietnamese in 1970, but these had been placed with Cambodian Buddhists by 1975. In ese countries, the question whether a local com- unity was imbued with Buddhist values was idently unimportant to the promoters of "people's ar".

In pursuit of the diplomatic line, China, if not directly Russia, has tried to enlist Buddhism on its de. After a crude, barefaced, appeal broadcast in 953 from the Chinese Shan province for a pan-Thai tate(38), Chinese forward policy concentrated, more btly, on the "five principles of peaceful co-existence", enunciated during the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese rapprochement the following year; though appropriated from the vocabulary of Muslim Sukarno, *pancha sila* was a Buddhist term, of course, designed to persuade that China championed the pacifist Middle Way of that faith — in the hope no doubt that they had not read Mao Tse-tung's extremist statement shortly before, that neutralism was all a fraud(39). The Russians — though preaching at home that neutralism was "a dangerous illusion"(40) — similarly tried to persuade U Nu at this time that Buddhism still flourished among the Buryats under Marxist-Leninist auspices(41). The Burmese and the Cambodian response was to adopt the slogan "Buddhist Socialism" as their national ideology: Burmese Communists and non-Communists alike rejected "capitalism" on the basis of Marx's analysis of it, but they interpreted the analysis into Burmese in the vocabulary of Buddhism(42); if the object of the Revolution was social betterment — a postulate in which Burmese and Cambodian leaders were profoundly deceived — and if that was what won revolutionaries their recruits among the peasants, then Communism might be appeased and disarmed on both counts by the adoption of a Marxian state economy.

Although we have practically no direct evidence about grass-roots transactions between guerrillas and peasants in either Burma or Cambodia, the circumstantial evidence is strong that neither religion nor the social policies of their governments have influenced Communist fortunes in the least; what has settled matters — or left them unsettled — is a combination of the fortunes of war, with the interest of the big Communist Powers, in moderating the speed at which the second, "national-liberation", stage of the Revolution proceeds. It would not have been wise for Moscow or Peking to try to arm the Burmese insurgents for an all-out seizure of power in Rangoon while a Burmese official was Secretary-General of the United Nations or until the USA and other capitalist powers had been discouraged from resistance to "national liberation". Conversely, Laos and Cambodia have been brought under total Communist rule by a Leninist combination of political manoeuvre and battle tactics in the first case, by brute force in the second, including a large number of atrocities aimed deliberately at breaking the spirit of the Sangha and of scaring the masses away from solidarity with it(43); these Buddhist communities have not given evidence of any power to prevent the Communists from getting their way where politicians and soldiers have failed — they have been no more impervious to Marxist-Leninist revolution than non-Buddhist communities.

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THE final aspect of our question is whether, after the last battle has been lost, Buddhist communities have proved impervious to the consoli-

dation of Communist rule over them. The purpose of "socialist transformation", we saw earlier, is to make it possible for the Party to wield a monopoly of power indefinitely without risk of serious opposition; are Buddhists harder than others to transform into "New Men" subservient to this purpose? Put negatively, the question might be phrased: Are they any less likely to be cowed into obedience than adherents of other faiths or of none?

The constitutions of all Stalinist states proclaim freedom of worship; none contain any provisions for the self-maintenance of churches against the monopoly of financial and economic resources held by the state on behalf of the Party. There are one or two states within the Soviet system where the full rigours of the Stalinist arrangements do not apply yet: in Poland, the Catholic Church is allowed to maintain and perpetuate itself — undoutedly for external as much as internal reasons, namely Moscow's desire not to scare Catholics in countries like France, Italy, or Portugal. But sects which have no substantial body of sympathizers abroad, alert and influential, to inquire about their fate, are subject to measures of varying severity to discourage or impede their continuance: "We can never approve of religious doctrine," says the Chinese military command; "we are bound to repudiate idealism, monasticism, and all kinds of religious superstition."(44) Although the 1975 Chinese Constitution grants "freedom to believe in religion", persons "found worshipping gods" are, if wall posters can be credited, subject to enforced "voluntary labour". Here too, Communist governments pursue two policies at the same time: whilst a limited number of religious institutions are kept in good order to impress foreign visitors — for example, the Peking mosque, frequented by Muslim diplomats(45) —, and a national association is maintained which can send delegates to "peace movements" that help disarm international resistance to the extension of Communist power(46), spontaneous activity by the faithful is prevented by the withholding of resources so that the faith gradually withers save for state hand-outs(47). There seem to have been no Buddhist ordinations in China since 1947; fast diminishing numbers of them even during the previous years of "Liberation" — coinciding with curtailment of revenue from the gifts of the faithful and from land or other capital goods that were owned by monasteries on endowment, but expropriated under land reform and collectivization — drove existing monks and nuns back into lay life from hunger(48). The same policy was being pursued by the Communists in the "liberated areas" of Laos during the very time when, as we saw just now, they were demanding control of the Ministry of Religion in areas of the country not yet liberated(49). The only reprieve Buddhists can look for is by letting themselves be used as propaganda agents for the Communist government, helping it to control their congregations more effectually(50).

This amounts to an extension to the religious field of the role assigned to non-Communist politic parties of mobilizing the collaboration of other class than the workers, peasants, and soldiers (represent by Communist parties in policies of "the leadi Party", so that the latter is spared the obloquy having to resort to draconian methods for getting way with the masses). Since the fall of Saigon, t An Quang Pagoda — one of whose monks, Thi Tri Quang, waved the Olcott flags to herald t overthrow of the Communists' most implacab enemy, the late President Ngo Dinh Diem, and o of whose lay figures, General Duong Van Min surrendered the city to the Communist army — nominal publisher of a new Buddhist magazin described as "the voice of patriotic Buddhists" an called *Giac Ngo* ("Bodhicitta" or "Undeception" But the editors are from the jungle, not the pagod the Lotus has to share pride of symbolism with t five-pointed star, and the "patriotic Buddhists" ur unity between the flourishing church in Sou Vietnam with that of North Vietnam(51) (whic withered away twenty years ago, except for t person of Thich Tri Do who attends internation gatherings in its name); whereas Thich Tri Quan himself is in prison for questioning the politic regime he once helped towards victory(52).

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THE acid test of Buddhism's capacity to prote its devotees from the social engineering of Stalinist state is to be sought, not so much countries like Russia or China where it is a minor faith, as in monarchies where the sovereign explicitly or implicitly, head of the Sangha, conversely, the head of the Sangha is the sovereig Alas, it is in the latter group, where there is Lama Buddhism, that the religious way of life has be transformed most swiftly and radically by Communi parties newly come to power. The Russians ma short shrift of the regime in Mongolia: when t Living Buddha died opportunely for them in 192 they vetoed the popular procedure for recognizing h successor(53). In Tibet — whose constitutional co nection with China was hardly more intimate tha Mongolia's was with Russia and which therefo stood, from Peking's point of view, in equal impelling need of "socialist transformation" lest seceded — the Chinese Communists, when th decided to set up the Tibetan Autonomous Regi (that is, to move in in force to begin assimilation did not have the good fortune the Russians had Mongolia thirty-five years earlier, for the Dalai La was a young man and no Leninist "crisis government" was in sight. The Dalai Lama fled India, however, and Buddhists were commanded the Party to acknowledge his rival, the Panch Lama, long obliged to reside in Peking, instead(54 That was but a step towards dethronement of lamas: within a year or two, the Panchen too w officially denounced as "opposing the people (i.e. t Party), the fatherland (China, not the Autonomo

Region), and socialism (i.e. Communism)" and has remained in detention, undergoing "re-education", ever since(55). Meanwhile, at the level of the masses, a vast campaign was begun by Party cadres, under the auspices of the army, to suspend all ordinations into the priesthood, to break up community life, to exploit Leninist tensions between villager and villager ("identification of class enemies"), and to condition the younger generation by removing them to distant workplaces and sever their links with home(56). Even Lamaism, itself strongly martial, could not withstand overwhelming military force; that both the faith and the way of life associated with it were virtually at an end was evidenced during the Cultural Revolution, when, under orders from Red Guards, final defilement of the monasteries and their scriptures was carried out by Tibetan hands(57). If it can be done in Tibet, it can assuredly be done in every Buddhist country.

From Laos, we have little news save of the abolition of the monarchy and of the same compulsory back-to-the-land movement of urban and other population not already tilling the fields, that has marked consolidation of Communist power all over Indo-China during the past year; presumably the slithering process noted earlier under Party rule in the Plain of Jars will be set in train in the towns as well. In Cambodia, the hatchet work against Sangha and monarchy dates from the banishment by the anti-Communists of the Samdech(58), Sihanouk, and the 1970 declaration of the Republic, under which the Buddhist masses were unable, as we saw on a previous page, to protect either themselves or their pagodas from the terrorizing onslaughts of the North Vietnamese Army and its Khmer recruits henceforward cheered on by the Samdech from his armchair in Peking. News from Cambodia today is scantier even than from Laos, but the reality of the bloodbath which has ensued — second in our times only to Hitler in the enormity and speed of its ferocity(59) — and the marches and countermarches of labourers in bondage(60), reminiscent of the friezes at Angkor Wat (Vishnuist, not Buddhist), must have obliterated whatever remained of the community of monks together with the lay community organized around them.

It is not only the shattering of the illusion of Buddhist invulnerability, trusted in by the masses of South-east Asia, and the suffering of those who have put the matter involuntarily to the test, but the unwillingness of fellow Buddhists to evince even the mildest sorrow, such is the strength of their trust in weakness. A sincere sympathizer and admirer of the Theravada, himself a delegate at congresses of the World Federation of Buddhists in the 1950s and '60s, sadly recorded the prevalence of an attitude among Asian Buddhists corresponding to Lenin's strictures on European and American intellectuals for lack of realization when Communists were trapping them into self-destruction:

> "Buddhism is inherently disposed to co-operate in its own destruction. ... I had assumed when I embarked on my tour of Asia that Buddhists there would be distressed, if not appalled, by the Chinese Buddhist Association's doctrinal revision (to the effect that killing reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries is compassionate and satisfies the vow not to destroy life), particularly the Theravadin Buddhists, who take pride in the purity of their doctrine. I am afraid that I can hardly report any distress at all."(61)

Notes and References

1. See, for example, the well-documented conclusion in this sense of Trevor Ling, *Buddha, Marx and God* (London, 1966), pp. 89ff. Captain Kong Le of Laos pleaded this view to excuse his own rocking of the boat in the face of "people's war" directed from outside Laos: H. Toye, *Laos* (Oxford, 1968), p. 142.

2. G. Coulet, *Les Sociétés secrètes en terre d'Annam* (Saigon, 1926), p. 39. Amulets against bullets are not exclusively Buddhist; on their occurrence among Muslims [*jimat*], see S. Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java* (Singapore, 1973), p. 11.

3. Quoted in Lazitch & Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern* (Stanford, 1972), p. 1,549.

4. *The Listener* (London), 28 September 1962.

5. Emile Gaspardone, "Annamites et Thai au XV^{e}siècle", *Journal Asiatique* (Paris, 1939): CCXXXI, pp. 405-36.

6. Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China* (Princeton, 1964), p. 400, compared with Klaus Wenk, *The Restoration of Thailand under Rama I, 1782-1809* (Tucson, 1968), pp. 38-42.

7. P. Pelliot, *Mémoires sur les Coutumes du Cambodge de Tcheou Ta-kouan* (Paris, 1951), pp. 14-5.

8. E.g. Chau Ju-kua (eleventh century), edited by Hirth & Rockhill (St. Petersburg, 1911), pp. 47-54; G. Quiroga de San Antonio (sixteenth century), edited by A. Cabaton, *Relation du Cambodge* (Paris, 1914), pp. 7-8.

9. E.R. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (London, 1964), p. 287.

10. *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu, 1968), p. 253.

11. P. B. Lafont, "Introduction du Bouddhisme au Laos" in René Berval, *Présence du Bouddhisme* (Saigon, 1959), p. 892.

12. *Buddhism in Chinese History* (Stanford, 1959), p. 98.

13. H. Maspero, *Les Religions chinoises* (Paris, 1950), p. 193.

14. H.G. Quaritch Wales, *Ancient Siamese Government and Administration* (London, 1934), pp. 237-50.

15. R. Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia* (Cornell, 1956), p. 10.

16. G. Condominas, "Le Bouddhisme populaire en milieu rural Lao", *Archives de Sociologie des Religions* (Paris, 1968): XXVI, pp. 144-5.

17. Maung Htin Aung, *History of Burma* (Columbia, 1967), pp. 242-3.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 272; G. Navarine, "Le Colonel H.S. Olcott", *Lotus Bleu* (Paris, February 1969), pp. 33-8. For the extent of Olcott's doctrinal influence — and a modest reference to his own — see Christmas Humphreys, *Buddhism* (London, 1951), pp. 70-1.

19. J.M. Halpern, *Economics and Society of Laos* (Berkeley, 1964), p. 11.

20. H. — D. Evers, *Loosely Structured Social Systems: Thailand in Comparative Perspective* (Yale, 1969).

21. *Works:* XXXI, p. 85.

22. Mao situates his own teaching, in the phrase "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought" (e.g. in article 2 of the 19[illegible] Constitution), as a mere commentary of "thought" [*ssu-hsiang*] on the dominating "-ism" [*chu i*] of Marx and Lenin — inequality of expression more marked in the Chinese than in English; his basic essay on revolutionary tactics, "On Contradiction", is an elaboration of Lenin's essays on dialectics [*Works: XXXVIII*], from which it quotes many references.

23. *Works:* XXXI, p. 96. For the intention to indicate the Party when using "class", see *ibid.*, p. 47. This passage is often quoted as a basic text by later Communists (e.g. by the Vietnamese in *Hoc Tap*, September 1966), directly or via Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* (Peking edition, 1970).

24. *Works:* XXXI, pp. 70-1.

25. *Ibid.:* XXIII, p. 373.

26. Ideally, the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911 would have been China's "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, and it is sometimes so regarded (e.g. in note 17 to the 1966 edition of Mao's "On Contradiction"; but the view in 1924 was as stated here.

27. *Works:* XXVIII, p. 236.

28. Leonid Brezhnev, "All Communists in this country, regardless of nationality, are members of the single Leninist Party", *USSR Fifty* (Moscow, 1972), p. 34.

29. The Chinese exponent of this policy, Comrade Chang Chih-i, attributes its inspiration to Lenin's *Theses on the National and Colonial Questions* (1920); G. Moseley, *The Party and the Nationality Question in China* (M.I.T., 1966), p. 121.

30. J.H. Brimmell, *Communism in Southeast Asia* (Oxford, 195[illegible] p. 120.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 114 (Thailand); obituary of Comrade Tran Phu in *Communist International* (Moscow, 1932): No. 14, p. 67 (Laos and Cambodia).

32. *Works:* XXXI, p. 36.

33. *Ibid.:* XXVII; p. 82.

34. *Giai Phong* ("Liberation" — Saigon): 12 October 1975.

35. L.W. Pye, *Southeast Asia's Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 48.

36. Reports in *The Guardian* (Rangoon, 27 April, 26 May, October, 1968). Chinese encouragement of the "war-winning liquidating, seizure of power" appears in *New China News Agency* bulletins for 1 July 1967.

37. *Op. cit.*, especially conclusions in pp. 264-78.

38. V. Thompson & R. Adloff, *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia* (Stanford 1955), pp. 223-8.

39. *People's Democratic Dictatorship* (Peking, 1949), p. 5.

40. *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia,* quoted in R.N. Carew-Hunt's *Guide to Communist Jargon* (London, 1957), p. 97.

41. His encounter in Moscow 1955 with the Chief Lama described by W. Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (London, 1961), p. 459.

42. M. Sarkisyanz, "Social Ethics of Buddhism" in M. Rudner, *Society and Development in Asia* (Jerusalem, 1970), p. 8, p. 17.

43. Ministère de l'Information, *Livre Blanc sur l'Agression 1970-71* (Phnom Penh, 1971).

44. Army periodical, *Red Flag,* August 1969.

45. *New China News Agency,* 4 January 1974.

46. E.g. the Chief Lama of Mongolia who recently took the chair at the Executive Council of the Asian Buddhist Peace Movement in Moscow (*Radio Peace and Progress,* 7 October 1975).

47. This is an old trick: in the 1830s, the Emperor of Vietnam disciplined the Sangha by limiting supplies of imported incense, paper, and tea: A. B. Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model* (Harvard, 1971), p. 28.

48. H.H. Welch, *Buddhism under Mao* (Harvard, 1972), pp. 117-24.

49. G. Chapelier & J. van Malderghem, "Plain of Jars Social Changes under Five Years of Pathet-Lao Administration", *Asia Quarterly* (Brussels, 1971): No. 1, p. 70.

50. Exhortation by Comrade Kaysone Phomvihan that monks should use their influence to persuade the laity to work harder [*Radio Vientiane,* 1 January 1976]. Monks in Khmer-Krom communities in South Vietnam are ordered to tell their followers, not only to work harder, but to have faith in the genuineness of Communist electoral arrangements [*Liberation Radio,* 13 March 1976].

51. Charles Antoine de Merciat reporting for *Agence France Presse,* 8 January 1976.

52. *United Press International* report 14 August 1975. Thich Tri Quang was one of those Buddhists who believed that his faith had a social and political role to play as neutral Third Force between Communist expansionism and "capitalist" resistance (Sermon in *Dan Ta* [Saigon daily newspaper], 21 October 1964).

53. T.T. Hammond, *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers* (Yale, 1975) p. 133.

54. K. Ch'en, *op. cit.,* p. 469.

55. Mention of his present whereabouts by Miss Han Su-yin to *U.P.I.,* 10 November 1975; Miss Han omits the "re-".

56. Dawa Norbu, "Tibetan Response to Chinese 'Liberation'", *Asian Affairs* (London), October 1975.

57. Eyewitness report in *The Guardian Extra* (London), 6 June 1975.

58. Ironically, this title — which Sihanouk took after his abdication in favour of his father and the latter's premature death — seems to mean in the original Sanskrit/Pali something like "Commissar".

59. Ferocious, but still following the example of Lenin: "My most vivid impressions (on talking to Lenin)," wrote Bertrand Russell, "were of bigotry and Mongolian cruelty. When I put a question to him about socialism in agricultural, he explained with glee how he had incited the poorer peasants against the richer ones, 'and they soon hanged them from the nearest tree — ha! ha! ha!' His guffaw at the thought of those massacred made my blood run cold." — *Unpopular Essays* (London, 1950), p. 219.

60. Reports of Martin Woollacott in *The Guardian* (London), 15 and 22 February 1976; also *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 26 March 1976.

61. H.H. Welch, *op. cit.,* pp. 438-40.

VIETNAM: *Now that the Communists have been in control of the South for over a year, the author provides a detailed account of their achievements there to date. Particular attention is given to the structure of the Vietnam Workers' Party's rigid control at all levels of the southern polity.*

Political Developments in South Vietnam: Transition to Socialism

Carlyle A. Thayer

ACCORDING to theorists of the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) the "national democratic" stage of revolution came to an end on 30 April 1975 when the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) surrendered its forces unconditionally(1). In the twelve months which have elapsed since then, South Vietnam has passed through a transitional stage of consolidation and stabilization. This phase ended on 25 April 1976 when elections were held throughout Vietnam for a new National Assembly. This Assembly is composed of deputies representing constituents all over Vietnam. Its members will form a new national government which will embark on a programme of building socialism in a unified Vietnam. Thus, according to VWP analysts, Vietnam's unification will be complete as the two governing administrations for the North and South merge at the state level.

This process marks the end of separate political and administrative organs in South Vietnam. A new front structure will merge the Fatherland Front in the North with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL). A unified government will render redundant the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG)(2). One unified command will oversee the integration of units of the northern People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) with the southern People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF).

The driving force behind the revolution in Vietnam, now openly acknowledged by all groups in the South, is the Vietnam Workers' Party [*Dang Lao Dong*]. During the course of over a decade and a half of fighting in Vietnam, the VWP's role was obscure and confused. Western Press reporting compounded this by referring to the southern branch of the VWP as the "Viet Cong" (short for *Viet-Nam Cong-San* — Vietnamese Communist) as if it were a separate entity from the VWP in the North(3). The name "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP) was used by the VWP to refer to its southern organization, especially in publications designed for circulation abroad. Since April 1975 the southern organization [*dang bo mien nam*] of the VWP has emerged as the prime political group in the South. There can be no doubt as to the unity of the Party as senior members of the VWP's southern organization are simultaneously members of the Party's Central Committee.

This article is primarily concerned with the policies adopted and the problems encountered by the VWP in South Vietnam during the first year of liberation. For convenience of analysis interrelated policies will be arbitrarily considered under six main headings: leadership, public order and security, political control, economic development, social affairs, and reunification.

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THROUGHOUT the twelve months following the collapse of the RVN the most significant development in the area of leadership was the emergence of previously little known VWP personalities into positions of prominence. Heretofore stress had been given to the nominal leadership of the PRG and its Advisory Council, as well as members of the Presidium of the NFL. After liberation the southern organization of the VWP ended its underground existence. Its members were identified as occupying key posts on the transitional Military Management Committees (MMC) and in interlocking posts in the PRG and NFL structures. All officials

Press and radio coverage listed senior Party officials before their non-Party counterparts.

VWP importance was first demonstrated on the Military Management Committees, which were formed immediately after the collapse of RVN power. These MMCs maintained public order and concerned themselves with all the major functions of government . They existed at various levels and as security conditions improved they were replaced by civilian-dominated People's Revolutionary Committees (PRCs). The most important MMC was that for the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. It was formed on 3 May 1975 and continued to function until 21 January 1976 when it handed over power to the Ho Chi Minh City (as Saigon is now called) PRC(4).

The Saigon-Gia Dinh MMC comprised eleven individuals, four military (Colonel General Tran Van Tra, Major General Hoang Cam, Major General Tran Van Danh and Colonel Bui Thanh Kiet) and seven civilians (Vo Van Kiet, Mai Chi Tho, Cao Dang Tien, Nguyen Van Thu, Duong Ky Hiep, Vo Thanh Van and Phan Minh Tan). At least seven of these men are overt members of the VWP and Tran Van Tra, the MMC chairman, is a member of the VWP Central Committee, a post to which he was appointed in 1960(5).

The existence of the VWP's southern organization, a subject of prolonged speculation by Western intelligence analysts(6), was dramatically revealed on 13 May last year, when a joint delegation comprising members of the VWP Central Committee, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) and the Fatherland Front arrived in Saigon from Hanoi to attend victory celebrations scheduled for 15 May. On hand to greet these guests were Pham Hung (identified as a member of the VWP Politburo and as the Secretary of the South Vietnam Party organization) and Nguyen Van Linh (Deputy Secretary of the South Vietnam Party organization). Linh was later officially identified as a member of the VWP Central Committee, a post to which he was probably appointed in the 1960s. Tran Van Tra and Tran Nam Trung were also present at the airport (thus ending all speculation as to whether they were the same individuals). Both of these men have been officially identified as members of the VWP Central Committee.

As 1975 wore on the VWP's dominance over all other organizations became more noticeable. In August a 31-member delegation from South Vietnam went to the DRVN to attend celebrations marking the DRVN's thirtieth anniversary. Pham Hung led the southern delegation (thus taking precedence over the PRG's Huynh Tan Phat). Among his three deputies were two VWP Central Committee members: Vo Chi Cong and Tran Nam Trung(7). Among the crowd seeing the delegation off from Saigon was Phan Xuan Thai, another member of the VWP Central Committee and a Deputy Secretary of the South Vietnam Party Committee.

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IN NOVEMBER 1975, 25-member joint delegations from the North and South held talks in Saigon on the modalities of reunification. Once again VWP Politburo member Pham Hung was appointed head of the southern delegation, this time taking precedence over three senior non-Party officials: Nguyen Huu Tho (President of the PRG Advisory Council), Huynh Tan Phat (PRG President) and Trinh Dinh Thao (Vice President of the PRG Advisory Council). Listed fifth and sixth, however, were the ubiquitous Vo Chi Cong and Tran Nam Trung, both members of the VWP Central Committee.

As a result of these November talks, plans for national elections were drawn up for early 1976. Both delegations were to obtain ratification of the preliminary agreement. For the southern delegates this meant convening a second Congress of People's Representatives, which it did in December(8). It was at this meeting that the full influence of the VWP was revealed. Among the 276 delegates the following overt VWP members occupied positions on the Presidium: Pham Hung, Tran Nam Trung, Nguyen Ho (head of the Ho Chi Minh municipal VWP committee), Phan Minh Tan (Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh People's Revolutionary Youth Union Central Committee), Nguyen Van Chi (former head of the Saigon VWP committee), Nguyen Van (standing committee member of the Thua Thien — Hue VWP committee), Nguyen Quang Tu (standing committee member of the Central Trung Bo VWP committee), Nguyen Van Hoa (member of the Eastern Nam Bo VWP Committee), Nguyen Van An (member of the Central Nam Bo VWP committee), and Vo Van Si (member of the Western Nam Bo VWP committee).

The significance of the five last-named individuals is twofold. Firstly, their presence revealed a previously unpublicized level of administration within the Party's southern organization, —inter-zonal committees between the regional and provincial levels. Secondly, all five of these men were identified as occupying concurrent posts on the counterpart non-Party Provisional Revolutionary Committees. Vo Van Si, to take one example, was both a member of the Western Nam Bo VWP committee as well as of the Western Nam Bo PRC.

In other words the PRG Council of Ministers, consisting mainly of non-Party personalities, was the tip of a pyramid whose intermediate layers were composed of Party-dominated committees. A similar situation obtained within the NFL. For example, within the Presidium of the NFL's Central Commit-

tee three of its six vice-presidents are senior VWP officials: Tran Bach Dang, Tran Nam Trung and Vo Chi Cong. Two ordinary members of the Presidium are also Party officials: Dang Tran Thi and Phan Xuan Thai. More remarkable, however, was the revelation in November that Pham Hung, in addition to all his other posts, was also the VWP's representative in the NFL(9). Hung had never been listed as a member of the NFL and neither had a Party post within the NFL been so advertised before. More intriguing still was the identification earlier in the year of Nguyen Minh Duong as head of the Party's "Front Committee"(10). It would seem that claims made earlier by American and RVN officials that the Party controlled the front were accurate.

A major reorganization of the previously clandestine NFL Committee for the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone was announced at its third congress held in Saigon from 27-29 July last year. Not surprisingly, senior VWP officials were appointed to key posts on the Presidium. Nguyen Van Chi was elected chairman, while Party members Nguyen Ho and Ta Ba Tong were appointed vice-chairmen.

By the end of 1975 three main Party committees had been identified: the Party's southern organization (probably with exclusive responsibility for Nam Bo)(11), the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee and the Zone 5 VWP Committee (in Trung Bo, headed by Vo Chi Cong). The chain of command from these committees ran upwàrd directly to the VWP Central Committee. Subordinate to the Nam Bo and Trung Bo regional VWP committees, as we have seen, were intra-zonal Party committees. Throughout the year provincial Party committees became public.

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THE sudden collapse of the RVN was an unprecedented event for it left a majority of ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) soldiers under arms at the very moment power developed to the Party and its political and military forces. In the interval between the occupation of urban centres by PAVN-PLAF units and the creation of the first MMCs, thousands of ARVN troops went into hiding, taking their weapons and ammunition with them.

It is therefore not surprising that among the first communiqués issued by the revolutionary authorities were those dealing with the registration of "enemy" (i.e. ARVN) personnel and the turning in of arms at specially designated centres. It quickly became apparent that the revolutionaries lacked adequate manpower to cope with such an enormous task and deadlines had to be repeatedly extended. By late August 1975 it was estimated by one observer that only 300,000 men out of one million had registered. In December another source indicated that this figure had risen to one million but tha civilian as well as military persons had bee included(12). Perhaps 600,000 went unregistered.

Simultaneously with the disarming and di banding of ARVN units, the revolutionary forc moved quickly to seize public utilities and vit industries. In this they were aided by covert grou formed prior to liberation which had been set up fo such a task(13). No major acts of sabotage wer reported and water and electricity continued to b provided for Saigon residents. Later the Par organized security details at each installation com posed of trusted employees.

In May 1975 the Party, through the Saigon-Gi Dinh MMC, began to implement a system of contr at the most basic level: cells of from 10-1 households were created in the hamlets and neigh bourhoods. Over the course of the year this syste was extended and improved so that a majority o South Vietnam's population was under supervision o one kind or another through membership in "a va network and hierarchy of committees and associa tions, from the so-called 'solidarity cells' of te households...to province and city councils, trad unions, and left-wing pressure groups within th Church and Buddhist sects."(14)

After the initial period of consolidation, th various MMCs moved into the next phase of contr the commencement of re-education programmes fo various classes of ex-RVN personnel, both civilia and military. The initial announcements seemed t indicate that the length of these sessions would b relatively short. For example, lower-ranking soldie and officials were initially required to attend on three-day session while higher ranking officers wer slated for an initial session of thirty days.

This programme too ran into difficulties as th new revolutionary authorities could not cope with th numbers involved. On 11 June it was announced tha due to "improper organization" the period of stud reform would be extended until the end of th month. Apparently the length and quality of th study reform courses varied enormously for the lowe echelons of former RVN personnel. The main aim o these courses seems to have been to convey th revolutionary viewpoint to men who had until s recently opposed the revolution. Lectures were pr sented on such topics as the history of Vietnam, th nature of US neo-colonialism, war crimes, etc.. Aft these lectures those in attendance were asked t acknowledge the error of their ways and to rela their own "crimes and misdeeds" publicly.

The prolonged absence of mid-level and seni officials led to a spate of rumours and caused unre among their families. In July, in fact, it was reporte that wives of ex-RVN officers attending study refor

organized a demonstration outside the headquarters of the Saigon-Gia Dinh MMC to demand news(15). These and other pressures mounted so that the MMC thought it prudent to dismiss the rumours. In August it was announced that certain courses had ended and that "officers and civil servants" would shortly return home. Over the course of the following months several reports were made public to indicate that small numbers were being returned(16).

It is significant, however, that these education courses for senior officers were described in early announcements as constituting "the first phase". An editorial in *Saigon Giai Phong* (Saigon Liberation) stated that the "graduates" of such courses could only prove their sincerity by returning to their native villages, performing productive labour and helping the people "wipe out the counter-revolutionaries and wicked elements and detect and smash all enemy designs"(17).

This latter item refers, of course, to a persistent problem faced by the new revolutionary authorities in South Vietnam: the continuance of armed resistance in both the cities and countryside. Some of the violence is clearly of an apolitical nature (crime, for example); the most serious acts however are directly linked to groups in opposition to the PRG.

There appear to be four main groups conducting armed die-hard resistance to Communist rule: certain ethnic minority elements in the Central Highlands; ex-ARVN personnel who operate in scattered and as yet unco-ordinated groups in isolated pockets throughout South Vietnam, but mainly in the provinces adjacent to the Cambodian border to the west and south-west of Saigon; elements of the Hoa Hao sect concentrated in and around Soc Trang province; and Catholic dissidents, mainly in the urban areas. Most of the armed resistance has been overcome and what opposition remains is of a low-level kind. For example, montagnard militia groups (ex-ARVN) and breakaway factions from FULRO (United Struggle Front of Oppressed Races) operated for a time in the Central Highlands. By mid-1975, however, they had been crushed and their radio station "Viet Nam Dau Thuong" (Suffering Vietnam) forced off the air(18).

Nevertheless Party officials still remain preoccupied with security considerations. In February 1976, after the Saigon MMC had officially turned over power to a civilian PRC, one of the most spectacular episodes of resistance occurred at the Vinh Son Church in Ho Chi Minh City itself(19). A unit of the municipal internal security service stumbled upon an armed resistance group equipped with portable radios and machines capable of counterfeiting PRG currency. A gun battle erupted and one security cadre was killed before the group was apprehended. The revolutionary authorities gave wide publicity to this incident and stimulated numerous civic and religious groups to publicly denounce the resisters.

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IN ADDITION to establishing its physical control over remnants of the former RVN regime, the VWP has moved to monopolize political control over all areas of activity. Immediately after its formation, the Saigon-Gia Dinh MMC moved to abolish all political parties which operated under the constitution of the RVN. Among the proscribed groups: the Democratic Party, the Worker-Peasant Party, the United Vietnam Nationalist Party, Can Lao Nhan Vi Party, Tan Dai Viet Party, Nhan Van Cach Mang Party, the VNQDD (Nationalist Party), Tu Do Party, the Vietnam Restoration Party, Dai Viet Party, Cap Tien (Radical) Party and the Social Democratic Alliance. Leaders of these "reactionary political parties" were ordered to register and undergo political re-education. All property and other assets belonging to these groups was to be inventoried and turned over to the care of the MMC.

A similar policy was implemented towards all trade unions which operated under the old RVN. These were disbanded. Their leadership had to register with the revolutionary authorities and undergo a period of study reform.

So-called Third Force groups (the Anti-Famine Front, the Committee to Defend the Workers' Rights, the Committee to Reform the Prison System, the Movement for the People's Right to Self-Determination, the Women's Movement for the Right to Life, etc.) were not treated so harshly. One by one they were permitted to declare that "in the new circumstances" they had outlived their usefulness and that they were accordingly voluntarily disbanding themselves. The rank and file of these "progressive" groups was urged to join the more orthodox liberation associations (for women, youth and students, trade unions, intellectuals, journalists, teachers, etc.). Many of the prominent Third Force personalities were co-opted into leadership positions in these liberation associations or onto the central committee of the Ho Chi Minh City NFL Committee (such as Huynh Tan Man, Huynh Lien, Truong Ba Can, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, Tran Ngoc Lieng, and Nguyen Long)(20). Others served as representatives on the southern delegation to the November 1975 reunification conference or attended the December Congress of People's Representatives. A few were elected to the new National Assembly.

Technically there are no Press censorship laws in South Vietnam. In practice they exist. On 1 May last year it was decreed that publication of all printed matter (books, newspapers, magazines) should cease and that prior authorization was

now necessary for the **distribution** of all printed matter. Three months later, in August, these rules were modified. Now, according to a provisional Press statute, all printed material must serve the national interest and be deposited with the authorities prior to distribution(21). At last count there were some 16 publications permitted to circulate in Saigon. In addition to Party publications, such as *Giai Phong* (Liberation) several semi-official publications have been allowed to flourish: *Tin Sang* (Morning News), a paper dating to the days of the Thieu regime has continued publishing under the aegis of Third Force personality Ngo Cong Duc; *Cong Giao va Dan Toc* (Catholicism and the Nation); and *Giac Ngo* (Awakening), a Buddhist fortnightly, under the editorship of Superior Bonze Thich Minh Nguyet.

Political activity within South Vietnam has been institutionalized within Party-controlled groups. In addition to the six major liberation associations (Liberation Federation of Trade Unions, Liberation Women's Union, Liberation Peasants' Association, Liberation Youth Association, Liberation Students' Association and Liberation Writers' and Artists' Association) there are a variety of organizations which draw together special interest groups such as: patriotic Catholics, patriotic intellectuals, patriotic Buddhists, patriotic journalists, patriotic teachers, etc.. There has been no reported activity on the part of the two political parties allegedly constituents of the NFL: the Radical Socialist Party (RSP) and the Democratic Party (not to be confused with the proscribed *Dan Chu Dang* mentioned above). The leaders of these groups in fact wear several organizational hats anyway and it would be a simple matter to revive the RSP, for example, should the need arise (there are presently counterpart organizations in the North, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, who have representatives in the DRVN National Assembly).

The administrative structure of the new South Vietnam is based on a hierarchy of elected "people's revolutionary committees". Initially these were provisional until conditions of stability permitted their proper election. As a result of the November 1975 reunification conference the process of electing PRCs at all levels was stepped up so that by April 1976 it would be possible to top the entire edifice with an elected National Assembly for all of Vietnam. Nevertheless there were problems. *Giai Phong* was moved to remark in late November:

> "There are still quite a lot of deficiencies and shortcomings in the building and consolidation of the revolutionary administration. In some localities due attention has not been paid to the building and consolidation of revolutionary administrations in wards, villages and hamlets...In some other localities, the people's democratic freedoms have even been violated and many bad or enemy elements have infiltrated into the administration to conduct insidious acts of sabotage...A small number of cadres of the administration who are degenerate, corrupt, authoritarian and arbitrary have violated state laws..."(22)

* * * * * * *

IN NOVEMBER 1975 at the North-South conference on reunification, Pham Hung, head of the southern delegation, stated quite explicitly the direction in which the southern economy would develop:

> "Recently, a joint enlarged conference of the NFLSV Central Committee, the VANDPF (Vietnam Alliance of National Democratic Peace Forces) Central Committee, the PRGRSV, the PRGRSV's Advisory Council, and many representatives of patriotic and democratic intellectuals and personalities was held in the south to discuss early national reunification of the state. The conference fully agreed on the need to achieve the early national reunification of the state on the basis of socialism. National reunification on the basis of socialism is the most steadfast and profound type of reunification for the sake of national independence and the building of a decent, happy life for the present and future generations."(23)

This goal was, not unexpectedly, approved unanimously the following month at the second Congress of People's Representatives.

It would seem that the period from April to September 1975 was primarily a period of stabilization. Party leaders faced enormous problems in the aftermath of the RVN's collapse. Nearly three and a half million people were left unemployed, by their estimates, and the danger of famine was real. Various industries lacked fuel and the materials with which to continue production. Several key industries were tied to overseas, mainly American, imports. In these circumstances a variety of *ad hoc* policies were developed until 10 September when a new fourteen-point policy on the economy was promulgated. This lengthly document(24) may be summarized as follows:

1. The state-managed sector of the economy will be expanded in all areas so as to lay a solid foundation to increase production, expand the distribution of goods, stabilize

the economy and insure the people's livelihood.

2. The state welcomes the investment by capitalists of their talents and money in various sectors of the economy approved by the government. Private ownership and the right to profit will be protected. The state will assist small business enterprises in securing raw materials, supplies, fuel, and in circulating their goods.

3. The state will enter into partnership with capitalists who want to employ their capital, equipment, raw materials, supplies and know-how to help the government restore or create new and needed businesses.

4. The state will do its utmost to encourage and help capitalists to use their capital, technical knowledge and talents in the establishment of new economic zones.

5. The state will consider on a case-by-case basis all offers of sale or donation of business enterprises made by their present bourgeois owners.

6. Intellectuals with scientific or technical knowledge and those who possess specialized skills in management will be given appropriate jobs and rewarded according to their contribution to national development.

7. The state will assist light industrial and handicraft producers in every way possible in increasing production for export and domestic consumption.

8. The government will assist small traders in earning their livelihood...The government will assist small traders in resettling in either their native villages or in new economic zones.

9. The state is determined to eliminate all speculation, hoarding and smuggling activities and will severely punish all those who manipulate the economy, cause confusion, spread false rumours, steal national economic secrets, sabotage production or harm security and public order.

10. Speculators who disrupt the economy and/or collude with counter-revolutionaries will be subject to arrest, imprisonment, appropriate punishment and the possible expropriation of their properties either in whole or in part.

11. Comprador bourgeoisie who co-operated with the US imperialists and members of the puppet regime, who have either fled abroad or who have remained in the country, are subject to the possible confiscation of their properties (either in whole or in part) depending on the gravity of their crimes.

12. Individuals who continue to assist comprador bourgeoisie in their illegal economic activities will be punished according to the gravity of their crimes.

13. Those who help the government in exposing speculators will be rewarded appropriately.

14. Cadres, government employees and soldiers are expected to strictly implement government policies. Any violation of this principle in any manner will be punished appropriately.

It was on the basis of these 14 points that a concerted campaign was launched to uncover, arrest and punish those individuals deemed "comprador bourgeois monopolists". A major police sweep was conducted in October and a number of individuals, mainly Chinese businessmen it would appear, were rounded up(25). This campaign was only partly successful, as two writers observed in the columns of *Giai Phong:*

> "Why have commodity prices increased so rapidly? Only a few months following the complete liberation of the south, the prices of almost all kinds of commodities — except rice — began to rise. Prices dropped somewhat during the campaign to struggle against the comprador bourgeoisie. The greatest price slumps occured after the change of currency — with the prices of fabrics and many other industrial products such as plastic and aluminium items decreasing very rapidly. However this situation lasted only for a short period. Then only the prices of rice, gasoline and oil remained stable while those of all other commodities went up fairly rapidly, with some of them doubling or tripling over previous prices."(26)

The answer, in the authors' view, lay in "market monopoly (practices), speculation, hoarding and psychological warfare tricks by the comprador bourgeoisie and reactionaries."

Later that month four speculators (in hogs, cloth and oriental medicines) were given a much

publicized trial in Saigon. In the end they were sentenced to prison for terms ranging from four to ten years. All had their property confiscated by the state. Nevertheless it would appear that shortages of goods and defects in the distribution system will continue to plague Party economic planners and that the campaign to eliminate speculation and hoarding by "comprador bourgeois monopolists" will continue for some time.

The unveiling of the 14-point economic programme in September was also connected to policy decisions in other spheres. At that time, well after the banking system had been effectively nationalized, MMC authorities introduced a new currency system replacing the RVN piastre. The new southern monetary unit was set on a par with the DRVN's *dong* (equivalent to US$0.65). This was followed shortly thereafter by a brief experiment at price control. The experiment was a failure as prices soared rapidly. The control regulations were swiftly rescinded. In early January 1976 the new South Vietnamese piastre was devalued by 23 per cent, making its rate of exchange with the US dollar roughly equivalent to the DRVN's *dong*(27).

One final feature of the VWP's post-liberation economic policy deserves mention: rural resettlement of urban refugees either back in their native villages or in new economic zones. Although no comprehensive figures are available, the Vietnam News Agency claimed that as of January 1976 "more than one million people have already returned to their native lands" from the cities of Saigon, Danang and Vung Tau(28). In late December last year Saigon Radio claimed that in the period 20 May - 23 December some 360,095 persons from Ho Chi Minh City "have either gone to build the new economic areas or returned to their native places"(29).

No attempt has been made to launch a full-blown programme of collectivization but that is certainly a goal for the future. For the moment the RVN's "Land-to-the-Tiller" programme has been completely scrapped and Vietnam's peasants are being encouraged to form mutual labour exchange teams. Settlement in the new economic areas, such as in Binh Phuoc province, is being organized on a co-operative basis. Apparently rural conditions have become sufficiently settled for the authorities to have begun reminding the farmers of their duty to pay an agricultural tax(30).

* * * * * * *

PARTY officials have moved rapidly in a variety of fields to create a social environment conducive to "socialist construction". Immediately after the "liberation" of Saigon a campaign was launched to "eliminate enslaving and degrading culture". Thousands of youths and students went through the city streets rounding up copies of proscribed literature including "reactionary" books, as well as Western "girlie" magazines. The campaign quickly had to be slowed down as some youths went to the extreme of indiscriminately burning all sorts of books, including valuable scientific and technical tracts. In October, after a prolonged review by MMC officials, a total of 489 books authored by 55 individuals were formally proscribed. These were quickly replaced by literally tons of books shipped in from the DRVN.

The entire educational system has been overhauled. North Vietnam's curriculum for primary and secondary school appears to have been adopted wholesale. Private schools have "voluntarily" agreed to disband after mass meetings of staff and other concerned individuals voted to do so. Others have been nationalized(31). All teachers have undergone re-education course in which they have re-learned the ABC of Vietnamese history and the Party-approved version of Ho Chi Minh's life.

South Vietnam's universities have posed an even greater problem, mainly due to the imbalance of students enrolled in the faculties of law and literature. In June the only faculties permitted to re-open immediately were those of medicine, dentistry and pharmacy. Students in the other faculties engaged in political re-education. In October the Ministry of Education and Youth announced plans to train 1,000 student cadres, members of the Liberation Youth Union, for assignment in the 18 public and private universities. Universities opened for the 1975-76 academic year on 16 November. In a ceremony marking the occasion, Nguyen Huu Dang, a member of the leadership committee of the Ministry of Education and Youth stressed the necessity of forming a "brigade of managerial cadres, scientific cadres, technical cadres and professional cadres..."(32) These priorities were in line with the often stressed necessity to carry out the "three revolutions" (revolution in the production relationship, the scientific and technical revolution and the ideological and cultural revolution, with science and technology as the key)(33).

Various educational programmes were launched outside the formal educational system. Of particular note were the popular education classes designed to wipe out illiteracy and the so-called supplementary education classes designed to raise the cultural standards of the masses. There were special programmes designed to rehabilitate South Vietnam's 200,000 prostitutes.

In brief, the Party's policies in the area of social affairs were a multifaceted attack on the "neocolonial culture" left behind as a result of years of American influence on Vietnam. According to an editorial in *Giai Phong*:

"The struggle on the cultural front is a very important part of the overall revolutionary struggle underway in the political, economic, cultural, social and other fields...To completely uproot the poison of the reactionary and decadent culture we must simultaneously carry out different tasks on the political, administrative, cultural, philosophical, educational, press and other fronts over a period of many years. We must effect the people's dictatorship on the cultural front, that is, on the one hand we must guarantee and respect the people's freedom of thought and freedom of speech and build and develop the socialist national culture; on the other hand, we must severely punish, according to prescribed policies, those who popularize and promote decadent reactionary culture."(34)

* * * * * * *

IN THE aftermath of the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam the question of a time-table for Vietnam's reunification became an immediate and never ending subject of speculation in the West. This discussion was fueled in part by the varying suggestions of PRG and NFL officials themselves(35). It therefore came as a surprise when a North-South reunification conference convened in November decided to hold elections for a countrywide National Assembly five months later.

It now appears, according to American intelligence sources(36), that the decision to move ahead with rapid re-unification (but not necessarily the exact date) was made at the 24th. Plenum of the VWP's Central Committee. Preliminary groundwork was laid by the Politburo which met from 18-25 July in the Central Highlands resort town of Dalat. According to the resolution approved by the 24th. Plenum:

> "The revolution has ended in success throughout the country, the neo-colonialist regime of US imperialism imposed on South Vietnam has been smashed to pieces, the plot to partition our country has been completely foiled. Thus it is quite natural that the whole of our country has become independent and unified and is advancing towards socialism."(37)

The major arguments in favour of unification were advanced by VWP Politburo member Truong Chinh at the November talks. They were immediately endorsed by the head of the southern delegation, Pham Hung, and were later approved by the Congress of People's Representatives. On the theoretical plane Truong Chinh argued that Vietnam had a choice of two directions: the path of transition to socialism or the path of capitalist development. Citing Lenin's theory of interrupted revolution he argued that in present circumstances the South should not dally with the tasks of the "national democratic" stage but should move rapidly ahead with "socialist construction". In Chinh's words:

> "The South Vietnamese people should not make a halt but embark upon the path of socialist revolution, more concretely begin the step-by-step socialist transition of the national economy and the building of the first foundations of socialism. At the same time, they must complete the remaining tasks of the people's national democratic revolution through the following movements:
>
> •The movement of building the people's revolutionary administration and helping the population to exercise their right of deciding their own destiny.
>
> •The movement of repressing the reactionaries and helping former puppet servicemen and public servants to undergo re-education and become useful citizens in society.
>
> •The movement of abolishing the feudal system of land ownership and putting into effect the slogan 'Land to the Tiller' wherever this question remains in social life."(38)

Later in his address, Truong Chinh itemized the differences between the North and South (economically, in terms of social classes, on the state plane, and on the ideological and cultural plane) and concluded "however, similarities are essential and decisive whereas differences are conditioned and temporary. The question now is to strengthen and perfect the similarities between the two zones, and at the same time to do away with the differences arising in the process of socialist revolution and construction." At that time Truong Chinh was arguing that the main task was re-unification on the state plane (now an accomplished fact) because such a move would avoid difficulties that would inevitably arise if two administrations were kept in being: "difficulties in planning and developing the national economy throughout the country, in unifying the national defence, in broadening democracy, promoting the people's right of being masters of their country, in ensuring the observance of laws, etc..."

The elections of April 1976 have decided the composition of Vietnam's new National Assembly — "the highest organ of state power". This Assembly

has been charged with drafting and approving a new constitution and in choosing the leading state organs. It shall also decide on the name of the new state as well as the capital city. This development marks the end of the transition period and the end of autonomous southern organizations such as the NFL and the PRG(39).

* * * * * * *

THE swift collapse of the Republic of Vietnam during the first quarter of 1975 was as unexpected to leaders of the VWP as it was to foreign observers. Almost immediately they were faced with the tasks of administering all of South Vietnam. In the face of this unprecedented situation the VWP leadership has chosen to follow a temperate and pragmatic course. The often predicted bloodbath of anti-Communists did not occur nor does it seem likely.

The main featurs of twelve months of transition to a unified Vietnamese state have been:

1. The emergence of the underground VWP organization into a full and public position of dominance at all levels. At present a rapid expansion in membership is taking place in the South with special emphasis on organizations for children and youth.

2. The creation of reasonable conditions of public order and security. Resistance to the new regime appears weak, scattered, unco-ordinated and diminishing.

3. The creation of a dual control system based on small neighbourhood groups and mass associations of all types ("liberation associations" and special interest groups).

4. The inauguration of a variety of indoctrination courses ("study reform") designed to establish the norms of the "new socialist society".

5. The abolishment of all political groups and organizations not previously under Party control or influence (so-called reactionary political parties as well as Third Force groups); the co-option of progressive figures (prominent Third Force personalities and representatives of the various religious groups) into various administrative organs; and the establishment of absolute control over all facets of the news media and publishing industry.

6. The promulgation of a 14-point economic plan designed to maintain an economic system of five sectors (state-owned, collective, joint state private, private capitalist, and individual).

7. The adoption of non-coercive policies designed to encourage migration of urban refugees back to the countryside either to their native villages or to "new economic zones" organized on a co-operative basis.

8. The launching of a widespread series of campaigns and programmes designed to eradicate the "decadent neocolonial culture" which has also involved the total revamping of the southern school system (at both secondary and tertiary levels) and the conduct of "supplementary education classes" designed to end adult illiteracy and to raise the cultural standards of the masses.

9. The decision to move ahead with rapid re-unification on the state level by the election in April 1976 of an all-Vietnam National Assembly.

The Vietnamese revolution has indeed entered a new phase, one in which the Vietnamese people are no longer engaged in physical combat but one in which they will be engaged in building a new society. What model will they adopt? It seems likely that they will not slavishly commit themselves to either the Soviet or Chinese systems. Rather the VWP leadership, which is both Marxist-Leninist and nationalist in orientation, will doggedly pursue a unique "Vietnamese way to socialism".

Notes and References

1. Cf. Truong Chinh's report of 15 November 1975 to the National Reunification Conference in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), — *Vietnam News Agency* (Hanoi) in English, 17 November 1975.

2. Cf. Pham Hung's speech to the closing session of the Conference of South Vietnam's People's Delegates on 22 December 1975; *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vitnamese, 22 December 1975. According to Hung: "It is therefore one in two but also two in one". Truong Chinh, *loc. cit.* stated: "it is necessary...to advance toward unifying the platforms and regulations of the NFLSV and the VFF (Vietnam Fatherland Front) — on this basis we can unify the organizations of the front; unify the South Vietnam PLAF with the VPA (Vietnam People's Army) in the fields of name, functions, duties, rules, regulations, systems and so forth..."

3. Truong Chinh, *op. cit.* states: "Concerning the leadership of the revolution, the revolutionary cause of our people in both zones has always been assumed by a single and genuine Marxist-Leninist party."

4. *AFP* dispatch from Saigon in English, 21 January 1976.

5. In 1962 a DRVN official inadvertently revealed that a half-dozen or so cadres were secretly appointed to the VWP CC at its Third National Congress in September 1960; "Agents from the North Lead Viet Cong", *The Sunday Telegraph* (London), 29 July 1962, p. 24.

6. See the discussion in the author's "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations and the Vietnam Workers' Party: Continuity and Change, 1954-1974" in Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown eds. *Communism in Indochina* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975), pp. 27-46.

7. *Liberation Press Agency* in English, 28 August 1975, listed Phat after Cong and Trung, whereas the *Vietnam News Agency* in English, 27 August 1975, listed Phat before Cong and Trung.

8. *Liberation Press Agency* in English, 22 December 1975 and *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vietnamese, 22 December 1975.

9. *Vietnam News Agency* in English, 9 November 1975.

10. *Liberation Radio* in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 25 July 1975.

11. Carlyle A. Thayer, "North Vietnam in 1975: National Liberation, Reunification and Socialist Construction", *Asian Survey* (January 1976), Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 18.

12. Cf. Philippe Pons in *Le Monde*, 20 August 1975; and *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vietnamese, 4 December 1975.

13. Cf. despatch by Alan Dawson from Bangkok in *The Washington Post*, 10 September 1975, which cites US intelligence sources as stating that as many as 20,000 "Viet Cong" agents were GVN officials.

14. Martin Woollacott, "A New Life Under the Shade of Uncle Ho", *The Australian* (Sydney) 19 April 1976.

15. Despatch by Charles Antoine de Merciat from Saigon carried by *AFP* on 11 July 1975.

16. Philippe Pons, *op. cit.; The Washington Post*, 10 September 1975; *Liberation Radio* in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 10 October 1975; *Radio Hanoi* in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 29 November 1975; and *Radio Hanoi* in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1 February 1976.

17. "Today's Topic: Continue Reform to Become Genuine Citizens", *Giai Phong* 17 June 1975.

18. Based on confidential information supplied to the author by US Government officials in Washington, D.C. in December 1975.

19. This incident received wide coverage in the overseas Press, see: "Vietnam Catholic Revolt Crushed" unattributed despatch from Hong Kong appearing in *The Age* (Melbourne), 16 February 1976; and "Vietnam: Murder in the Cathedral", *Newsweek* (International Editor) (1 March 1976), p. 12.

20. *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vietnamese, 29 July 1975.

21. "Down With Reactionary Decadent Culture" (editorial) in *Giai Phong*, 10 January 1976.

22. "Build, Consolidate and Strengthen the Revolutionary Administration", *Giai Phong*, 29 November 1975.

23. *Radio Hanoi* in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 16 November 1975.

24. This summary is drawn from two versions of the 14 Points: *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vietnamese, 10 September 1975; and "The 14-Point Economic Policy of the P.R.G.", *Vietnam Quarterly* (Philadelphia) (Winter 1976), No. 1, pp. 64-5.

25. Cf. Wilfred Burchett writing in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 October 1975.

26. Le Dien and Phuoc Tin, "Let Us See Why Commodity Prices Have Increased So Rapidly", *Giai Phong*, 6 January 1976.

27. *AFP* despatch from Saigon in English, 15 January 1976.

28. *Vietnam News Agency* in English, 12 January 1976.

29. *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vietnamese, 27 December 1975.

30. See the comments of Tran Dinh Trac, director of the Agricultural Taxation Service, as broadcast by *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vietnamese, 11 February 1976.

31. *Liberation Press Agency* in English, 30 September 1975; and *ibid.* in English, 28 October 1975.

32. *Liberation Press Agency* in English, 18 November 1975.

33. Cf. statement on the "Situation and Tasks of the New Revolutionary State", read by Pham Hung to the closing session of the Conference of South Vietnamese People's Delegates on 22 December 1975 as broadcast by *Saigon Domestic Service* in Vietnamese, 22 December 1975.

34. "Down With Reactionary, Decadent Culture", *op. cit.;* in late December and early January over one thousand persons were arrested on charges of violating this policy, see: "Dealing with the Task of Satisfactorily Maintaining Security and Order in Order to Ensure a Peaceful Life for the People" (editorial) in *Giai Phong*, 3 January 1976.

35. See the remarks by Le Van Giap as quoted by *AAP-Reuter* in *The Age*, 16 May 1975; and by Trinh Dinh Thao as cited by *UPI* in *The New York Times*, 29 July 1975. This vacilation has been analyzed by Douglas Pike in "A Year-end Report: North Vietnam in the Year 1975" Mss (Washington, D.C., December 1975), p. 10.

36. Confidential information provided to the author by US Government oficials in Washington, D.C. (December 1975) and in Bangkok (January 1976).

37. Cited by Truong Chinh in his political report to the North-South political consultative conference on 15 November 1975; *Vietnam News Agency*, 17 November 1975.

38. *Ibid.;* unattributed quotations in the following paragraphs are drawn from this source.

39. *Editorial Note:* Paradoxically, on 15 May this year, South Vietnam set up separate diplomatic representation in Phnom Penh, when Ambassador Pham Van Ba of the Republic of South Vietnam presented his credentials to President Khieu Samphan. North Vietnam also has an ambassador accredited to Cambodia (see *Bangkok Post*, 19 May 1976).

CHINA : *Unlike other analysts of present-day China, the author sees no justification for lulling South-east Asia into the belief that China has become a benign force. On the contrary, he sees evidence, in the "two point theory", for believing that the PRC's foreign policy is as militant now as it ever has been.*

China's New Model for "People's War" Strategy

Leslie R. Marchan

A NEW model for "people's war" strategy appeared in the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the end of the Vietnam War, and has been presented in the current ideological campaign as the only correct form of revolutionary war strategy for Marxist-Leninists.

The model is of significance. Designed to help Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries maintain and consolidate recent gains and to win new victories for the "proletariat" in the special circumstances of the 1970s, the model has already had considerable impact at home and abroad. In the PRC, the new orthodox line on strategy has played a part in the new Party building; it has served as one of the approved frames of reference in the ideological rectification campaign — in particular after the condemnation of the late Marshal Lin Piao — that has accompanied the new Party building; and it has served to justify new directions in Peking's foreign policy, with Peking turning from primarily encouraging class warfare, and from wholeheartedly favouring and supporting "proletarian liberation forces" rather than established governments, to follow instead the more complex strategy for protracted war based on the "theory of two points", which is the fundamental principle contained in the new model.

While Peking's policy has been changing to apply theory into practice, the new correct line for strategy has influenced Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leaders seeking to appear orthodox. It has encouraged them to forsake warlike confrontation aimed at securing immediate "liberation for the proletariat" and to engage instead in local new-Party building, and in local ideological rectification campaigns, in order to ensure the achievement of victories by protracted war, and to avoid the pitfalls and dangers of "left wing adventurism".

* * * * * * *

THE new military strategic model discouraged instantaneous hot war and the immediate prosecution of class war by the proletariat, and approved protracted war and political action. Even so, it promised to encourage continued suspicion of Peking by leaders who were threatened by "people's forces" and by "people's wars". Also, it promised to be disadvantageous to Peking in its diplomatic drive to establish foreign ties, especially when it was making overtures to leaders who opposed violence as a means of social and political change and who hoped or expected Chinese Marxist-Leninists would renounce the use of force to establish proletarian dictatorships. The new model's appearance was neither surprising nor unexpected: the need for such an innovation had existed for some time.

A new statement on war strategy was needed after the fall of Lin Piao in 1971, not merely because he was denounced — to infer that would be to oversimplify the anti-Lin campaign — but because his military ideas were held to be erroneous. Lin Piao had been prominent in the field of military strategy, and had popularized "people's war" at home and abroad, since 1965 in particular(1). Lin's main fault, it was revealed in the condemnations of his line of thought, was that he promoted "right deviationism", and stressed a "one-point" instead of the "two-point" theory(2). In brief, he failed to give proper stress to the class character and class aim of war. In practice this means that non-Communist revolutionaries could use his strategies to achieve

heir sort of "liberation", and to establish their sort f regime, just as well as Marxist-Leninists. By not eeping class war and class aims in mind, and by oncentrating on the struggle in hand at any one oment, Communists might let the leadership of the evolution fall into the hands of either "bourgeois lements" who would construct capitalism, or revi- onist elements who would delay the advent of true ocialism. To further aggravate the problem and nhance the dangers for genuine Marxist-Leninist evolutionaries, Lin's error in not promoting the wo-point theory meant that those who engaged in people's war" could stress "all alliance", or "all ruggle", and thus fall into the heretical ways of right deviationism" or "left deviationism"(3). That , in the case of "right deviationism", Communists ight overstress the role of the united front in the rocess of revolution, and accept the aims of the hited front as ends in themselves and not as part of he permanent process of class war. This in turn ould lead to Communists' unduly supporting and romoting non-Communist leaders of "liberation ovements", like Chinese Communist "right devia- onists" had done in the case of Chiang Kai-shek in he period of his anti-Japanese struggles, when they pted for an alliance under his leadership to save hina. In the case of "left deviationists", this could ad to revolutionary hot-heads taking control of the evolution, and conducting class war for its own ake, irrespective of the conditions and types of ocial "contradictions" that existed(4).

These points, which had been made by Lin iao in his *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*, but not properly stressed by him, needed arification. The new model for strategy has done is. Besides this, and more important than Lin's rrors, was Peking's new appreciation of the world tuation.

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ONE of the important tasks undertaken by Chinese Marxist-Leninists before they make foreign olicy changes or before they make important oreign policy statements, is a dialectical analysis of he "current world situation". This analysis reveals or them the nature of the contradictions that exist n the world about them, and the order in which the contradictions" need to be resolved so as to make ommunist advances. The analysis is based on the larxist-Leninist supposition that the world and uman society move according to determined natural ws, and that Marxist-Leninists alone have disco- ered the secrets of these laws. Thus "scientific ialectical materialist analysis" provides for Marxist- eninists not only what they believe is a scientifically ccurate assessment of the world situation and eliable predictions about future developments, but lso a knowledge of the scientifically correct strate- ies that need to be used to resolve the "contradictions" they have detected, and a knowledge of the most auspicious times to use these strategies(5).

A series of changes in the world situation in the 1970s made a new analysis necessary for Peking. Some of these changes were believed by Chinese Marxist-Leninists to be favourable for the cause of Communism, providing reasons for confidence in the proletarian revolutionary movement. Others were seen to be unfavourable, and gave rise to doubts and fears.

On the credit side for the proletarian cause, the apparent Marxist-Leninist victory in Indo-China, which had long been predicted by Chinese Communists, consolidated the Chinese Marxist-Leninist belief that their theories were scientifically sound, and that their strategies based on these theories were infallible. If Peking gained nothing else in Indo-China, it gained a new confidence in Marxist-Leninist "people's war" strategies. They were convinced that the "magic weapon" they had used to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat at home in China had now proved its effectiveness in the rural world abroad.

Added to this, and providing Peking with further confidence, was the apparent collapse of the United States in Indo-China, and at home. This collapse had also been predicted by Chinese Marxist-Leninists as a result of their dialectical analysis of the "contradictions" in the world and in the United States in particular. Political and racial divisions, together with economic problems and administrative indecision led the Chinese Communists to view America as a "paper tiger", which had sharp teeth, but which it could not use effectively.

Further adding to Peking's confidence, Chinese Marxist-Leninists believed that the whole "capitalist-imperialist" world was collapsing. This they had also predicted would happen. They firmly believed that parliamentary democracies, beset with inflation, economic troubles and trade union problems, had reached their end, and that a bright future lay ahead for those planning to establish dictatorships of the proletariat(6). Added to this was the "independence movement" of small Powers in the so-called "Third World"(7). These small Powers were said to hold vast natural resources needed by the "hungry factories of the industrial Powers". The significance of this was that these small Powers might hold a weapon that could be used to threaten the well-being of the industrial Powers, as the energy crisis revealed in 1973. The Third World Powers and the subject of commodities, therefore, assumed new importance in Peking's view.

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ON THE other, unfavourable side, and causing apprehension, was the rise of Soviet military

power, the apparent expansion of Moscow's influence, and the spread of Soviet Marxist-Leninist "revisionist heresies" in the world.

From the end of the 1960s, Peking regarded the Soviet Union and Soviet revisionism (which Chinese Marxist-Leninists believed was taking Moscow back along the road to capitalism and imperialism), as the major threat to revolutionary China and to the cause of correct Marxist-Leninism in the world. This new confrontation, which Peking believed had superseded the one between itself and Washington, was not only quantitatively as big or bigger than the previous, alleged American threat, but according to dialectical laws, was also qualitatively more developed. The Soviet Union did not seem to be the same sort of "paper tiger" as the United States, particularly since Moscow changed its strategies and its priorities of military building after the Cuba fiasco of 1962. It was more of a "hard board tiger", with few of the apparent weaknesses of America. It had a united administration, like any dictatorship of the proletariat; it had power, and an ability to use this in the way it wanted, seemingly without trouble.

In confrontations with the United States, Peking could rely on internal splits and bickerings there. In confrontations with Moscow, although Peking tried to encourage bickerings, there were no demonstrations either in the Soviet Union or in the parliamentary democracies abroad that could be used to aid Peking's cause. Peking had to confront the problem alone. More significantly, the tactics of "people's war" and the united front strategies that Peking used to exploit divisions in America and elsewhere did not work in confrontations with the Soviet Union. The Amur River border conflict was fought in the main as a straight-out military operation between the two combatants. No world-wide mass movements were developed to condemn Moscow.

The real nature of the Soviet threat and Soviet strength was revealed more clearly in the Angola crisis. There the Soviet Union and Cuba apparently gained in a matter of weeks what Marxist-Leninist forces took years and many casualties to achieve by means of protracted struggle in Indo-China. And Moscow achieved this with little notice and trouble. There were no anti-Soviet demonstrations about Angola in the parliamentary democracies. Those demonstrations that were supported by "liberals" and "churchmen" were directed against the Western mercenaries who went in to fight for the anti-Marxist forces. But, in the main, protesters in the parliamentary democracies ignored Angola and fixed their attention on Timor, demanding the withdrawal of Indonesian forces there and the restoration of *Fretilin* rule.

Peking's belief that Moscow not only has power but also the ability to use it, has persuaded Chinese Communists to make an accommodation with the "defeated" United States, and with the emerged and emerging "bourgeois" states in the Third World; and this has served in great part to stimulate the production of the new military strategic model.

But, although the confrontation with Soviet revisionism was viewed by Chinese Marxist-Leninists as the most important struggle in the 1970s, they did not view it as the only one. That would have been contrary to the theory of two points that was being promoted in the ideological campaign(8). It would mean falling into the ways of "left" or "right" deviationism". That is, class and class conflict and the long term needs of the proletariat could be overlooked, as could other types of "contradictions", if Chinese Marxist-Leninists used all their efforts and gave all their attention to combat one apparently dominating "contradiction", — the Soviet problem.

The analysis of the world situation made by Chinese Marxist-Leninists in the 1970s provided no simple basis for an anti-Soviet struggle. The "contradictions" seen to exist in the world then were seen to number five.

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FIRSTLY, and most important, there was the heightened "contradiction" between the Peking-led forces of "correct Marxist-Leninism" and the Soviet-led forces of "revisionism and social imperialism". This was regarded as a bitter confrontation that threatened not only the well-being of Marxist-Leninists outside China, but also threatened to cause subversion in the PRC itself, where rightist and leftist heresies were constantly being found. The intensity of this threat meant that no accommodation or *détente* between the forces representing these two "contradictions" could be expected. There could only be intensified hate campaigns at least until the "contradictions" had been reappraised and the ideological confrontation between the two separate leftist forces represented by Peking and Moscow were given a place of lower importance.

Secondly, it was seen that there was still, in a less intense but nevertheless unwanted and disturbing manner, a "contradiction" between the correct forces of Marxist-Leninism led by Peking and the forces of "capitalist-imperialism" led by the US. Peking's view that American "capitalist-imperialism" still represented a threat was continually evidenced by the frequent attacks made on Washington's overseas policy in the course of United Nations debates and at other forums.

Peking's other point of view, — that the threat from Washington was not intense and could easily be countered if it came to a test — was revealed in Peking's move to reach an accommodation with the

US from 1969, before the Vietnam war ended, when the intensity of the threat from the militarily and ideologically strengthened Soviet Union became obvious.

Thirdly, there was seen to be a continued "contradiction" between the hegemenous Powers of "socialist-imperialism" led by the Soviet Union and of "capitalist-imperialism" led by the US. This "contradiction" was believed to be most intense in the oil area of the Middle East, and to a lesser extent in Africa, the Indian Ocean and Latin America.

Fourthly, there was a "contradiction" between the newly emerged Powers of the Third World, whose peoples and leaders wanted independence, and the "avaricious hegemenous Powers" who wanted to subject them to a "new colonialism" and exploit their resources "for the benefit of the industrial rich". This "contradiction" has been given great emphasis by Chinese Marxist-Leninists recently. This has been demonstrated by the efforts Peking has made to establish links with governments in the Third World, and to offer less open encouragement to "people's forces" endeavouring to overthrow "bourgeois" rulers. In Peking's view, established leaders in the Third World are more likely to be of use in stopping Soviet expansion than newly emerged "people's" leaders who could switch to heretical revisionist courses, as did Castro in Cuba and as seems to be occurring in Laos.

Finally, there is class "contradiction", which is considered to vary quantitatively and qualitatively according to locality. In the PRC this "contradiction" is believed to be between "correct-line socialists" and "Left and Right deviationists", the latter representing the left-overs of capitalist society. It is this idea of permanent class "contradiction" in human society that forms the primary message in the Chinese Marxist-Leninist ideological campaign about the theory of two points. This cautions Chinese Communists not to forget class war and the needs of class war when they are solving other types of "contradictions", even if these "non-class contradictions" seem to be all pervasive(9).

Peking's diplomatic drive in the Third World and its change of attitude towards "people's liberation movements" in those parts have in part been caused by Peking's awareness of the need for continued class consciousness and class conflict. Projecting the lessons of the theory of two points abroad, Peking is making clear to Marxist-Leninist leaders that they must digest this idea and achieve ideological unity on this in their Communist Parties, if they are going to make real advances and avoid the heresies of revisionism. That is, they must use the strategies of complex protracted war that are being presented in the new strategic model.

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THE initial steps to produce a new strategic model for "people's war" were taken immediately after the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which ended in April 1969. Marshal Lin Piao himself presented the basis for change. In section 7 of his report to the Congress, after describing and applauding the spread of armed revolutionary struggle in the world at the time, Lin concluded that "the truth that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun is being grasped by ever broader masses of the oppressed people and nations".

In view of the nature of the newly assessed "contradictions" that were believed to exist in the world, this statement was likely to provoke thoughtful consideration. The dictum about political power growing out of the barrel of a gun had been originally made by Mao Tse-tung in his essay on *Problems of War and Strategy,* published in 1938 when the situation confronting Chinese Communists was not unlike that existing in 1969. Then, in 1938, China was confronted by a seemingly powerful outside enemy, Japan. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, Mao Tse-tung had called on Chinese Communists to give all-out support for the war of resistance against Japan(10). This war was being led by the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. The call for Communists to support this war meant that the disrupted Communist-Nationalist alliance would have to be mended. This was not an unexpected change in 1937. Moscow and the *Comintern* had approved a shift by Communists to united front tactics just before. In Europe, Communists turned to form seemingly unusual alliances to combat "Fascism"; and not long afterwards, Moscow made an alliance with Berlin itself.

The point about the move for "alliance" by Communists in China, was that it could have resulted in "right deviationism". That is, some Communists might have committed themselves to "all alliance" and forgotten their Communist principles of class revolution. Mao Tse-tung had clear cut views on this matter. He agreed with Stalin's thesis that armed revolution in China existed to fight armed counter-revolution. That is, when conducting armed struggle, Communist forces should not forget that their aim is to use this to win proletarian victories. Mao Tse-tung's 1938 essay on *Problems of War and Strategy* was written to make this point clear(11). It indicated that the main goal of the Chinese Communists, no matter what the circumstances, remained the seizure of power by armed force in order to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. That is, while joining with the Nationalists to fight the Japanese, they should at the same time work to create the conditions for the establishment of a "new people's democracy" by military power. This theory of two points was further indicated in Mao Tse-tung's essay on *The New Democracy* published shortly afterwards, in 1940.

Lin Piao's reference to Mao's dictum thus raised thorny issues. These were discussed in forums specially held to consider the problems of Communist acquisition of power by armed force. The major forums, where Mao's dictum on this was discussed, were provided by the *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily). These met, significantly, at Chingkangshan and at Nanchang in Kiangsi province, which were cradles of the Chinese Communist armed revolution. At the forums, the need for the theory of two points was discussed and the dangers of "Left and Right deviationism" in periods of "alliance" or apparent *détente* were highlighted, together with the need for Communists to adhere to Mao Tse-tung's "scientific" strategy for "people's war", which guaranteed "true proletarian victories"(12).

Briefly stated, the discussion at the forums was centred on two points. Firstly, it was made clear that a comprehensive, informative statement on "people's war" strategy based on Mao Tse-tung's theories was necessary. Secondly, it was made clear that the materialist-historical evidence that would be used to provide the lessons would be drawn from Chinese experience, and not from "people's war" abroad. In particular Chinese Communist experiences in the second revolutionary civil war, when "Right deviationists" such as Chen Tu-hsiu, and "Left deviationists" such as Li Li-san, Wang Ming and Chu Chiu-pai were identified and corrected, and in the third revolutionary civil war when "all alliance" was condemned and the Communists finally won power by armed struggle, were used.

The war of resistance against Japan was not stressed in the discussion, nor were the experiences gained in this period used later. This would have been difficult to do. Chinese Communist historical writings make quite clear that Japan was not defeated by Chinese "people's war", nor by the American atomic bomb, but by the Soviet Union which entered the war against Japan in August 1945, causing Japan's capitulation ten days later(13).

It should not be inferred from this omission that Peking, since its confrontation with Moscow, is at present reluctant to praise the Soviet Union. In Peking's view, the Soviet Union today is markedly different from the one that existed and achieved victories in the 1940s. The praises given for long-ago acts can thus still stand. The omission of the war of resistance against Japan in the forums, and later discussions and comments, stems from the fact that that war did not directly result in proletarian victories and "liberation". These came as a result of the "third revolutionary civil war" when, incidently, Lin Piao's strategic errors and Mao Tse-tung's scientific military correctness were more clearly observable than in the period of the Japanese war.

The latter point, about Lin Piao's erroneous strategic ideas, was made clear in the series articles on the subject of military strategy whi appeared in the following years. Between 1970 a 1975 a selection of these were published(14). Th consisted in the main of three types of writing Firstly, new printings of Mao Tse-tung's milita essays appeared. Secondly, historical appraisals of t practices of Mao's strategies in the revolutionary civ wars were made. Added to these were the rem miscences of successful warriors who had taken pa in China's "people's wars". These writings were n presented in isolation. They formed part of t corpus of ideological works and commentaries th formed the ideological/educational drive and t movement for all revolutionaries to study "Marxis Leninist-Mao Tse-tung theory and practice". All these stressed the theory of two points, the need f correct strategic thinking and practice, and the nee for Party unity on the matter.

As a result of these writings, by 1973 Lin Pia was discredited as a military theorist and pract tioner, and Mao's reputation enhanced. Lin w shown not only to be a rightist, and incompeten but also to be a person who would not listen advice and learn. It was revealed, for instance, th Mao had specially written his essay on *A Sing Spark can Make a Prairie Fire,* in order to corre and educate the erroneous Lin(15). And that t series of telegrams about the conduct of t campaign in Manchuria, where Lin held comma in 1948, were made to correct Lin's errors strategy. In particular they were meant to turn L away from his strategy of "lightening attacks", to u instead the method of establishing base areas, as w approved in the theories for protracted war(16 That is Lin was turned from the "adventurist" poli of conducting an all-out attack on the enemy, to t policy of building up revolutionary bases in order guarantee long-term victories. For Lin, this mea splitting his military force into base area and fro line groups, which promised not merely to del victory, but also threatened the very success of h campaigns.

Thus by 1973, not only were Lin and H strategic ideas discredited, but also the corre strategies Mao had in mind were presented in clarified way.

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TAKEN in brief summary form, Mao's vario writings describe, firstly, the pre-requisit which Chinese Marxist-Leninists deem necessary f the launching of a "people's war" and, secondly, t specific strategies needed in order to make re proletarian advances.

The main point about the new correct model that emphasis is placed on the former point, that the need to prepare correctly for "people's wa

rather than how to fight it. This means, in effect, that Peking is now advising "proletarian revolutionaries" abroad and at home to hold back from engaging in hot wars and uprisings, unless the pre-conditions needed are fully met, and the conditions suitable.

It is the advice given in this model or directive which gives Chinese Communist foreign policy its apparently bewildering, inscrutable appearance, and which gives rise to the varieties of conflicting interpretations by Western and other observers. The less bellicose statements and declarations made about "proletarian revolutionaries" engaged in "people's wars" in such areas as Malaysia and Indonesia, as compared with more bellicose previous statements(17), are regarded by some as evidence of Peking's growing "moderation". The more bellicose statements and declarations made about Korea and the need for "people's war" there(18), are viewed by the same interpreters as an aberration caused by local circumstances.

In reality Peking's policy of flexibility is being conducted on a world-wide scale in strict accordance with the theory of two points and Chinese Marxist-Leninist eschatological concepts, — that is their idea of revolutionary time-tables. In Peking's view, different states have reached different levels of attainment in their "proletarian revolutionary" drive, which means that each revolution is expected to proceed at its own pace. In the case of Korea, the "proletarian forces" there are considered to have met the preconditions deemed necessary for "people's war". In consequence, they can now act to achieve power by using the barrel of a gun. Indonesian and Malaysian Marxist-Leninists, in contrast, have not yet created all the preconditions necessary for launching a "people's war". Their prime task is therefore to establish such conditions — in particular a united Party wholly following the correct line. Local hot-heads who go beyond this and launch a "people's war" in an immediate attempt to take political power, open themselves to the charge of "left-wing adventurism", like Li Li-san did earlier on. Thus, in these circumstances, Peking is provided with opportunities to link with non-Communist leaders in the Third World who had previously been considered as "bourgeois", in its attempts to preserve the *status quo* and prevent extensions of Soviet and American hegemony. But Peking has not forsaken local proletarian revolutionaries in the Third World and elsewhere. It has merely set back their time-tables for revolt, and the time when "reactionary leaders" will be thrown into the "rubbish bin of history".

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PEKING'S differing policies towards different parts of the world highlight the need for a "Gestalt" approach when studying Peking's policy: that is to examine the policy in its entirety, and not to make studies of microcosmic parts of it. To do that, as Mao Tse-tung said, would be like listening to the noise one finger makes when a person is playing a ten-finger exercise(19).

The articles mentioned indicate that the Chinese Communists gained political power as a result of "three magic weapons": the united front, armed struggle, and Party-building. Although much stress is placed on these three essential activities, specific pre-requisites are held to be needed for the launching of a "people's war of liberation". Firstly, there is the need for Marxist-Leninists to comprehend and accept "the correct line". Chinese Marxist-Leninists believe the world consists of "appearances" and "realities". They believe that they, being equipped with the weapon of "scientific dialectical materialism", are the only people able to understand the nature and the play of natural laws, and so comprehend the realities, that is the real state of affairs. They do this by combining Marxist-Leninist theory with analyses of experiences in practice. This combination produces the correct line, or a knowledge of the situation and the tactics deemed necessary to deal with that situation at that particular stage in history(20).

This belief in their special ability to acquire and apply knowledge has caused the intense "ideological/educational" and "ideological rectification" campaigns. These are designed to impress the one correct line of belief onto the minds of Party members and followers. If Party members do not have these correct beliefs, then they will not have the knowledge and ability to act correctly.

Correlative to this, Chinese Marxist-Leninists believe that the Party must be built into one ideological unit, devoid of "splittist" or "deviationist" elements(21). This is based on the following assumptions, — that there exists a scientifically determined path for "proletarian revolutionaries" to take; that this path is discernible, and that orthodox Marxist-Leninists have a unique ability to gain this knowledge and apply it, much like many Christian evangelists believe that they know the ways of God, and have a special ability to lead the righteous and sinners along His path to a New Jerusalem on Earth.

The "magic weapons" of the Chinese Commuist movement are a small but strongly united Party and a strong, small but expanding army which plays its part in the general drive made under the direction of the Party. The fact that Chinese Marxist-Leninists maintain an army under Party leadership makes clear their intention not to take the parliamentary road to power, like many of their European counterparts.

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ALSO stressed is the need for proletarian revolutionaries to create and secure "base areas": this is a cornerstone of Maoist strategy(22). The Party (and the army under its control), therefore, does not exist as a competitive party in an electoral system, nor as a subversive group seeking power. Nor does the army exist as a "roving band of fighters". The Communist fighters occupy their own independent territories. These "liberation zones", as they are called, have distinct advantages for Communist revolutionaries. They create the impression that the nation containing "liberation zones" is split into two areas, each with its own rule and administration. This lends support to claims the Communists later make for a coalition government to be established, as happened in Laos, where the non-Communist government was forced to share power with the Communists because of their territorial claims.

When such demands are made, the base areas or "liberated zones" are regarded by Communists as inviolable. The only areas Communists regard as negotiable, and the only areas they hold to be open for "coalition government" rule, are the non-Communist areas not yet "liberated". The "liberated zones" remain a secure base where the "liberation" army remains ready and prepared to move out to take action when negotiations fail, or when the time for action is thought to have come, after coalition attempts have failed. This was clearly demonstrated recently in the case of Laos.

The new military model makes clear that it is the Party's duty to establish, secure, and expand the "liberated areas" so that they can serve as springboards for later attacks. This should also provide the basis for the claim by the Communist Party that it shares power in an already divided state, and must, therefore, share the government too. While the new strategic model indicates clearly that for some "proletarian revolutionaries" the time for final action to achieve liberation has not arrived, it indicates to all that they must create, secure and expand "liberation areas", and not turn to parliamentary or "co-existence" methods in the Western sense. Consequently, while Malaysian or Indonesian Communists might forsake launching "people's war" at this particular time when Soviet influence is growing, they must not give up their claim to the "liberation zones" they have established.

Another point stressed is the belief that Marxist-Leninists need to use united front strategies to achieve political power. These strategies were necessary from the time when Mao Tse-tung first decided to set up bases in rural areas in China. Farmers, farming their own private plots and relying on profits, are not notoriously socialist by inclination. To get them to support "proletarian revolutionary forces" in the past, the Chinese Communists had to use united front tactics. They thus became champions of social and economic reform, appealing to "bourgeois elements", by promising land, tax reform and fair prices. After victory was achieved by the Communist-led united front, the area was declared "liberated", and set up as a model to be compared with non-Communist areas.

When the united front has done its work, its eventual fate is to be purged of "bourgeois" elements so as to leave socialists free to conduct the "proletarian cultural revolution" and to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat under Party guidance. When applied to the "proletarian revolutionary movement" in the world as a whole, the stress on the need for united front strategies in the new strategic model for "people's war", means that Peking is telling its followers to work with anyone, no matter what their political colour(23), to help check Soviet expansion; but this should be done in such a way that foundations are laid for later "proletarian" advances.

When Allende was overthrown in Chile, for example, Peking soon shifted to work with the military group which took power. And in the more recent case of Australia, where Whitlam's socialist government claims to have been ousted as a result of a *coup,* Peking has not taken up cudgels on behalf of the socialists, but has transferred its attention and links to the new coalition (non-socialist) government.

Finally, the articles point out clearly the military strategies that need to be followed in order to expand the liberation areas and to win "people's wars". These strategies are the classical ones set down by Mao Tse-tung.

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THE new model for "people's war" is significant in that it reveals clearly the ideological nature of Peking's foreign policy and the eschatological beliefs that help compose this. Chinese Marxist-Leninists believe that revolutions move forward and upward by a set mechanical process, through determined stages until complete "liberation" is achieved for the proletariat. In the case of Indo-China, Chinese Marxist-Leninists believe that previous "people's war" strategies brought about the resolution of the "contradictions" between "imperialist" forces and their "running dogs" on the one hand and the forces of "liberation" on the other. With reconstruction and political unification now the main aims there, new "contradictions" are held to exist: namely between the victorious forces of liberation and socialism on the one hand, and the forces of "reaction" who want to turn back along the road to capitalism and revisionism on the other. Thus Peking regards those countries as being on the verge of achieving real dictatorships of the proletariat. Relations are thus firmly established with the "democratic-proletarian"

coalition governments whose task it is to effect this "socialist cultural" revolution. The one big question that remains concerns the area to be ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat in Indo-China. Chinese Marxist-Leninists, like other Communists, prefer large areas of rule and big states. They are not inclined towards "Balkanization". It therefore remains to be seen if they will continue to seek to combine the former states of Indo-China into a union such as that which fell with French colonialism's demise.

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BY CONTRAST, Korea is regarded as a divided state occupied by American forces in the South, and in need of unification. The revolutionary base area, that is the Democratic Republic of Korea, is regarded as strong, reliable and ready for further advances on behalf of the proletariat. South Korea, alternatively, is viewed as being in a chaotic, disastrous state, being ruled by unpopular "capitalists" and "foreign puppets", with the people underneath them waiting to be "liberated" by the "people's forces" in the North.

In this case, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists believe that the major contradictions are similar to those that existed in Indo-China before 1975, and that as the Party in North Korea is strong, unified and correct in its line, the time for action is ripe(24). Consequently, the idea of "people's war" strategies to achieve immediate unification there is strongly supported. This belief that the mechanistic process has taken Korean "proletarian revolutionaries" to a point of success is likely to provide a permanent stumbling block for the US in regard to any general settlement or attempts to reach in the East Asian area in general.

In further contrast, the "proletarian revolutionary forces" in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia are regarded as being at a much lower stage of revolutionary development and not yet ready for launching large scale "people's wars"; thus the way is opened for Peking's links with "bourgeois" and "feudal" leaders.

The new strategic model, with the united front/protracted war tactics it stresses, are also of significance in the case of Taiwan. While the border between the Communist and Nationalist-ruled areas remains firmly demarcated and militarily guarded, and, while Peking continues its policy of seeking to isolate the Nationalist government diplomatically, it is also now stressing co-operation and unity between the peoples in the two parts of China.

Although some American scholars and administrators see this as a turning point(25), united front tactics are not likely to be successful twice in China in one generation, in particular while friendly overtures to Taiwan are parallelled by continued "cultural revolutionary" activity and "socialist revolutionary" drives in the PRC. For the Chinese in Taiwan the issue of the civil war continues to turn on two distinct ways of life, one Communist and favouring a dictatorship of the proletariat, the other not Communist and favouring private ownership and material incentives. United front tactics by Peking to gain control of Taiwan are not likely to be successful while this awareness remains. The correct time for Chinese Marxist-Leninists to take Taiwan was in 1949 when they should have achieved complete unification of the country as the Vietnamese revolutionaries achieved in 1975. Now they have established a dictatorship of the proletariat and pushed forward "socialist cultural revolution" in the Communist-ruled area, it is too late to achieve unity by means of united front tactics and attractive talk. The new strategic tactics are, therefore, not likely to produce successful results in that area, and Peking could be further forced to make continued efforts to isolate the Nationalists, thus creating a lack of confidence about Taiwan and adversely affect the economy of the area. This could lay them open to the charge of being bad Marxists. Marx never intended Communists to retard economic growth.

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THE new strategic model has an added significance, besides the importance it has in foreign and domestic policy determination. The failure of many "outside" observers to notice or highlight the strategic military changes reveals the weaknesses in Western assessments of China. One basic fault is that many commentaries on China are based on preconceived ideas and theories held by authors whose methods of research consist of finding evidence to support their beliefs and theories. Commentaries of this sort inform readers not so much about China as about the hopes and beliefs of the author.

Many modern academic historians, when dealing with China, see history moving along in a series of leaps and halts, with man going forward or upward to reach, stage by stage, higher planes, and finally perfection. This type of study, based on teleology and eschatological concepts, produces "sacred histories" and not academic theses(26). In fact the empirical research historian is often intimidated as a result of the profusion of "sacred histories". The unbelieving, "profane" historian, who does not believe in and join the cause, becomes instead a target for attack for being "unenlightened", "reactionary" or "unprogressive".

In recent years, in Australia and elsewhere, commentators on China, including university teachers and researchers, have claimed that Chinese Communists have now moderated, or that moderates are

making their presence felt in Peking. This is taken to be a new point of departure in history, marking the commencement of a real new order in Asia. This claim has gone beyond a mere statement of description. It has encouraged and served an evangelical crusade, with praises being sung about the change in China and the apparent détente. This view is essentially mythical. Comprehensive study indicates that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that China has basically changed in recent years, and will now link with a new world order, any more than when the early British evangelist, Timothy Richard, claimed that China had seen the light in 1877.

Chinese Communists are not people whose basic views change. They hold strong beliefs, and they hold these permanently and fixedly as Communist ideologues should. They are not notable apostates. They hold to their beliefs in periods of triumph and in adversity. Neither are they reactionaries. Chinese Communists are not inclined to discard their beliefs because of threats or material comforts. To suggest that they will change fundamentally and forsake what they believe are their sacred duties as international proletarian revolutionary leaders is to suggest that they are bad Communists.

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A COMPREHENSIVE study of contempora Chinese Marxist-Leninist documents indicat that it might be correct to conclude that instead "mellowing" and turning "moderate", Chinese Com munists are using new tactics suited to new cond tions in order to gain their ends, while maintainin their basic beliefs and principles. This practice wou of course be in strict accordance with the current advertised theory of two points.

The production of the new model for "peopl war" strategy, which has not been condemned by a so-called "moderate" Communists in China, indicat that Chinese Marxist-Leninists have not renounce violence as the way for social and political chang All they have done is to rewrite the timetable f revolution, indicating that the "bourgeois, capitalis imperialist" leaders and nations will be thrown in the "rubbish bin of history" not now, but a litt later when the world situation is more suited to thi Thus the present so-called *détente* is not so much *détente* as a period of revolutionary dormancy.

It is the Western interest in *détente,* and t desire for it among observers, that has caus Westerners in great part to miss the appearance the new military strategic model, and to turn th attention to "moderates" and "evolutionists" in Chi who, by definition, are neither military-minded believers in violence.

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE: *The author examines the susceptibility of the region to political violence in the post-Vietnam era.*

Patterns of Political Violence in South-East Asia: Challenge and Response

Robert W. McColl

POLITICAL violence, especially insurgency, has been endemic to South-east Asia since at least the end of World War II. The challenge of successfully dealing with political violence and insurgency is two-fold: first, there is the need to determine the cause or motive; second is the question of how to respond to it. If the threat is national in scale (a revolution), then the response must also be national. However, if the threat is merely local, then the response should also be limited to local circumstances. An obvious problem occurs when a localized act of insurgency is viewed as a national threat and repressive measures are taken throughout the country. This is a tactical error that often generates such widespread antagonisms that they in turn lead to nationwide revolts or possibly to a national revolutionary movement. Added to this is the problem of insurgencies which governments may view as not only of national but also of regional or international significance, or as part of an international Communist conspiracy. This was the basis for the escalation of violence in Indo-China. The original insurgency — or threat of insurgency — was viewed as part of the international threat of Communism, and responses were generated from this perception of motives, thus making the insurgency international.

Since political violence and insurgency are generally based upon some pre-existing political model, it is useful briefly to review the nature of three successful revolutionary models whose motives and tactics are archetypes for most of the world. It is especially important to note their different political and geographic patterns. It might also be remembered that these models also compete for global political dominance and their competition is the basis for most post World War II conflict.

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DURING the course of history a number of models for achieving the best form of government have evolved. The most recent of these models have stressed revolution and political violence. The American, Russian and Chinese revolutions today compete for followers in the developing economies and politics of the world, especially in South-east Asia. To fully appreciate what this competition means, it should be remembered that in their ideals all three models stress the same premises: that it is the right of the governed to use violence to overthrow the government if it should be oppressive or unrepresentative of the population at large (the "people"); and that it is the right of any political group possessing its own territory (nation) to be independent. From this point on, both in terms of their ideals and their practices, they differ widely.

The American revolutionary model stresses the *vox populi* and the right of any national group of common purpose to rebel against a tyrannical government or against domination by a foreign government. This model had such appeal that it acquired considerable currency in revolutionary France. The motives of the American model were and remain, essentially idealistic and rooted in the belief that all men are created free and equal:

> "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness...That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,...That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive

of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."(1)

Unhampered by problems of consistency between their ideals and practices, the Americans have stressed this same moralistic attitude in their foreign policy. The same ideals were continued in such policies as Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, the containment of Communist expansion in Greece and opposition to the return of French colonial rule in Indo-China. It is also at the root of the Nixon Doctrine.

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THE *Russian model* is totally different. Stressing the same ideal of equality, its methods of implementation and achievement are totally antithetical to those of the United States. The Russian Marxist-Leninist model stresses class differences and class conflict, and is much more élitist than the American model. Furthermore the Russian revolution was successful through the use of troops and urban groups, not through a general mobilization of the entire population.

More important than its historic origins and doctrine — since these could have remained purely national in significance — was the creation in 1919 of the *Comintern* (Communist International) and Lenin's creation of a University for the Toilers of the Far East. These two institutions were designed solely to train and support the export of the Communist system to the rest of the world, especially the Far East. It was this aggressiveness that for so long isolated the Russian government and its leaders from full participation in world politics. This isolation, combined with their revolutionary zeal, pushed them to ever greater efforts to export their revolution.

Of special importance in this regard was the establishment of regional bureaux. As early as 1926 the *Comintern* had created the Nanyang (South Seas) Communist Party with its headquarters in Singapore. Following the creation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, the Nanyang Party focused primarily on Malaya and Thailand, but also showed interest in Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines(2). Clearly the *Comintern* and the Soviet Union had marked South-east Asia as a major area of activity in their effort to create more Communist states. The Russians also set up a Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, with important *Comintern* officials in residence. It was their job to oversee operations throughout Asia. Thus, even when the Nanyang Party was dissolved in 1930, it merely broke into its national party groups. It was still directed by the *Comintern* and officials in Shanghai.

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THE *Chinese Communist revolution* is the most recent example of a generically different revolutionary model. It is different from both the American and the Russian models. Simultaneously it combines elements of both. First, the Chinese revolutionary model stresses rural rather than urban organization and political focus. The emphasis in China was on the political organization and education of a large agrarian population. While Marxist doctrine was initially adhered to in that the Party's leaders and headquarters were urban, and attempts were even made at urban revolution, this arena of action proved futile as a means of acquiring total national political power. The eventual tactic was to "surround the cities with the countryside", and fight a protracted war, — one with no timetable for success; success was its own end. The entire process was made easier because foreign domination of so much of China and the Chinese economy helped galvanize public opinion and create a nationalist sentiment. One could argue that the Japanese invasion and occupation was the final push that created the conditions necessary for the eventual success of the Chinese Communists and their doctrine of national sovereignty. The Chinese model was new, distinct from both the Russian and the American. It was also an amalgam of both, sharing an emphasis on the rights of all people.

Like the Russians, the Chinese began to proselytize beyond their own nation, concentrating on South-east Asia. Once it had control of the Mainland, the Chinese Communist Government took the lead in calling for more military activities by the region's Communist Parties. This call had first been made in 1948 at *Cominform* meetings held in Calcutta and again in 1949 when the Chinese held international meetings in Shanghai and stressed the need for armed struggle and the creation of Communist-led armies of liberation. Liu Shao-ch'i in a 16 November 1949 speech, reported by the NCNA is 23 November 1949, made the following points:

- "The working class must unite with all other classes, political parties and/or organizations and individuals who are will-

ing to oppose the oppression of imperialism and its lackeys, form a broad and nationwide united front and wage a resolute fight against imperialism and its lackey."

- "This nationwide united front must be led by and built around the working class, which opposes imperialism most resolutely, most courageously, and most unselfishly, and its party, the Communist Party, with the latter at its centre. It must not be led by the wavering and compromising national bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie and their parties."

- "In order to enable the working class and its party, the Communist Party, to become the centre for uniting all the forces throughout the country against imperialism and competently to lead the national united front to victory, it is necessary to build up, through long struggles, a Communist Party which is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, which understands strategy and tactics, practises self-criticism and strict discipline, and is closely linked with the masses."

- "It is necessary to set up wherever and whenever possible a national army which is led by the Communist Party and is powerful and skilful in fighting the enemies. It is necessary to set up bases on which the liberation army relies for its activities and to make the mass struggles in the enemy-controlled areas and the armed struggles to co-ordinate with each other. Armed struggle is the main form of struggle for the national liberation struggles of many colonies and semi-colonies.

  This is the basic way followed and practised in China by the Chinese people in winning victory. This way is the way of Mao Tse-tung which may also be the basic way for winning emancipation by the people of other colonial and semi-colonial countries where similar conditions prevail."

Thus both the Soviet Union, via the *Comintern* and later the *Cominform,* and the new government in China, called for armed resistence and the creation of mass bases and guerrilla wars of liberation. This, and the American commitment to the end of colonialism and to political stability, was the post-war challenge to both global and regional politics.

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WORLD War II had a profound affect upon the role of violence as a legitimate form of political expression in Asia. When the Japanese occupied the countries of South-east Asia, they not only threw out the former colonial and imperialist foreign Powers and placed themselves in power, they also created a sense of Asian nationalism. Their doctrine of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere stressed the development of Asian economic resources for Asian consumption. The Japanese placed local national leaders in high posts, and, despite the fact that the final decision remained in Japanese hands, they did train and provide administrative experience for an entire generation of new politicians. Likewise, those who opposed and fought both the occupying Japanese and their "puppets" developed a cadre of new politicians. Both groups of "politicians" developed an ethos in which violence to attain political ends was fully acceptable; in fact, it became something of an art.

In addition, the Japanese often created an entirely new national infrastructure, especially highways and railways. These added to the sharing of ideas and information, an important criterion for the creation of nationalism(3).

To counter the Japanese, the United States and Britain encouraged and supported virtually any organized group (and organized them if they were lacking) that would oppose, through sabotage and guerrilla operations, the Japanese. Their support went to groups on both the Left and Right wings of the political spectrum, including the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines, Chin Peng in Malaya, Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China, and the Chinese Communists, as well as the Nationalists, in China.

In short, World War II saw an alliance between those Powers that were later to compete for dominance. In the meantime, their support for various and sundry liberation groups not only helped create a growing sense of nationalism but also a large number of organized, militarily trained and politically motivated sects or groups that later competed for their own political ends. In some states, these groups became dominant; in others they continued and still continue to fight for total national control. No place is more typical of the fracturing this created than Burma.

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WITH the conclusion of the war, the United States and its European allies confronted increased political aggression from the Soviet Union. As Eastern Europe came under Soviet domination President Truman "held the line" against Communism in Greece. Simultaneously, the Chinese Communists were clearly routing the Nationalist Chinese but there was some confusion as to whether they were actually Communists or merely "agrarian re-

rmers". With their victory in 1949 and Liu o-ch'i's proclamation, the question was answered. hey were Communists and had aggressive intentions ward their neighbours.

At this point, the spectre created by Sir alford J. Mackinder's assertion came to the fore:

> "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
> Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
> Who rules the World-Island commands the World."(4)

estern strategists and politicians noted that a mmunist China and Russia now controlled not ly East Europe but also the presumed strategic eartland. This access to the entire Eurasian conti- nt and the bulk of the world's population made em appear a formidable foe both doctrinally and ysically. The only hope for meeting their challenge world domination was for the Allies to erect a rrier to contain the Communist menace by keeping within its already existing boundaries. The resut as an entirely new geo-political view of the world d the inclusion of many small nations (and tional politics) in a much greater global strategy. cal wars of liberation, guerrilla wars, in fact any litical instability, were laid at the doorstep of the mmunists. There was now such an intermingling global objectives and local politics that unraveling e Gordian knot would be child's play.

Political groups and leaders that had been lies during the anti-Japanese period were suddenly emies. Luis Taruc, Chin Peng, Ho Chi Minh, Mao e-tung, *et. al.* became the new, local *bêtes noires.* maintain the "containment", it was imperative the view of the strategists) that no ally be allowed fall to the Communists. For, in the view of the merican National Security Council, the US's allies re like a line of dominoes. If one should topple, ey all would fall(5). The maintenance of national litical stability was now of paramount importance American global aims. Local political issues came subservient to global considerations. The allenge was to prevent the spread of Communism, d all internal insurgents were viewed as Commu- sts. Not only did the US believe they were, but it as also good business for national politicians and ilitary units to perpetuate this belief, since it meant assive economic and military aid.

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HAVING met the Communist challenge in Korea, and defended the Straits of Taiwan, the nited States took up the fight against any further eakout of the Communist menace in Asia. It was pecially well prepared for a full-scale, regular war sault. It was not prepared for a protracted guerrilla war, and that is what it met in Vietnam. Still, the American belief that any problem could be solved with effort, logic and good will (and the threat of ultimate force, if necessary) led them to take up the challenge:

> "Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved — once and for all — by determined effort. We considered peace natural, stability normal, and foreign involvement appropriate — only so long as needed to remove some temporary threat or disorder. We entered World War I as 'the war to end wars', and to make the world 'safe for democracy'. We fought World War II until 'unconditional surrender'.
>
> ...we acted as if the world's security and economic development could be conclusively insured by the commitment of American resources, know-how, and effort.
>
> ...the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the purity of means...Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance (of power) often made it seem unnecessary."(6)

Through the use of science, technology and massive firepower, the United States met a challenge that was primarily organizational and small-scale. It expected to meet the global challenge of Communism and found instead local Vietnamese villagers. It allied itself with national governments to fight the evil of Communism and found itself tied to corrupt politicians and power-seeking generals. While winning on the battlefield, it lost the war(7).

After years of applying its science, computers, technology and fire-power, the United States finally made the decision to pull out. It was a conclusion rationalized in terms of global strategic re-evaluations. The US had become mired in the local politics of Vietnam and the rest of Indo-China, and Washington, recognizing the dichotomy between local and global motives, viewed its new challenge to be global. This was a rationalization. It was an effort at face-saving, given the shift in American public opinion. The State Department, CIA and Pentagon officials continued to recognize the need for American containment and presence as a balance between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Still, it was impossible to continue any direct involvement of American personnel in what were now recognized as local and/or regional squabbles. This review of insurgent motives was the basis for the Nixon Doctrine. It is also the basis for future US participation in the region.

The result is that the countries of South-east Asia must now meet acts of insurgency with a new response. They must begin to view political opposition in a new vein. No longer can all insurgents be grouped under the general rubric of "Communists"; no longer will their American ally supply them with virtually unlimited arms and financial aid to combat "Communist insurgents". To meet the new challenge of continued and escalating acts of insurgency, each nation in South-east Asia must more accurately identify the motives and objectives of its insurgents. There is a new South-east Asia, and it no longer belongs to the political myths and responses of the 1960s.

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IT is now clear that, with the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine, the American pull-out from Vietnam, and the catastrophic fall of the governments in Indo-China in 1975, insurgency, especially insurgency laid at the doorstep of international Communism, will no longer evoke a sympathetic response from allied Powers. Today a national insurgency is just that — a matter of national, not global or even regional concern. The insurgents must be dealt with locally. To focus on the still recent, and politically emotional, issues of events in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos may be good for local politicians for a while yet, but those are events of the past and tied to an entirely different era.

One thing is clear, however. Acts of insurgency and political violence will continue. They will increase in frequency and so will the number of groups who participate in them. But not all these insurgents will necessarily be revolutionaries or even Communists, although Communists will certainly be present. In Thailand, the Philippines and other countries, right-wing parties have also formed guerrilla units in an attempt to gain control of the government; and martial law and authoritarian government by military leaders or under a strong personal leader such as Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore or President Marcos in the Philippines will continue as major options for maintaining national stability.

While Communist support for internal insurgent movements remains at a high, even increasing, level, the political motives of most insurgent groups remain remarkably conservative. Thus, to prevent their aims from becoming more radical, to prevent nascent insurgent groups from being pushed into the arms of the Communists, it is necessary to take a long, hard, honest look into the dark corners of national politics and determine who the insurgents really area. Where do they find their support? What are their real objectives or motives? What kind of government response is necessary to prevent civil war and catastrophic change, to encourage evolution in place of revolution? These are the most critical questions and challenges now facing the governments of South-east Asia.

The only way to identify the insurgents a their support is to engage in a time-tested practi developed originally by the Marxists and perfected the Chinese Communists, namely "an analysis of t classes of the national society" and a determinati of "who are our friends and who are our enemies"(8 To accomplish this, one must begin with t recognition that there is a new demography, a n sociology, and a dramatically new political geograp in the South-east Asia of the 1970s.

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DURING the past three decades the populatio of all the countries in the area have grow substantially. And, even in the countries where th growth has yet to produce obvious populati pressures, the majority of the population is n under the age of 20(9). In addition, urban areas, n just the cities, but the surrounding urban regi also, have shown rapid growth and increasi concentrations of population. For just one examp consider the growth of Bangkok. In 1960 t Bangkok-Thonburi area had a population of 1 million. It is estimated that the 1970 population w over 3 million. In 1967 its population was 32 tim larger than that of the next largest city(10). Alo with this rapid growth and shift to a predomina young population has come a new sociology.

Until recently, the old sociology still appli with traditional leaders, concentrated in the prim city or capital, determining national and inter tional affairs. Such primate cities tend to be the b of all wealth and whatever material well-being a social services as may be provided by the gover ment. Rural areas have remained traditional, ag rian and with few social services and limited, if a social or political mobility. Politics, both local a national, are élitist, and stability is the watchwor This system was only temporarily upset by t Second World War. The post-War period saw only limited broadening of political participation, b even this was concentrated in the capital city occasionally in an important provincial capit Traditional political rule was not based upon a real sense of nationalism or national purpose, b rather on the dominance, and protection of t dominance, by a few select ruling groups. Und such a system, little or no attention was paid to ru areas, rural leadership or to any sharing of natio power or wealth.

This is precisely the political system t Communism seeks to overthrow. It is also a politic system that is anethma to the American ideal of egalitarian society, with the full and equal particip tion of all citizens, and a system which includes t right of political protest. This is the system again which the new sociology is reacting with its acts insurgency.

Today all the countries in South-east Asia not ...ly have a larger and younger population but also a ...opulation that is better educated and more inform... about the world beyond the village and the ...ation. They also have more diversely structured ...cieties. There are many "new" classes, which have ... rôle in the traditional political system. The ...urgeoning number of service personnel is one such ...class. In addition, the improved systems of national ...ansportation and communication have created new ...oups of migrants and workers. All these groups are ...ll informed about political issues, and seek more ...rticipation in the economic wealth of the country. ... is a world that is alien and often incomprehensible ... people over 40 years of age. It is also a sociology ...rgely committed to change and willing to use ...olence to bring about that change.

Politically the most important group today is ...uth, especially the student population. This is not ...ly because youth forms the bulk of the population ...t also because youth is full of vigour, highly ...ealistic, prone to manipulation by demagogues, ...d increasingly well-informed and educated. Much ... this education has been received in American and ...itish style schools and has thus stressed the values ... democracy and egalitarian forms of society, along ...h the right to protest (become insurgent)(11). ...d, the demise of élitist politics — the very basis of ... old sociology — is a major premise taught to ...uth in the growing number of nationally funded ...leges and schools. The government is training its ...n insurgents.

The power of students can be seen in the ...mber of governments changed or brought to ...litical crises by student demonstrations. One need ...ly recall events in South Korea, Burma, Indonesia, ...uth Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia ...d even Malaysia to have some sense of how potent ...d widespread is the increasing political involve... ...nt of the student segment of a young population. ...ilure to find them meaningful jobs or to provide ...m with useful commitments to the nation will ...ve their energies and organizations open to ...ponents of more radical and violent models of ...litical change, models that do offer them a role, if ... the leadership, in a new social order.

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IN ADDITION to the students there is the increased number of urban industrial workers. ...atter districts in Bangkok, Manila, Kuala Lum... ..., Jakarta and other cities are the main concentra... ...ns of this growing segment of society. Largely ...an-oriented and often lacking basic social ser... ...es, these recent migrants from the countryside ...en retain their rural contacts. They send letters ...ne or make personal visits via the improved public ...nsport system. They carry the news and attitudes ... the city — both its good and its evil — to their rural cousins. They thus form a powerful link between urban-based politics or insurgency and any rural guerrilla force. As they become organized or unionized and gain some taste of their political and economic power, they too become essential ingredients in any new equation for national political power. That such workers and migrants are an element than cannot be overlooked was demonstrated in Bangkok in June 1975 when they threatened to cut off all city services (water, power and sewage) if the military interfered in a labour strike.

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FINALLY, but certainly not the least element in the new sociology, there are the ethnic minority groups, which have often been in the countries as long or longer than the dominant ethnic group. They now constitute an important element in national security. Often straddling international boundaries, groups such as the Meo, the Karen, the Moro, etc. frequently find support for their political independence and acts of insurgency from outside the country. Other minorities, such as the Overseas Chinese, are concentrated in the cities and may have a dominant economic role in the local economy. The Overseas Chinese, who have a history of close organization and association with the ruling élites to avoid harassment, are well organized, and may constitute a potentially explosive element in the very heart of the capital city.

These new demographic and sociological factors, together with the decline in the American presence and the new governments in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, have created a new political geography both within each of the countries and within the region.

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THERE is now a new balance of power among the nations of South-east Asia. Facing the traditional allies of the West, are the new Communist states. On balance, counting China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as Communist and the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia as non-Communist, the balance seems evenly divided. However, if one considers the importance of strong purposeful nationalism, strength of internal organization and the ability to marshal population, economics and material to national ends, the Communists clearly are a more dominant force. Also, today there are no non-Communist buffer states between Thailand and Vietnam, and, with the entire coastline of Vietnam and Cambodia now under the sovereignty of states whose political system is diametrically opposed to that of the non-Communist states, even Malaysia, Borneo, and the Philippines are not so remote as to be invulnerable to a determined effort at exporting revolutionary Communism.

Then there are the various ethnic minorities,

often concentrated in remote areas of the nation and sharing their language and history with people of the same ethnic group across an international border. When trained in military strategy and armed, and with a strong belief in their own identity and a desire to defend their tribal territories, these groups pose a potential threat to national security. But, it should be noted, they presumably pose an equal threat to the Communist states. The reason they have not been a political problem in Vietnam and China is that their organization, history and very separatism have been accepted and politically organized for national purposes, a point that might be learned by other states with similar political geographies.

Internal political geography has also seen a drastic change. There has been a decline in the dominance of the primate cities and the growth of regional capitals and the latter's increasing economic and even political significance. Again, the critical ingredient in this change has been the improved infra-structure of highways and telecommunications. Whether they were originally built for military purposes, as "friendship highways", or for economic exploitation, the new highways today link formerly remote districts to their provincial and national capitals. Places that were formerly up to two days' travel away in the dry season, today are only hours apart. The economic development and urban growth in North-east and Southern Thailand, in the Southern Philippines, and similar areas in Malaysia and Indonesia have not lessened the strong sense of regionalism. Today we can find potent insurgencies in these formerly remote areas, which are often economically and politically discriminated against. Such insurgencies constitute an even greater threat to national sovereignty when linked to ethnic or religious grievances or when concentrated along the border of a Communist neighbour. But they need not be a threat to the entire national political order — they are not national revolutions. They may pose a threat to the state's physical integrity, but their motives are local.

Perhaps the classic example of fragmented national political geography is Burma. Here ethnic-based rebellions continue to plague efforts at creating a single nation, and the problem is clearly exacerbated by the fact that such groups have a history of separate political organization and their own identifiable territories. The failure to offer these groups political participation is an obstacle to the unification, and to the economic and political growth of this potentially very rich state.

Within these new demographies, sociologies and political geographies lie the challenges to national sovereignty, stability and growth. Combined with the political potential of the new groups, and the emphasis on change from the old system of rule to the new, there is a rich and varied choice of tactics from which insurgents can choose(12). The[re] are also the massive supplies of modern arms le[ft] over from the war in Indo-China, many of whi[ch] have already found their way into the hands insurgents and even common bandits. The proble[m] facing each nation in its effort to meet these futu[re] challenges will be to separate political motives fro[m] tactics, — to determine which political issues a[re] truly national in scale and which are politically an[d] geographically limited and can be dealt with on [a] local scale. The continued feeding of the delusion [of] a Communist conspiracy may possibly push many le[ft] radical movements and their leaders much closer [to] Communism, as the only political alternative to oth[er] models of political change.

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FAILURE to find sufficient outlet for the ang[er] of the various insurgent factions, or to provi[de] significant redress for their grievances leads th[em] insurgents increasingly to tactics of sabotage, bom[b]ings, and assassination. Thus the coming decades w[ill] see a marked increase in the application of politi[cal] violence by the entire political spectrum, — Righ[t] Centre and Left. This makes it even more importa[nt] not to seek a psychologically comfortable explanati[on] by declaring all such acts to be the acts Communists, but to face the actual nature of wh[at] provokes the violence and to seek solutions to [the] acts and issues themselves.

The basic problem facing the governments South-east Asia thus becomes one of choosing th[e] right response to different types and scales political challenge. Clearly the governments of Si[n]gapore and the Philippines have chosen a nation[al] response — guided, limited democracy. While co[m]mitted to democratic principles and making serio[us] efforts to promote evolutionary social change, a[nd] thus to pre-empt any act of revolutionary insurgen[cy] they are authoritarian. This is one response and it [is] working tolerably well for the time being. But it is [a] response that often leaves a boiling cauldron discontent, especially among people who have taste[d] other times or other systems. They chafe against th[e] limited right to speak out against discrimination bureaucratic bungling and the inability to criticiz[e] the system. What most often is lacking in suc[h] models of political stability is an escape valve, som[e] way for people to express their feelings and criticism of a system that permeates their lives.

In contrast Thailand is presently committed a democratic process and civilian government. The[re] does not appear to be any dynamic, charismat[ic] leader who could institute personal, military rul[e] nor does there appear to be much popular sympath[y] for another military coup. It is a system that is n[ot] geared to meeting the insurgent challenge, except [by] allowing all those with political motives to expre[ss]

themselves openly and run for seats in Parliament. This is a major escape value for political discontent among the Thai, but it does not yet provide any expression or outlet for minority groups, such as the hill tribes and the Muslim-Malay population in the South. Fortunately these groups are distant from the primate city-capital, Bangkok, and its highly concentrated population and volatile politics. But this only provides time to find a solution; it is not a solution in itself.

Different again is the situation in Malaysia. The major political threat to national stability there is concentrated in the cities, primarily Kuala Lumpur. It is largely an ethnic contest between Malays and Chinese, which tends to invite overly simplistic solutions. The Chinese remain an essential ingredient of Malaysian politics and economics, although the Malay remain the ethnically, linguistically, and historically dominant group. Also there will continue to be acts of insurgency motivated by the geographic separation of Sabah and Sarawak. However, such strains are more easily met within the context of a federal political system, than one which is wedded to a unitary form of government and strongly centralized rule. Thus the major threat remains a race war.

One point is clear. Politically motivated acts of insurgency and violence will continue to plague the governments of all the non-Communist states. However, each act of insurgency or violence may vary, from local or issue-specific rebellions to attempts at total national revolution. Externally supported guerilla wars of national liberation will continue. Regions will challenge the domination of the primate city-capital, and the economic and political dominance of a few select families will be eroded. Anti-corruption and broader political and economic participation are other issues which may contribute to violence. It is also clear that urban-based violence will increase since most of the potential insurgents are concentrated in the cities (workers, youth, students, and Overseas Chinese). Finally, one can also anticipate an increase in the "banditry" of those who are frustrated over the lack of economic opportunity or social mobility, or who simply want to share the riches of the cities and the monied classes.

The most important adjustment necessary to meet these new challenges is the elimination of the attitude that all acts of insurgency are part of some externally-supported, militarily based war of national revolution. Not every public demonstration, riot, strike or even attack on a remote police or military unit is *a priori* a Communist act. It is necessary to face up to the fact that there are numerous internal pressures and dissatisfactions that are unique to each country and that must be met and solved internally. Naturally, external forces will attempt to make use of labour unions, student demonstrations, strikes, and the traditional jungle-based guerrilla. But this does not mean that these groups or their actions are necessarily foreign-directed or orchestrated. Such an assumption ignores the often highly nationalistic and patriotic motives of the insurgents, whose leaders may have no alternative but to turn to sympathetic foreign powers. In short, the preconceived idea of a Communist conspiracy may in fact **create** a Communist conspiracy. One can therefore forecast a continuum of the results of these circumstances:

- There will evolve a federal form of political organization that will take account of strong regionalisms and ethnic groups.

- There will develop a strong sense of national purpose and commitment to national goals that will unite the various class, ethnic, and regional groups to a single purpose.

- Strong dictatorships may emerge which, by decree and effective police and military powers, will create the image of national unity.

- Bloody civil wars will occur whose outcome will be either the fracturing of the state into a collection of smaller state-like units, or a national revolution will occur that will replace the confusion with a strongly centralized government.

Obviously the major Powers will continue to play a role in the direction and responses to these challenges — often muddying the waters and exacerbating the problems — but such is the nature of power. Nevertheless the problems remain national and so do their solutions. The comment of Mao Tse-tung to Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand in July 1975 is appropriate. In response to a request that the People's Republic of China cease aiding Communist insurgents in Thailand, Mao said that if the Thai Government stopped fighting them militarily and made the appropriate social and economic changes, they would simply fade away.

Notes and References

1. This is an excerpt from the American Declaration of Independence.

2. Robert A. Scalipino, ed. *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements,* (Prentice Hall 1965), p. 233; and A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (Harper and Bros. 1960), pp. 153-4.

3. The importance of transportation and the network of communication in the growth of nationalism is treated by Karl Deutsch in a number of publications of which the following is merely representative: Karl Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration", *World Politics,* Vol. V (January 1953), pp. 168-195.

4. Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc. 1962) p. 150.

5. See *United States — Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967,* Book 8, p. 285 and p. 341 and Book 9, p. 221 as well as the article in *SPECTRUM* by Russell H. Fifield, "The Concept of South-east Asia: Origins, Development, and Evaluation", Vol. 4, No. 1 (October 1975) pp. 42-51.

6. Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Commonwealth Club and World Affairs Council of Northern California, 3 February 1976, "The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union", Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Media Services, US Department of State, Washington, D.C., p. 2.

7. Among numerous post-mortems on Vietnam, the recent documentation by Lawrence Grintner is perhaps the most com plete. See his "How They Lost: Doctrines, Strategies an Outcomes of the Vietnam War", *Asian Survey,* Vol. XV No. 12 (December 1975) pp. 1114-1132, and "South Viet nam: Pacification Denied", *SPECTRUM,* Vol. 3, No. 4 (Jul 1975) pp. 49-78.

8. This approach to political organization can be found in th writings of many Communist and Nationalist leaders of revo lutionary movements. The earliest model is provided by Ma Tse-tung in his article, "Analysis of the Classes in Chines Society", written in March 1926 and reprinted in his *Selecte Works* and other collections of his writings.

9. See the various annual issues of the United Nations Demo graphic Yearbook and in W. Howard Wriggins and James F Guyot, eds. *Population, Politics and the Future of Souther Asia* (Columbia University Press 1973).

10. *Ibid.*, especially the article by Sidney Goldstein, "The Demo graphy of Bangkok: The Case of a Primate City", pp. 81-119

11. The article by R. F. Zimmerman, "Student Revolution i Thailand: The End of Thai Bureaucratic Polity?", *Asian Sur vey,* Vol. XIV, No. 6 (June 1974) is one example of a realisti examination of the motives of such movements.

12. I have discussed the various models of guerrilla war now bei used in South-east Asia in "Geopolitical Themes in Contemp rary Asian Revolutions", *The Geographical Review,* Vol. No. 3 (July 1975), pp. 301-310.

JAPAN: *The author analyzes the political implications of Tokyo's economic power in the region.*

Japan in South-East Asia: Perspectives of Industrial Power

E. Stuart Kirby

KEY aspects of the South-east Asian situation, which have recently been reviewed in *SPECTRUM,* are the development of Sino-Soviet rivalry, new forms of political strife and the possible emergence of China as a major supplier of oil(1). The present article discusses the position of Japan, whose presence is already formidable in some respects, and of portentous significance for the future. A preceding analysis by the present author(2) identified India as one main base of regional power, where Soviet influence is at present strong; the other main non-Communist power-base is Japan.

Industrially, technologically, financially and organizationally Japan is a Great Power by World standards; in Asia, Japan is pre-eminent in those respects, and looks like remaining so in future. Certain "futurologists" even project that Japan will become the world's leading industrial nation by the year 2000. Japan is also the greatest potential contributor, within Asia itself, to the development of that continent.

The first subject discussed below is the nature and significance of Japan's "economic miracle", and how this relates to the needs of Asia. The second subject concerns the real structure of Japan's basic requirements and material interests, and Japan's possible contributions in Asia: on this, Japanese policy must be evaluated. In the third place, note must be taken of the fact that economic and political growth may generate stresses and frictions as well as benefits. This, too, is exemplified by the case of Japan, with its environmental pollution and social strains. Finally, perspectives must be drawn of Japan's actual and potential participation in Asian and world development.

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JAPAN, like the United Kingdom, is a nation particularly dependent for its livelihood on the production, export and import of goods and services (and, what is too often forgotten, of the ideas and competences that go with them). Whether or not it is accepted that economic factors determine political reality, these must be our practical terms of reference, if only for the reason that they are far more quantifiable than political indices, also less transitory and variable. Politically, since 1945 Japan has kept a "low posture", although this has by no means precluded the Japanese from keeping their eyes and ears open to world events and trends, or maneuvering adroitly among them.

Political assertiveness obviously correlates, however, with economic and technical capacity, which, in Japan's case, has now grown so great that refusal to take a positive role is impossible, indeed the attempt to refuse it appears hypocritical. Japan is the only Asian country, except Hong Kong and Singapore on the one hand, Siberia and Soviet Central Asia on the other, to have achieved the sort of development to which all aspire. Japan's impetus began with the United States' provision of US$1 billion of import aid, to a country still under its occupation and suffering post-war poverty, in the years 1949-52. India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mainland China before the Communist take-over, and South Korea received equally massive aid without similar results. Japan's reconstruction was very rapid, and was transformed into relative prosperity as Japan profited from the Korean War boom. It regained its trading and manufacturing eminence in Asia around 1952.

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IN THE following decade, to 1962, Japan's foreign trade quadrupled again, and kept this

pace, actually doubling again in the four years 1972 to 1975. Of course prices were soaring by then; but Japanese productivity soared even faster. The index of manufacturing output in Japan doubled between 1958 and 1962, the general production index tripled again by 1972(3). These are huge increases, from a baseline already high, — unlike the large percentage gains publicized by such countries as Mainland China, which are from extremely low starting-points. Japan resumed, in greater earnest, its pre-war position as a "workshop of Asia" and made a large commercial penetration of all other parts of the world as well.

It is useful to bear in mind that the addition to Japan's capacity in recent years, in many lines of industrial activity, is actually larger than the whole existing stock of such facilities in the Asian Communist countries. No country can play a greater part in Asia's development, no country is more intrinsically interested in the security and prosperity of the whole area. And no country is so compelled by its situation to take a major role in Asian development as Japan, whose population, which has just reached 112 million, can only be sustained at its now high standard of living by taking such a role.

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JAPAN'S international trade is the key to its livelihood. The broad picture by continents shows Japan as still strongly linked, in the trade context, with the USA (Table 1). The degree of this connexion is however often exaggerated. Japan now takes about one quarter of its imports from North America; but it took about one third before the war. In contrast, Japan is now dependent on Asia for about 45 per cent of its imports and that is about double the degree to which Japan depended on Asian sources before the War. This shows at once Japan's vital interest in keeping trade open and flourishing, in and through the Asian region.

Japan's Asian trade has been redistributed since the War. Trade with China, the main item in pre-war days, was negligible until the 1970s, but then began swiftly to rise. Exports to Asia had fallen 20 per cent below pre-war levels, precisely because of the cessation of the China trade; but this slack was picked up by the rest of the world, where Japanese exports have widely flourished, greatly enhancing Japan's involvement with the developing world, and Japanese experience in dealing with it. Asia's share of imports from Japan rose 11 per cent compared to before the War.

The composition of Japan's trade has changed in quality even more than in direction and is now that of a highly industrialized country. The measure of this change is shown in Table 2. Before the War, Japan was predominantly a producer of textiles and other comparatively simple commodities; now, leaving such products increasingly to other developing countries, Japan specializes more and more in the production and export of machinery, sophisticate equipment and services. These go largely to the gre American and European markets; but they cat increasingly also for the developing Asian markets i which the Japanese have special competence and (Asians themselves) often show better understandin than their competitors.

Within this general trend, it is necessary t examine more closely the recent progress of Japan trade with East Asian and other countries (see Tab 3). The United States took some 29% of Japan exports and imports (by value) in 1964, but its sha fell to about 22% in 1974. China figures at on about 2% throughout, the USSR at only about 3% and the minor Communist countries of Asia repre sent an insignificant share. Eleven non-Communi countries of East Asia take almost as large a share i Japan's total trade as does the United States; an this is the most readily expansible, among the group so far mentioned, unless or until dealings with Chin become much less politically and organizational complicated than they are at present, which sti seems a remote prospect.

But the above represents only about one half Japan's worldwide trade, which is extremely diver fied, thus giving a flexible base for its trade policie

Table 3 also adduces clearly the records of t various countries and areas in terms of the rates growth of their trade with Japan, as expressed index numbers. In sum, non-Communist East As and North America each represent about one fifth Japan's trade, the former growing more rapidly th the latter. Trade with the Communist countries much smaller (only about one twentieth of Japan total trade), but capable of great expansion; bu after many years of persistent effort, the Japanes find great difficulties in developing trade with th Communist countries, whose procedures are bureau cratic, protracted, tedious or expensive, compare with those in capitalist markets. With patience an clearheadedness, these difficulties are surmountab but, unfortunately, they are accompanied by politica sensitivity and the obtrusion of political considera tions into the negotiations.

Thus Communist China insists on Japan declar ing opposition to the "hegemony" of Russia (o America). Japan does not want to make any suc partisan gesture, and considers it particularly irrele vant to discussion about trade matters. Japanes participation in railway construction in Siberia ha been discussed, along with other large projects i that area: but, besides practical difficulties, suc projects arouse the strategic anxieties of the Chinese Better relations with the USSR are blocked, beside other difficulties, by the Moscow Government's blan refusal to consider returning to Japan any of th score of Kuril Islands taken from Japan by the Sovie Union at the end of the Second World War. Th USSR now refuses to consider returning even those o the Kuril Islands which are actually in sight of th

panese coast, which are the only remaining areas of foreign military occupation, from the viewpoint of the Japanese people. This dividing line is as much an ivesore to the Japanese as the East-West dividing line to the Germans in their country. Soviet intransi-gence on this point still prevents the signing of a eace treaty between Japan and the USSR, — the o countries have full diplomatic relations, but no eace treaty, more than 30 years after the War nded. In contrast, doors to trade, investment and rticipation appear wide open to the southward, in d through South-east Asia.

The trade figures above are in terms of current lues. Prices have risen greatly, and it is desirable allow for this by noting the quantum index, which ves the volume (tonnage) of the shipments. This ows that Japanese exports and imports both nearly adrupled in volume during the 1960s and again in e 1970s, while the physical volume of Japanese dustrial output more than tripled over the 20 ars. The strength of the Japanese home market ust also be noted: exports, in a wide range of oducts, take an increasing share of Japan's total tput, but that total output has risen so much that me-market sales remain generally no less than they re before, in absolute amount. In the case of any other products, the proportion going to the me market has risen. These trends have proceeded pidly(4).

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IT IS clear which are the more profitable, and which the less profitable, directions of ternational relations for the Japanese. Table 3 ows East Asia (especially its eastern half) to be a ofitable area for Japan from the point of view of e balance of trade. There are some who would say at Japan is exploiting South-east Asia. There have en powerful agitations in various countries against panese economic penetration. These have included me militant demonstrations and, notably in Indo-sia and Thailand, boycott activities accompanied some violence, such as the burning of Japanese ods. But the Japan trade is equally vital to the st Asian countries, as Japan takes 20-25 per cent their exports (the same proportion as the United ates takes).

The commercial prosperity of Japan has meant eat financial resources available for investment and reign aid, — resources far beyond those of any her East Asian country. In 1966, for example, pan held US$2 billion worth of reserves in gold d foreign currency, about one seventh of those of e USA and about one twentieth of the total world serves. By 1972, Japan held nearly a quarter of the hole world's reserves, with over US$18 billion rth, much more than the United States, which en had a fifth of the world total. By 1974, Japan's are had fallen again to 16 per cent of the world total, against the United States' 19 per cent; and this trend continues. But Japan is still a formidable financial power, the United Kingdom's gold and foreign exchange reserves amounting to only about one half of Japan's.

This wealth has been used for investment and for aid, especially in East Asia. Japan, like Germany, made large payments of reparations to countries which suffered physical damage in the Second World War, particularly Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines; this was additional to the aid flows considered below.

In 1973 the world total of economic aid to less developed countries was US$15 billion, an increase of US$3.8 billion over the preceding year. Japan provided 70 per cent of that increase, the United States 30 per cent. Japan's total foreign assistance in 1973 was US$5.8 billion, three times the figure for 1970, 70 per cent that of the United States but five times that of the United Kingdom. Only 17 per cent of Japan's aid was however official development assistance, compared to 38 per cent of that of the United States. What Japan is extending is primarily private investment, often officially assisted, which amounted to two-thirds of Japan's total aid in 1973, compared to half of the USA's and one third of the UK's.

Direct private investment overseas by Japanese soared from just over US$200 million in 1971 to 1,300 million in 1973. The latter figure was swollen by official finance worth US$1.8 billion, more than half the United States' overseas investment in that year. About half of this Japanese investment went to East Asia, 17 per cent to Indonesia, 14 per cent to South Korea, 6 per cent to Hong Kong, 5 per cent to Malaysia, 4 per cent to Singapore; the rest was widely spread. In 1975, there were considerable Japanese allocations to North Vietnam. No less than 80 per cent of Japan's foreign investment is in manufacturing, the rest equally divided between petroleum and other extractive industries. In the world market for capital and in international financial transactions, the yen is now a leading currency, in the "hard money" class.

Japan's contributions to the United Nations' and other multilateral agencies in Asia are surpassed only by the United States. As technical assistance, for example, Japan gave a further US$57 million in 1973 (four times as much as in 1970), a contribution similar to that of Canada, but much less than those of the USA, UK and others. This is a topic that cannot be pursued in full detail here, but it re-emphasizes Japan's vital interest in peaceful developmental relations with East Asia. The benefit to particular countries must also be stressed. For example, from 1969 to 1972 Japan gave 25 per cent of the total official development assistance of the non-Communist countries to the little state of

Bhutan, 23 per cent of the US$30 million given to Indonesia, 66 per cent of the US$3 million given to Burma, 24 per cent of the US$5 million given to Thailand, 57 per cent of the US$6 million given to the Philippines(5).

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ALL the foregoing shows the rising tide of Japan's contribution to the development of the world economy, and of East Asia in particular. In the last two years Japan has been hard hit by the fuel crisis, following the great rise in oil prices enforced by the Arab states since the latter part of 1973. (Some of the effects are already detectable in the figures given above for that year).

Pre-war Japan imported about four million kilolitres of petroleum per year, representing less that six per cent of Japanese imports, and costing some US$40 million, or US$10 per kilolitre. By 1961 Japan was importing twelve times as much petroleum, at an outlay of nearly US$700 million. The price remained at about US$13-14 per kilolitre through the 1960s, even declining a little at the end of the decade. Japan's imports passed the 100 million kilolitre mark in 1965, reached 230 million kilolitres in 1970 and approached 300 million kilolitres in 1973, when the price suddenly rose to over US$20 per kilolitre. This raised the cost to Japan by 50 per cent and increased Japan's disbursement for this item to six million dollars. The full impact came after 1974, in which year Japan paid over three times as much for petroleum imports as in 1973 (about US$19 billion, at nearly US$70 per kilolitre). The Japanese Finance Ministry stated that Japan would, if the price of oil had not soared, have had a trade surplus of US$6.6 billion in 1974, instead of a deficit of that amount.

Japan has become more dependent than any other country on fuel oil, — to the extent of nearly 80 per cent of Japan's energy needs, compared with 52 per cent for West Germany, and 46 per cent for the USA and UK. In terms of coal equivalent, petroleum constituted 38 per cent of Japan's total supply of energy in 1960 and 78 per cent in 1973. Japan has difficulty in maintaining or developing other sources of energy, in face of rapidly increasing consumption. The share of coal in Japan's energy consumption declined, between 1960 and 1973, from 42 per cent to 16 per cent, hydro-electricity from 15 per cent to 11 per cent, atomic and geothermal energy from 5 per cent to 3 per cent.

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JAPAN'S oil comes chiefly from the Near East: in 1973 nearly 80 per cent came from that area (Iran 33 per cent, Saudi Arabia 19 per cent, Abu Dhabi 9 per cent, Kuwait 8 per cent, Neutral Zone 6 per cent, Libya 0.5 per cent, others 3 per cent). But Japan is vitally interested in developi supplies from East Asia, where the main source Indonesia (15 per cent in 1973, against 11 per ce in 1960), followed by Brunei. The USSR provid less than half of one per cent in 1973, against 4 p cent in 1960. China provided slightly less than t USSR in 1973, but is now considered as a possib important source(6). Japanese planners predict th an even more drastic dependence on oil imports inevitable in the future. By 1985, they calculate, t national energy requirements will be from 1.9 to 2 times the 1973 level(7). Only oil has been emph sized above, but Japan is a main purchaser of ma other primary products. Japan is one of the worl leading buyers of rubber, tin (and other minerals sugar, cereals (and other foodstuffs), timber, a packing materials. Thus Japan has the most vit interest in the maintenance of free passage, fr access, and free trade, in and through the who East Asian area, and an interest in the econom development of the area, under stable condition

Japan's need for free trade and open commun cations with the world at large and with South-ea Asia in particular is crucial. Freedom of commer and passage are simply essential for Japan's livel hood. Japan's living standards, moreover, can on be maintained and further improved if there is pea and international security in Asia, such as to ensu much greater economic development of the who region. Japan has adopted, ever since its catastroph defeat in 1945, a "low posture" (as the Japan themselves call it) in international relations. B recent economic progress has virtually forced Jap to take a far more assertive position. Should a Power, or group of countries, endeavour to cut obstruct the sea-lanes leading to Japan, or to blo Japan's markets or sources of supply, the Japane would have no choice but to react forcibly. Jap has re-armed to a considerable extent, and so is n altogether without the capacity to react in such way. That capacity is still limited by certa constraints that remain to be considered below. B the first point to be emphasized is that one of t main dangers in Asia is any obstructive alignme that would force the Japanese to react violently. It with these points in mind that a summation Japan's political role and potential must be final considered.

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IN 1970, there was a clear initiative on the pa of Chou En-lai for Chinese rapprochement wi the United States, — to the extent at least reducing the antagonism on that "front", the bett to concentrate on the deeper rivalry with the Sovi Union. The Kissinger and Nixon visits to Peki followed in 1971. The first third-party consequen was an attempt, within a few months, by China t make some reconciliation with Japan also. Thenc

rward China began to give candid reassurances at it was no longer contesting an alliance or terdependence between Japan and the USA, but en considered some such association necessary as a unterpoise to the Soviet Union.

The aim of the Chinese is to draw a triangle of rces pointed against Russia. Subsequent American forts, under President Ford, at détente with the viet Union have been vigorously discouraged and ticized by Peking, every difficulty and disappointent emphasized to show that such a policy is asory. As a baseline for China's triangle, an gnment of common interests — something far less an an alliance, or what would before the Second orld War have been called an "axis" — should be stered between the United States and China. This e would run through Japan, obviously a key ement in the Asian structure.

During the past four years, all this has been ade increasingly clear by the Chinese. To underline ina's warning against and discountenancing of US licies of détente with the USSR, ex-President xon was invited to revisit Peking, on the fourth niversary of his original visit there. The Maoists e willing to use even a political corpse, as a gesture indicate their policies. They hint at tolerance of a w American strategic perimeter on the longitude Japan and the Philippines.

What the Chinese make most clear and explicit however, the pointing of their triangulation ainst Russia, as expressed in the "hegemony" use. In 1972 the Chinese leaders signed identical tements with President Nixon on 27 February and emier Tanaka of Japan on 30 September including e words: "each of the signatories undertakes not to pose its hegemony in the Asian region of the cific and to oppose any attempts by any other untry or group of countries to establish such an gemony". In the circumstances, this clause is inted against Soviet "hegemony" or dominance in rticular; but the phrase was not special to the ian area, and it was equally insisted on by the inese in their statements regarding Czechoslovakia d other parts of the world(8).

Meanwhile Japan's hopes of participation in ge schemes of development in Siberia were largely appointed (largely, but, it must be emphasized, t completely: schemes totalling some US$5 billion re canvassed, and about US$1 billion worth still pear to be going forward). Equally large long-term nomic attractions are emerging in China, which oduced what seemed at first to be an ace from the ttom of the pack in the shape of offers of oil to an. (Later, this proved less certain: the quality of Chinese oil has been critized; it can supply only small part of Japan's requirements; and domestic mand is rising in China). However, offers and counter-offers of this kind are beginning to play a major part in Asian politics, and will increasingly do so in future.

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IT IS equally evident that the Russian strategy has broadly been to construct some triangular pattern of relationships, pointed against China. The Soviet Union has a strong presence in India, considerable influence in Vietnam, and its naval power has grown strongly in Asian waters. Soviet policies have centred on the advocacy of an Asian collective security system, the establishing of a neutralist bloc of countries in Asia, similarly a compact against any "hegemony": in this case, of course, the hegemony of China.

As noted above, Japan seems to find China more conciliatory or collaborative than Russia. It is possible to assert that Japan has an important cultural affinity with China, whose civilization and arts have been so strongly drawn upon by the Japanese throughout their history. Many who know both countries would express some scepticism about this. The two countries have gone quite different ways, in recent generations, and in practical terms this cultural linkage may really be no more than that between (say) the British and the Greeks, due to the ancient cultural inheritance of the former from the latter. A much more potent force in Japan today, so far as the attitude to China is concerned, is the obviously powerful "guilt complex" due to the mistreatment of the Chinese, including acknowledged atrocities, by Japanese militarists in the preceding generation. Just as the German people and Government today evince a strong desire to make "reparations" to Jewish people in general and to the State of Israel in particular, the Japanese people and Government today appear to be well disposed towards the Chinese people and State. This subjective element is certainly powerful, but cannot always overcome the objective difficulties, or sway the Japanese towards relaxation of basic principles, such as their reluctance to be party to a "hegemony clause".

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IN THESE lines, it has only been possible to mention a few highlights in the complex and swiftly developing situation in East Asia. The aim has been to clarify the basic perspectives from the Japanese point of view. The Japanese are a major force, actually and potentially, in Asia, — from the economic point of view especially; strategically or militarily they are still relatively weak and highly vulnerable. Their interests are many-sided, embracing the whole panorama of Asian and worldwide development. They must and will, in accordance with a self-interest which they understand very accurately, refuse to participate in any of the "triangulations" that have been mentioned above, or any others that

may be propounded. For Japan the metaphor might rather be the favouring of a completely multilateral and open state of affairs in East Asia. Or, if that is too much to hope for in the short term, the evolution of some "parallelograms" rather than "triangles" of forces, — strongly based, in a politically non-discriminatory fashion, on Japan's increasing contribution to the economic progress of the region.

Such is the general horizon, — against which Japan has until recently appeared quietist, or too concern with its own improving economic condition- to take any foreground role on the international stage. Now Japan is beginning to be forced to take a major part in Asian and world affairs. Interested countries try to draw Japan into "triangular" relationships, pointed in one direction or another; this Japan is essentially concerned to avoid. The countries of South-east Asia are most anxious that there should be no return of Japan to the militarist courses which brought them so much suffering and destruction in 1941-45.

As noted above, Japan has re-armed to a considerable extent — but only with "conventional" weapons as yet. These would enable some limited defensive action, if the Soviet Union or another Power moved to cut Japan's vital communications and block its exports and imports. They would be for short of a "deterrent", except perhaps, at the most, to pose for the USSR a choice between acting at once with nuclear weapons or not acting at all. At present the Japanese homeland itself is desperately vulnerable to nuclear attack, in which the USSR has a huge potential, and China is beginning to develop one. For that reason alone, an aggressive or "revanchist" Japan is not very likely to materialize in any near future, especially if Japan can rely on some substantial defence "cover" by the United States. If, however, a Sino-Soviet clash leads to attempts to block Japan's vital links with South-east Asia, or Japan's free passage within and through that area, or if the United States withdraws its general support for the integrity and independence of Japan, such maneuvers can only throw Asia back to the untenable situation that resulted in the Pacific War of 1941-45. A possible crux, from the Japanese point of view, might be a United States withdrawal from South Korea; the Japanese still regard the *status quo* in South Korea as essential to their security, — its undermining would alarm them greatly and force them to look to their defences.

Last, not perhaps least, it is necessary to consider internal pressures in Japan itself. Japan suffers from problems of industrial maturity, — high-level consumer society, of pollution, of techn logical and social adjustment, of the latest forms sophisticated corruption, e.g. the Lockheed scanda It will require a third Japanese economic and soci "miracle" (taking the first to have been Japar industrial revolution and modernization before Wor War II, and the second to have been the countr phenomenal advance after that War) to solve the latterday problems and show once again the Japane genius for adaptation. These problems generate sor extremist tendencies in the internal politics of Japa which are often in the news, though they actua represent only a small percentage of the populatio These extremist tendencies come both from the L and the Right (indeed there are also some hybrids both). The rival Communist systems, Russian a Chinese, spare no effort to encourage and promc the extremists on the Left. Thereby — as their ov dialectical philosophy should show them is inevitab — they succeed equally in nurturing the extremis of the Right.

Disruptive forces, generating from Peking a Moscow, work within nations, as well as setti nations into alignments against each other. Mu depends, for East Asia and the world, on Japa ability to avoid being steered or enmeshed into eit of the Communist super-Power strategies, and Japan's ability to continue as a main contributor the growth and progress of Asia.

TABLE 1 — JAPAN'S FOREIGN TRADE BY CONTINEN
(per cent, by value)

	Exports to:		Imports from:	
	Pre-war[a]	1974	Pre-war[a]	197
China	24%	4%	14%	2%
Other Asia	27%	28%	21%	45%
Total, Asia	51%	33%	36%	47%
EEC	4%	11%	7%	6%
EFTA	6%	3%	5%	1%
Other Europe	1%	3%	1%	2%
Total, Europe	11%	17%	13%	9%
North America	21%	26%	35%	25%
Latin America	4%	9%	3%	4%
Africa	8%	9%	4%	5%
Oceania	4%	5%	9%	8%
USSR	1%	2%	1%	2%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note: [a] 1934 - 36 average.

(per cent, by value)

EXPORT			IMPORTS		
	Pre-war[a]	1974		Pre-war[a]	1974
Textile products	57%	7%	Textile fibres	43%	3%
Machinery	5%	35%	Machinery	6%	7%
Fishery products	3%	—	Petroleum	6%	34%
Iron and Steel	2%	—	Lumber	—	6%
Ships	—	10%	Iron and Steel scrap	3%	—
Metal manufactureds	—	3%	Coal	—	5%
Optical instruments	—	3%	Crude rubber	—	2%
Others	33%	42%	Pulp	—	2%
			Copper ore	—	3%
			Cereals	—	4%
			Others	42%	34%
	100%	100%		100%	100%

Note: [a] 1934 - 36 average.

TABLE 3 — JAPAN'S TRADE WITH ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1964 AND 1974
(million US$)

To/From:	1964 Exports (% of all Japan's exports)	1964 Imports (% of all Japan's imports)	1964 Total (% of all Japan's trade)	1974 Exports (% of all Japan's exports)	Index, 1964 = 100	1974 Imports (% of all Japan's imports)	Index, 1964 = 100	1974 Total (% of all Japan's trade)	Index, 1964 = 100
Non-Communist Asia:									
South Korea	109 (1.6%)	42 (0.5%)	151 (1.0%)	2,656 (4.8%)	2437	1,568 (2.5%)	3733	4,224 (3.6%)	2797
Taiwan	138 (2.0%)	157 (1.9%)	295 (2.0%)	2,009 (3.6%)	1456	955 (1.5%)	570	2,964 (2.5%)	1005
Indonesia	121 (1.8%)	128 (1.6%)	249 (1.7%)	1,450 (2.6%)	1198	4,572 (7.4%)	3572	6,022 (5.1%)	2418
Singapore	114 (1.7%)	33 (0.4%)	147 (1.0%)	1,388 (2.5%)	1218	619 (1.0%)	1876	2,007 (1.7%)	1356
Hong Kong	292 (4.3%)	35 (0.4%)	327 (2.2%)	1,360 (2.4%)	466	273 (0.4%)	780	1,633 (1.2%)	499
Thailand	213 (3.2%)	131 (1.7%)	344 (2.4%)	951 (1.7%)	446	686 (1.1%)	524	1,637 (1.3%)	476
Philippines	191 (2.9%)	254 (3.2%)	445 (3.0%)	911 (1.6%)	477	1,105 (1.8%)	435	2,016 (1.7%)	453
Malaysia	59 (0.9%)	263 (3.3%)	322 (2.2%)	708 (1.3%)	1200	979 (1.6%)	372	1,687 (1.4%)	524
India	189 (2.8%)	139 (1.8%)	328 (2.2%)	595 (1.1%)	315	658 (1.1%)	473	1,253 (1.1%)	382
Pakistan	81 (1.2%)	31 (0.4%)	112 (0.8%)	226 (0.4%)	} 372	75 (0.1%)	} 290	301 (0%)	} 349
Bangladesh	—	—	—	75 (0.1%)		15 (0%)		90 (0%)	
Sri Lanka	23 (0.3%)	10 (0.1%)	33 (0.2%)	68 (0.1%)	296	31 (0%)	310	99 (0%)	300
Total	1,530 (23%)	1,223 (15%)	2,753 (19%)	12,397 (22.3%)	810	11,536 (18.6%)	943	23,933 (19.9%)	869
Communist Asia:									
China	153 (2.3%)	158 (2.0%)	311 (2.1%)	1,984 (3.6%)	1297	1,305 (2.1%)	826	3,289 (2.8%)	1058
North Korea	11 (0.2%)	20 (0.3%)	31 (0.2%)	252 (0.5%)	2290	109 (0.2%)	545	361 (0.0%)	1164
North Vietnam	3 (0%)	4 (0%)	7 (0%)	20 (0%)	667	30 (0.0%)	150	50 (0.0%)	714
Mongolia	0.5 (0%)	0.2 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0%)	—	1 (0.0%)	—	2 (0.0%)	—
Total	167 (2.5%)	182 (2.0%)	349 (2.4%)	2,257 (4.1%)	1351	1,455 (2.3%)	793	3,702 (3.1%)	1061
USSR	182 (3.0%)	227 (3.0%)	409 (2.8%)	1,096 (2.0%)	602	1,418 (2.3%)	265	2,514 (2.1%)	615
USA	1,842 (28%)	2,336 (29%)	4,178 (29%)	12,799 (23.0%)	695	12,682 (20.4%)	543	25,481 (21.7%)	610
World Total	6,673 (100%)	7,938 (100%)	14,611 (100%)	55,536 (100%)	832	62,110 (100%)	782	117,646 (100%)	805

Notes and References

1. *SPECTRUM*, Vol. 4, nos. 1-3.

2. Stuart Kirby, *Russia in Asia*, in *SPECTRUM*, Vol. 4, no. 1 (October 1975)

3. Figures used in this article are, throughout, from Japanese official sources in Tokyo, unless otherwise specified. It would be laborious to give detailed references at every point, but the following are the main sources: Prime Minister's Office, *Nippon Tokei Nenkan* (also in English as *Japan Statistical Yearbook*); Diet Library, *Kokkai Tokei Teiyo* (Statistical Abstract: in Japanese only); Bank of Japan, *Keizai Tokei Nempo* (English version, *Economic Statistics Annual*); Economic Planning Agency, White Papers, *Keizai Hakusho* (English version, *Economic Survey of Japan*); Ministry of Finance, *Nippon Boeki Nempyo* (English version, *Trade of Japan*); Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), *Kogyo Tokeihyo* (Census of Manufactures: in Japanese only); and MITI Yearbooks, in Japanese only, on the various industries (mining, iron and steel, electrical, machinery, chemical, textile, coal and paper).

4. Examples: Ratio of exports to Japan's production in 1971 and 1973: crude steel 35% in 1971, 28% in 1973; machine tools, 11% and 27% respectively; TV sets, 47% and 43% fans, 16% and 41%; textile machinery, 46% and 51% passenger cars, 38% and 35%; bicycles, 25% and 13% ships, 55% and 85%; ammonium sulphate, 64% and 46% tires and tubes, 30% and 40%; cameras, 63% and 80%; sy thetic fibre yarn, 19% and 15%; synthetic fabrics, 56% a 40%; cotton fabrics, 17% and 10%; porcelain, 29% a 18% (Source: MITI).

5. IMF, *International Financial Statistics;* OECD, *Developme Cooperation: 1974 Review.*

6. Yuan-li Wu, in *SPECTRUM*, Vol. 4, no. 2 (January-Mar 1976).

7. *Report* of MITI Committee for the Study of the Energy P blem, July 1974.

8. These topics have been widely discussed in newspapers a journals. For useful recent comments, see Robert Guilla *"Dealing Moscow out of the Game"* and *"Japan's Pac Role: backing away from equidistance"*, in *Le Monde* (Pa 11-13 February 1975); English translations in *Guardi Weekly*, 29 February and 7 March 1976.

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